







ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE;

OR,

OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC.

Dr. f.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

DR. FRANCIS *Theremin*,
M

BY

WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD.

WITH

AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

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
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TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE edition of this work published in 1850 has become exhausted, and the existing demand for it is such as to warrant its republication. The translator undertook the work primarily to supply a need which he felt for a text-book adapted to the more advanced class of students, and he has been encouraged to learn that other teachers have found the same adaptedness in it. The opportunity, afforded by a reprint, has been embraced, to attempt to explain and illustrate the leading position of the treatise, in an Introductory Essay, as well as to throw some more light upon the general subject of Rhetoric and Eloquence. The series of Questions, which has also been appended to this edition, will serve, it is hoped, to generalize the contents for the student, and thereby to assist him in getting possession of them. The work is again committed to the public, with the confident belief that its influence, wherever felt, will be truthful and salutary.



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P R E F A C E

T O T H E F I R S T E D I T I O N .

IT is believed that this little treatise upon Rhetoric possesses some characteristics which render it worthy of a place among the current English treatises on this subject. Perhaps no one will be ready to assent to all the positions laid down in it, and many may think that in its method and spirit it is altogether too foreign to our own modes of thought and expression, to be of any worth to the English student. Still, if used in the right way, it is thought that it may be made to contribute to a broad and thorough discipline in this department of culture. For no production, especially of a foreign mind, should be servilely received by the student, or allowed to exert an arbitrary and violent influence upon him. He should retain his own individuality and nationality in their most independent and determined forms, while, at the same time, he opens his mind and heart to all that is true and genial in a foreign literature. Non-intercourse is as impolitic and injurious in the world of contemplation, as it is in the world of action.

Moreover, the present state of Rhetoric, considered as one of the coördinate branches of discipline, to which the mind of the student is subjected in the course of liberal education, seems to call for the infusion of an element which may be found in this treatise of Theremin. Rhetoric, in its best estate, is but the science of Form, or to use Milton's phrase, an "organic," *i. e.*, instrumental, Art. It does not propose to furnish the material

of knowledge, but only to put the material, when furnished, into as fine and perfect forms as possible. Owing partly to this intrinsic nature of Rhetoric as an art, and partly perhaps to the excessively popular character which science and scientific statements have assumed in the present age, Rhetoric has become extremely superficial in its character and influence, so that the term "rhetorical" has become the synonyme of shallow and showy. Dissevered from Logic, or the necessary laws of thought, it has become dissevered from the seat of life, and has degenerated into a mere collection of rules respecting the structure of sentences and the garnish of expression.*

Any treatise, therefore, of which the tendency is to restore the connection between thought and its expression, cannot but be beneficial in its influence upon both the theory and practice of Eloquence. Even if it were constructed upon a false fundamental principle, and as a systematic whole were incorrect, still the mere effort to systematize the subject, the striving to ground it in something deeper and more solid than its own hollow forms, would not be without its salutary influence upon the art itself and the student. It would, at least, direct attention to the fact, that an art like Rhetoric should be based upon some science, and that its rules and maxims, in order to be efficient and influential, must be the off-shoots of principles lying deeper than themselves. It would point to the adaptation that really exists in the nature of things, and that ought actually to exist in practice, between an

* Lord Bacon remarks that it was an error in the educational course of his time, "that scholars in universities come *too soon* and *too unripe* to logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and novices: for these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the art of arts; the one for judgment, the other for ornament: and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter, and therefore for minds *empty and unfraught with matter*, and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth 'sylva' and 'supellex,' stuff and variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind,) doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerated into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation." — *Advancement of Learning, Book I.*

instrument employed by the human mind, and addressing itself to it, and the human mind itself.

The work of Theremin, whether it be true or false in substance, is, what it purports to be, a *systematic* Rhetoric. It does not begin with rules, and it does not, in starting, deal in minute observations upon minutiae ; but it begins with the Ideas which are conceived to underlie the whole subject, and to constitute the ground and soil from which the whole after-development and detail will naturally spring. It begins at the beginning, goes through the middle, and so arrives at the end.

Now there is power in such a method, apart from its contents. The course and movement of the system is according to nature. Commencing with the Matter, it proceeds to the Form, which is to take shape and character, and all its qualities, from that primitive material for whose sake alone it has any existence at all.

“ Well may men knownen, but it be a fool,
 That every part deriveth from his hool.
 For Nature hath not taken his beginning
 Of no partie ne cantel of a thing,
 But of a thing that parfit is and stable
 Descending so, til it be corruptable.” *

The whole tendency of such a theory of Rhetoric is to produce, in practice, masculine and thoughtful discourse. The student, if we may use the term, is headed right by it, and is taught to apply his best power to the evolution of truth and the production of thought in his own mind, not surely to the neglect of the Form in which it is to be expressed, but in order to the highest and most perfect elaboration of the Form. He is taught to be severe with himself, to forget himself in the theme, that he may exhibit it with that boldness and freedom of manner, that daring strength and grandeur of treatment, which is absolutely beyond the reach of him who is anxious respecting the impression he may make ; who, in short, is tormented by too much

* Chaucer, *Knights Tale*.

consciousness of self, at a time when he should be absorbingly conscious of the theme.

According to the theory here presented, the Oration, — meaning by this, every rounded and complete discourse, — is the evolution of an Idea, which is the germ and principle of the whole composition. Hence it is simple in its structure, and homogeneous in its character ; fitted to enlist the whole attention of the hearer, and to produce one distinct total impression.

Nothing can be of greater benefit to the student, than, in the very beginning of his intellectual life, to be habituated to compose in the light, and by the guidance, and under the impulse, of Ideas ; than to be enabled to discover those germinal truths which are pregnant with life, and which, when embodied with freedom and power in a discourse, constitute the ground-work of the finest creations of the human mind. And apart from the benefit which is to be derived from this habit and ability, for the practical purposes of Rhetoric, what a benefit is derived from it in respect to the private contemplations and enjoyment of the scholar ! Supposing he does not need this ability, because he is never called upon to speak or write to his fellow-men, (a supposition that is hardly to the credit of an educated man in this peculiar age, *) does he not need it, in order that his own mind may reach essential truth, and may, in its own reflections, follow the method and order of Reason ? In what a serene and constant illumination does that mind dwell, which is able in its meditations to find the fonsal truth as it were by instinct, and to unfold it by its own light, and in accordance with its own structure !

By such a theory the student is introduced into the world of Ideas, Laws and Principles, and is taught to begin with these, and from them to work out towards detail, elaboration and ornament. It is a mysterious world, it is true, and it must be, from the very fact that it is the source and origin. But it is the very

* “ Ob eamque causam eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est, quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare : quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibus cum communitate juncti sumus.” — Cicero, *De Officiis*, Lib. I. cap. 44.

office-work of thinking to convert these Ideas into clear conceptions ; to put these vast unlimited truths into definite and intelligible discourse ; in fine, in the strict meaning of the term, to *develop* truth.

He is the mystical and obscure discourser who leaves truth as he finds it ; who does not, by the aid of close thinking and a rigorous remorseless logic, compel the dark truthful Idea to yield up its secret ; who does not force the contents out of the all-comprehending law or principle. And he is the clear and intelligible discourser, in the only high sense of the term, — clear while solid, intelligible while weighty, — who, not starting in light to make things light, starts in darkness and works his way out into high noon. In both the Pagan and Christian cosmogonies, creation emerged from old night.

But if we are not mistaken, the theory presented in this work is true in its substance. It teaches that Eloquence is moral in essence ; that it has a moral origin, moral means and movement, and a moral end. It teaches, with what may seem pertinacity to some, that in its substance and its accidents, its primary laws and secondary rules, Eloquence is ethical.

This is not a new theory. As the author remarks, it was distinctly announced by the elder Cato, and mentioned with approbation by Quintilian, a critic whose exquisite taste often brought him to an indistinct intimation of truths, which a more profound genius would have brought out into distinct intuition. It has, moreover, been the tacitly-received theory of all the great minds, the really eloquent of the race. We have it on the authority of Cicero, * that “ *Socrates dicere solebat, omnes, in eo, quod scirent, satis esse eloquentes.* ” By this he could only mean, that the *moral* feeling and interest generated by clear *knowledge* of truth, is the ground of that methodical, earnest, and animating mental action which we denominate Eloquence, — a truth which may be found substantially, if not formally, falling from the lips of Socrates in the *Gorgias*. Add to this the decisive statement of

* *De Oratore*, I., 14.

Buffon, "Le style — c'est l'homme," which meets with an equally decisive response within us, together with the views of Eloquence left us in the remarkable fragments of Pascal, and we find that the theory in question is no newly broached one, but one that is unconsciously formed by the thoughtful and eloquent mind everywhere.

Most certainly the tendency and influence of such a theory of Eloquence must be good and elevating. Setting aside the fact, that if it be the true theory, it is the only one by the aid of which Eloquence can come into existence, it is the only *working* theory, it is most certainly a great point gained, if an art, so often supposed to be at furthest remove from earnestness, and seriousness, which is regarded too commonly as the art by which the ornaments are furnished when the solid and real work has been done, is shown to have its native seat and source in Ethics. The expression of thought by this theory becomes a sincere process, and the mind, while giving utterance to its reflections, is really contributing to the moral culture and development of the man. The productions of such a Rhetoric are marked by that grave and conscientious character which is the natural fruit of simplicity and sincerity in the mental processes. The influence of the theory is felt even in the language employed. It is no longer stiff, stilted, and aloof from the thought, but pliant, vital, and consubstantial with it.

Finally, it is believed that the theory of Eloquence here set forth harmonizes with the true theory of Art. Perhaps the greatest defect in many of the current treatises upon Rhetoric is the absence of correct views of the principles of Art. Oratory is claimed, (though not by Theremin,) to be one of the Fine Arts; and how, then, can a clue to its mystery and power be obtained without a philosophic knowledge of those laws and principles by which embodiment, whether in Nature or Art, is regulated and impelled?

We say *embodiment* whether in Nature or Art, because the method of each is essentially the same. In both, a creative Idea is the starting point and the guiding principle, and the movement

in both is free and original. A genuine work of Art is no more a copy or a mechanical production, than a work in Nature is. It is not the product of ingenuity improved by practice and experience, but of impulsive genius, and the same characteristics are found in it, according to the degree of its perfection as a work of Art, that are found in Nature. Indeed, we demand that a work of Art have Nature in it, *i. e.*, be original, fresh, living, glowing, breathing; a demand that would be unreasonable if there were no likeness at bottom between Art and Nature. As Nature, according to Sir Thomas Brown, is the Art of God, so Art is man's Nature, and sustains the same relation to the Finite mind that creation does to the Infinite.

By this is not meant, of course, that it sustains the same relation *materially*, but only *formally*. The work of Art is the creation of the finite imagination, in the sense that it is the embodiment and result of an Idea, a productive thought, which sprang from the innermost recesses of this human faculty. As Nature is the result and embodiment of divine Ideas, so Art is the result and embodiment of human Ideas. The two differ from each other as the Infinite differs from the Finite, but they are alike, as reason in man is the same in kind with reason in God. We say, then, that the work of Art is formally—*i. e.*, in respect to its origin from a productive Idea, and in respect to the plastic method of its construction,—like the work of Nature; that man, the Artist, works creatively, not in the absolute and highest sense of creating something out of nothing, in which sense God is the only creator, but in the secondary yet significant sense of embodying Ideas, of producing works to which the terms applied to the works of Nature find a natural and spontaneous application, the world over.

Now, it is evident that Rhetoric, whose office it is to guide the student into the right method of embodying his thought, and which is the very science of Form, should itself be formative, constructive, plastic. But how is such a Rhetoric possible, if the theory that is formed is not only not conformed to, but positively contradicts, the laws and principles of what, after the remarks

above made upon Nature and Art, may be denominated Universal Art? Plainly, then, it is only by a deep and true insight into the nature of Art, in its widest sense, that a system of Rhetoric can arise that will lead to the production of works appealing with power to the imagination as well as the intellect.

This treatise of Theremin, while it strictly distinguishes Eloquence, by virtue of its moral character and its external aim and end, from a merely artistic process, at the same time sufficiently recognizes the æsthetic element in it, and while, by some, the author might be thought to have carried out his theory too rigorously, and have shown too much fear lest the high ethical character of Eloquence should be suffered to lose itself in the lower sphere of mere Art, he has by this very thing imparted to Eloquence a still higher character and a still more energetic power. For by thus insisting that, while the means employed by Eloquence may be æsthetic, and the form in which it appears artistic, the great *end* constantly aimed at must be moral, and only moral, the author has furnished a Rhetoric that is not only formative and plastic, but *organific*, and has thus superinduced life upon the lifeless. Art in this case passes over into the production of living realities; the old fable of Pygmalion becomes actuality; the oration is not only a beautiful and faultless form, it is also a living soul.

The work has been translated mainly for the purpose of furnishing a text-book, to be used in a free reproductive manner in giving instruction in the department of Rhetoric. It is believed, however, that any one who shall make use of it, by entering into its spirit and method in a free and independent manner, will find more or less in it promotive of a sound way of thought, and a serious, deep-toned Eloquence.

THE TRANSLATOR.

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT, Nov. 24, 1849.

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY,

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

THE proper product of Rhetoric is Eloquence, and the purpose of a rhetorical education is to produce an eloquent thinker, and an eloquent writer or speaker. So far as it comes short of this, therefore, Rhetoric comes short of its true end.

Hence it becomes important to inquire, first of all, into the essential nature of Eloquence itself; and, particularly, to define it in such a manner as to detect all false products, and preclude all specious methods and models. For nothing exerts a more injurious influence upon the taste, the studies, and the mental habits of an educated man than a false idea of Eloquence. All educated men desire to be eloquent, and at times make greater or less effort to be so. An eloquent man is, universally, an object of admiration and of imitation. The idea of Eloquence is consequently one that exerts a highly formative and modifying influence upon both individual and national culture. When an educated man has been seized by this idea, when he has become possessed with the desire and the aim to influence public opinion by free and fluent speech, how wonderfully are all his thoughts, and feelings, and acquirements, pressed into the service of it. If he has the true idea, he almost invariably becomes eloquent; if he has the false idea, he invariably becomes over-ornamented, and glittering, and degenerates into inflation, and bombast,—so energetic and influential is the idea itself, whether truly or falsely apprehended. It enters the mind with an interest and influence peculiar to itself, and works there with all the potency of a plastic principle. The thought of becoming a phi-

losopher, or a poet, or an artist, or a man of science, when once formed, indeed exerts a controlling influence upon the whole intellectual life; but the thought of becoming an eloquent man, a man who "wields at will the fierce democracie and shakes the arsenal," exerts an overmastering influence, so that the mind either becomes the most passionate of the passionate, or else the feeblest of the feeble, according to the truth or falsity of its idea of Eloquence, and its ideal of an Orator.

I. In proceeding to discuss *the true nature and essential properties of Eloquence*, it is deserving of notice, that nearly as many definitions have been given of Eloquence, as of Poetry, and so far as a perfectly exhaustive definition is concerned, with about the same success. Perhaps no one definition that shall include all the essential qualities of what are strictly *vital* products of the human mind can be given. We must be content to reach the inward nature of Poetry, of Art, and of Eloquence, by approximations; by several definitions, each of which contemplates some particular aspect of the subject, and specifies some peculiar characteristic omitted by the others. The more mechanical and common products of the human understanding may often be clearly comprehended in a single conception, and fully defined in one statement; but its rarer, richer, and more living productions, such as Poetry and Eloquence, being more mysterious in their origin, are more difficult of comprehension, and consequently of definition. We may lay it down as a general rule, that in proportion as a product takes its origin in the more spontaneous, impulsive, and original agencies of the mind; in proportion as it is less the work of mere experience, and trial, like a product of useful art, or of mere memory and classification, like a manual of science; in proportion as its nature is living, and its origin is fresh, will it be more difficult to bring it within the limits of a concise and full definition. Like the definition of Life itself, the definition of Poetry, and Art, and Eloquence, must be an approximation only.

Socrates, according to Cicero,* was wont to say that all men

* *De Oratore*, I. 14.

speak eloquently when they have a thorough knowledge of their subject, and Cicero coincided with him in the affirmation. The duty and office of Rhetoric, and hence of Eloquence, according to Bacon,* is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. Style, says Buffon,— by which he means the style of Eloquence,— is the man himself; a definition corresponding with the remark of Pascal, that a simple and natural style, the eloquence of nature, enchants us with reason; for while we are looking out for an author we find a man. Eloquence, says D'Alembert,† is the ability to cause a sentiment, with which the mind is deeply penetrated, to pass with rapidity into the souls of others, and imprint itself there with force and energy. Eloquence, says Campbell,‡ adopting the definition of Quintilian, is that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end, and the end of discourse is to move the will.

If we examine these definitions we shall find that they all presuppose a common nature and properties in Eloquence, and are, all of them, approximate definitions of it. Neither of them is sufficient of itself to exhaust the subject,— perhaps all of them together are insufficient,— but they all look one way, and give the mind of the inquirer one general direction. They all teach or imply, that *truth* is the substance, and principle, of all true Eloquence,— *truth clearly perceived, deeply felt, and distinctly expressed*. Men are eloquent in proportion as they thoroughly know their subject, say Socrates and Cicero. Eloquence is truth all aglow and practically effective in a human soul, it is reason in the forms of the imagination in order to influence the will, says Bacon. It is the coöperation of the understanding with the imagination and the passions, in order to carry the will, say Quintilian and Campbell. Eloquence is truth felt and transferred to others, it is the transfer of the orator's consciousness into the auditor's consciousness, says D'Alembert.

All these definitions teach that plain *verity* is the substance of

* Advancement of Learning, Book II.

† Reflections sur l'elocution oratoire. Oeuvres, IV. 275.

‡ Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book I. Chap. I.

Eloquence, and that through the transformation which it undergoes by passing through an earnest and eloquent mind, its final effect is to *carry* the whole man, head, heart and will, along with it. This *carriage* of men's minds, this mental *movement* in speaker and hearers, this *streaming flow* of thought and feeling to an outward end, seems to be inseparably connected, in all these definitions, with Eloquence as different from other forms of discourse. While in the essay, the historical narrative, or the philosophical disquisition, the thought more or less moves in a circle, returning back upon itself, and thus forming a wider expanse, in the oration, the thought is ever rushing onward in a deep narrow channel, like a river to the main. We are speaking, of course, of an ideal or perfect oration; and bearing this in mind, we may say that in proportion as the mind of the orator is improgressive in its action, it ceases to be eloquent in its action and influence. A mind that is continually eddying; that is inclined to *dwell* long, either upon a particular thought, or upon the expression of it, either upon a bright idea, or a beautiful figure; must break up this habit, and overcome this disposition, before it can create that strong rushing current, that overwhelming, overbearing torrent in a discourse, which under the name of $\delta\epsilon\nu\sigma\tau\eta\varsigma$ the Greeks regarded as the height of Eloquence. By this term, which was applied particularly to the eloquence of Demosthenes, the Greeks intended to denote that overpowering *vehemence*, in the exercise of the mental powers, which results from a clear consciousness of the truth and the right, united with a glowing fiery interest for it. This vehemence of soul, this onward sweeping rush in a channel which the mind has worn into a subject, and which it is continually wearing deeper, is preclusive of all retrograde movements, and of all stationary attitudes. Even if the subject calls in a great amount of argumentative or explanatory matter, this *current* draws it all into its own volume, so that it accelerates rather than impedes its mighty flow. "In his oration for the crown," remarks one,* "Demosthenes must have had as

* Marsh's Remains; Tract on Eloquence.

cumbrous a satchel, as any bearer of the green bag in our courts of law. He brings forward a great mass of testimonies, written and oral laws of Athens, decrees of foreign towns and of the Amphictyonic council, and records of history, all exhibited and discussed with the utmost force and clearness. But through the whole process, there is an under-current and moving power of passion and eloquence that carries us forward to a final and unavoidable result. It is as though we were embarked upon a mighty river. All is animation and energy around, and we gaze with a momentary reverie upon the deep and transparent waters beneath. But even while we admire, the current grows deeper and deeper, and we are unconsciously hurried onward with increasing and irresistible power."

An eloquent mind, then, is a mind under motion. It is a mind moving forward, under the influence of clear knowledge and deep feeling, with constantly accelerated motion, and constantly increasing momentum, to a final end, which is always a practical one. Eloquence itself, then, is thought with an impulse in it, thought with a drift and rush in it. Eloquence is, as we instinctively denominate it, a *flood*. *

Without dwelling longer upon these definitions, and others that have been given of Eloquence, we proceed now to a consideration of that particular one, upon which Theremin founds his rhetorical system. Eloquence, says Theremin, is a *Virtue*. This definition differs from the others that have been quoted,

* "Hazlitt," says De Quincy, "was not eloquent, because he was *discontinuous*. No man can be eloquent whose thoughts are abrupt, insulated, and (to borrow an impressive word from Coleridge) non-sequacious. Eloquence resides not in separate or fractional ideas, but in the relation of manifold ideas, and in the mode of their evolution from each other. It is not indeed enough that the ideas should be many, and their relations coherent; the main condition lies in the *key* of the evolution, in the *law* of the succession. The elements are nothing without the atmosphere that moulds and the dynamic forces that combine. Now, Hazlitt's brilliancy is seen chiefly in separate splinterings of phrase or image which throw upon the eye a vitreous scintillation for a moment, but spread no deep suffusions of color, and distribute no masses of mighty shadow. A flash, a solitary flash, and all is gone."

more in appearance than in reality. It does not, as its author remarks, differ essentially from the definition given by the elder Cato, and handed down to us with approbation by Quintilian ; and it coincides with the general doctrine taught by the more profound writers upon Eloquence, in all ages,— all of whom have recognized the moral element as the essential one in this species of intellectual productions. Stated, however, in this brief and striking form, Eloquence seems to become identical with Morality, and the author in one place actually speaks of Rhetoric as a part of Morals.* By this, however, it is conceived he did not mean to imply that Eloquence is merely and simply a moral virtue, and is therefore sufficiently defined when it is put into the list of virtues, along with temperance, or honesty, or veracity. Perhaps the real meaning of the author would be more precisely expressed, by saying that Eloquence is an *intellectual* Virtue. It has a common origin with the moral virtues, in the resolute action of the moral force or character of the man, and, so far as the point of *ultimate origin* is concerned, may therefore be denominated virtuous, or of the nature of virtue. The theory of Theremin is, that all true Eloquence springs ultimately from integrity and strength of character ; that the principle and the power by which the several faculties of the mind concerned in the production of Eloquence are actuated and guided is a voluntary principle and power, and hence that the product, in its *ultimate* and *essential* nature, must be moral. Let us explain in detail, that the theory may be understood. In the production of an eloquent oration, the understanding, the imagination, and the feelings, are employed. By the first mentioned faculty, truth simple and abstract is presented to the understanding of the hearer. By the second, this same truth is taken out of this abstract and intellectual form, and put into an imaginative form for the imagination of the hearer. And by the feelings, it is again transmuted in order to awaken and stir emotion in the hearts of others. Now, it is plain that the excellence of the oration de-

* Book I., Chap. xiv.

pends upon the presence in it, of some power or principle that shall swallow up into the unity of its own life all these processes of the understanding, imagination, and feelings, and thereby become that vehement and terrible energy, which we have seen, according to the Greek definition, is the reality and vitality of Eloquence. The unity of the oration, moreover, depends upon the proportionate and harmonious exercise of these several faculties. Any excess in the functions of the understanding, e. g., will be to the injury of those of the imagination and the feelings. The oration, in this case, must either lose its unity, or else give up its oratorical character and pretensions, and be converted into a philosophic essay. And the same may be said (*mutatis mutandis*), in case of an excessive action of either of the remaining two faculties concerned in the production of Eloquence.

Now, that power by which each of these faculties is to be guided and governed, so that there shall be a just proportion and true harmony in their co-working, is the *will* of the orator. He is to repress an undue tendency to ratiocination, by moral determination. He is to repress an undue poetic tendency, by moral determination. He is to repress an undue pathetic tendency, by moral determination. And let it not be thought that only a slight and feeble exercise of the self-controlling power is needed in the origination of this so-styled *Virtue* of Eloquence; that but little moral energy and stern force of character is required in order to the highest eloquence. How often does it happen that the Oration degenerates (for in this reference it is degeneration) into the abstract Essay, or the over-ornamented Prose-Poem, solely because there was not enough of moral strength, not enough of *will*, in the orator, to compel all his acquisitions, and all his tendencies, into subservience of that practical end, the actuation of his hearers, which is the ultimate end of Eloquence. Often, as much self-control is needed to mortify a strong logical propensity, in order that it may not damage or destroy a rhetorical process, as is needed in order to mortify a lust of the flesh. And still more often, as much force of character is needed to restrain a luxuriant imagination, in order that it may not clog and stop the on-

ward movement of the oration by excessive illustration and ornament, as is needed in order to restrain an animal passion. In short, that vanity, that self-feeling, which would draw off the orator from the *practical end* of his discourse to the undue display of his logic, if his mind is predominantly philosophic, or to an undue employment of the poetic element, if his nature is predominantly imaginative, requires for its conquest and extirpation, precisely the same kind of moral force, force of will, that is needed in the suppression of vice, or in the formation of any of the strictly so-called virtues.

Now, it is in this reference that Eloquence is styled a Virtue. So far as the principle from which it proceeds, and the impulse by which it is impelled, are concerned, Eloquence is Ethical, rather than Philosophic, or Aesthetic. It is the position of Theremin, that Eloquence is more strictly of the nature of Virtue, than of the nature of Science, or of the nature of Fine Art. Its essential quality and properties, he contends, are more properly ethical than scientific or artistic. Neither a scientific nor an artistic talent can become the living fountain of Eloquence. Only a moral force can. Although both a philosophic and an artistic process properly and necessarily enter into that complex mental action of which Eloquence is the product, yet neither of them is the *fundamental process*. We must look for this in the moral process which springs out of the character of the orator; which involves his earnestness, his sincerity, his honesty of conviction, his consciousness of the truth, and his love for it. These moral elements must first exist, or there can be no Eloquence. In the same sense, then, that the orator, according to Cato and Quintilian, is a good man, is Eloquence a Virtue. Not that every good man is eloquent, or that every virtue is *ipso facto* Eloquence (though we often say of the Virtues, as they shine out in human character, that they are eloquent); but no man is eloquent who is destitute of moral force of character, and no discourse is eloquent that is not pervaded with a moral earnestness that is higher than any mere scientific talent or aesthetic feeling.

The truth which there is in Theremin's definition may be

seen, again, by considering the difference between an Oration and a product of Fine Art. According to the theory of Theremin Eloquence is not strictly a Fine Art. It is no more one of the Fine Arts because it contains an aesthetic element, than it is one of the Sciences because it contains a philosophic element. It is taken out of the department of mere and pure Art, by the *practical and outward end* which it has in view. For if there is anything settled in the theory of Art, it is, that an aesthetic product has no practical end out of itself. Art, as such, has no utility, nor morality. Its productions exist for themselves, and not for any object other than themselves. We must not go beyond them, and look for a practical or beneficial influence exerted by them upon the minds of men, in order to decide whether they are excellent in their kind or not. Hence Art cannot become Religion, or even Morality. If a painting or a sculpture is beautiful, we cannot deny it *artistic* excellence. Whether it is useful, or whether it is moral, are questions for Philosophy and Religion, but not for Art. The Artist, unlike the Philanthropist, or the Orator, works for his own gratification solely. His work has no end but the embodiment of a beautiful idea. As an Artist *merely*, he is indifferent to the practical effects that may result. The work of Art is addressed solely to the aesthetic sense. If it were addressed to the cognitive powers, solely, it would be a scientific work. If it were addressed to the moral or religious nature, solely, it would be a religious work.

It is true, indeed, that a production of Fine Art may make a moral impression, and as matter of fact the highest works in this department invariably do. It is true that the Apollo may elevate the soul of the beholder, and the Madonna may soften and humanize it, but neither of them, *as works of Art*, owed their origin to any such practical and moral aim. Fine Art is its own end. It is self-sufficing, self-included, and irreferent. If it has ever contributed to the intellectual or moral improvement of man, this was a happy accident, and not a predetermined and foreseen result.

But that Morality, which thus stands in no inward and neces-

sary connection with Art, constitutes the very essential principle of Eloquence. The Oration, unlike a painting or a statue, aims to exert a moral influence upon a moral agent. It seeks to work a change, more or less deep and extensive, in the state of man's active powers, employing his cognitive and imaginative faculties as mere means and media. The Orator cannot, like the Artist, isolate himself from all outward circumstances, and find the goal of his efforts in the serene and complacent embodiment of his idea in a form of Beauty, without troubling himself in the least about the influence he may exert. The Orator is a man of moral influence, and of moral impression, upon moral agents, or he is nothing. If, then, the term Virtue denotes, generally, a product of the *will*, and not of the intellect merely, or the imagination merely,—is not Eloquence a Virtue? If that agency of the soul be virtuous, or of the nature of Virtue, which has an outward aim,—the aim, *viz.*, to exert a legitimate influence upon the character and actions of men,—is not Eloquence a Virtue? Is not this earnest, moral, and practical product of the human mind much more properly denominated a Virtue than an Art?

To place the definition given by Theremin in another aspect, we may say that Eloquence is an *intellectual* Virtue. It is the action of the understanding and imagination, when these are under the sway of the moral will. When the understanding merely follows its own structure and laws; when its action is unmodified by any reference to an auditor, or to an outward impression upon other minds; the product is Logic, and this action of the understanding is scientific. When the imagination merely follows its own nature and law, the product is Poetry, or some other work of Fine Art, and this action of the mind is aesthetic. In both of these instances the mental faculty is left to its own guidance and impulse. The will exercises no modifying influence in either case, and consequently there is no moral element, nothing virtuous or of the nature of Virtue, in these species of intellectual activity. It is true that the subject matter of both Philosophy and Art may be moral, but the mental

process itself cannot be so characterized. It is a purely spontaneous process, not deriving its quality in the least from the voluntary power, from the *character* of the individual, or even being in the least modified by it. The process in the one case is purely logical or scientific, and in the other purely artistic.

But Eloquence has a different origin from either Science or Art. It results, not from the isolated action of a particular faculty, like the understanding, or the imagination, but from the interpenetration and coöperation of all the mental powers, under the sway and actuation of the voluntary force. The *degree* in which each faculty shall work, as we have already remarked, is fixed by the determination of the orator, and the acme of Eloquence is seen in the rush, in one resistless volume, of all the cognitive, imaginative, and pathetic powers in the unity of the moral will. The combined action of these powers, in this instance, unlike their isolated action in the production of the philosophic Essay, or the Poem, is moral, and therefore of the nature of virtue. The will interpenetrates the logical and imaginative processes in the mind of the orator, and thus renders them ethical. Eloquence in this aspect, is seen to be the virtuous action of the human *intellect*, as distinguished from that virtuous action of the isolated human will, to which the term "virtue" is more strictly and commonly applied. There is voluntary action in both cases, and hence the epithet "virtuous" belongs to both; but in the case of a virtue, commonly so called, the action is confined to the will itself, while in the case of Eloquence it is action of the will *in* and *by* the powers of understanding, imagination, and feeling. The virtue of patience, e. g., is the product of the isolated action of the will, just as logic is the product of the isolated action of the understanding. Patience is the product of the will operating upon itself, subduing its own restiveness, and therefore is simply a particular habit of the will. But the virtue of Eloquence is the product of the will as it operates upon, and *in*, other mental faculties, for the purpose of exerting an influence upon the will of others. Eloquence is reason and imagination and feeling wrought into a

living synthesis by the vitality of a will,—by the force of a strong, deep, and earnest *character*.

There is less difficulty, therefore, in understanding this definition of Theremin, and in adopting it, if we do not take the term “virtue” in its more limited and common signification, but in its widest sense, as denoting a product into which the moral strength of the individual, his force of character, enters as the fundamental quality. And such we suppose to be the essential nature of Eloquence. If we are required to locate it, we think there are fewer objections to placing it within the province of practical Ethics, than in that of abstract Science, or in that of aesthetic Art. As Theremin affirms, that theory will be most successful, will explain most phenomena and exert the most beneficial influence upon the student, which assumes that the practical and moral element in Eloquence is the fundamental and denominating one, and that the philosophic and aesthetic elements are subsidiary to this. We know that the Ancients, from whom it is not generally safe to differ upon subjects like the one which we are considering, regarded Eloquence as one of the Fine Arts, and assigned it a place in the list along with Poetry, and Painting, and Sculpture; and the Modern world has generally acquiesced in their classification. And yet the rhetorical treatises of Aristotle, of Longinus, of Cicero, and of Quintilian, contain much that is irreconcilable with this theory. Unconsciously, the doctrine that Eloquence is at bottom neither speculatively philosophic, nor imaginatively aesthetic, but practically moral, creeps into these treatises, and exerts a modifying influence throughout. And it is the merit of Theremin, as it seems to us, that he has *systematized* this ethical view of Eloquence,—that he has organized these materials scattered here and there through all the best treatises on the subject, and wrought them into the unity of a consistent theory. Instead of defining Eloquence to be a Fine Art, and then, under the instinct and impulse of good sense and sound feeling, beating off and away from the definition, until it is perfectly apparent that there has been a mistake in the outset, and that Eloquence has received

a wrong *location*, this author affirms distinctly that it is not a Fine Art, but that it is (for want of a better term) a Virtue. Starting with this position as the basis of his theory, he is not troubled, as were the ancient Rhetoricians, by a conflict between his theory and its detailed unfolding and application. He is not compelled to those statements respecting the necessity of character, of integrity and sincerity and earnestness, in the orator, the necessity of subjecting everything in the oration to a practical outward end, and of subordinating Philosophy and Art themselves to the moral purposes of Eloquence, which are irreconcilable with the definition that makes Eloquence a Fine Art. On the contrary, these statements which suggest themselves so unconsciously, and spontaneously, as actually to override the false theory that has been assumed by the Rhetorician, are merely *corroborations* of the ethical theory of Eloquence. As they grow out of it, so they return back into it; like vigorous shoots, which by inarching are made to contribute to the vigor and strength of the parent stock.

The truthfulness of the ethical theory of Eloquence is still farther evinced, and illustrated, by a consideration of its influence upon the Orator. Here its excellence and value appear in plain view. Here is the place of its triumph. For even if an opponent should be able to make a stand, while discussing the nature of the theory itself, and to raise objections that are forcible, and difficult to remove, yet when its practical application, and practical influence, comes into consideration, the defender of the theory may speak with boldness and confidence. He really has the entire history of the department in his favor. All those forcible and impressive statements, in Ancient and Modern treatises upon Rhetoric, which lay emphasis upon the moral elements in Eloquence, and in the Orator himself,—statements which fall glowing from the mind of the theorist, when, having for a moment left his speculative theory behind him, he speaks more from the common feeling, and the common sentiment, of mankind at large upon this subject,—all such statements, we say, come thronging in upon the mind, when it is considering the practical influence of

the theory in question. The advocate of the ethical theory feels that all these statements legitimately belong to *him*, and to him alone; that they are but the practical and informal enunciation of his own speculative and formal theory. When he hears Quintilian define the Orator to be “*an upright man who understands speaking*,” he thinks he hears a concrete annunciation of the abstract position that “*Eloquence is a Virtue*,” and believes that, in the establishment of his theory, he has only applied an affirmation to *Oratory* itself, which long ago was applied to the *Orator*. Supported thus, as he is, by the spontaneous and unbiassed opinions of theorizers themselves, he is the more confident in his belief that the actual application of the ethical theory of Eloquence will only serve to verify it, and its practical influence to recommend it, in the very highest degree.

1. The influence of the ethical theory of Eloquence is most excellent, in the first place, upon *the studies of the Orator*.

It is the natural tendency of that theory of Eloquence which defines it to be a Fine Art strictly, to isolate *Oratory* from the real sciences, and the solid acquirements of the orator. The eye is too intently fixed upon Form, and the secondary properties of discourse, because it is assumed that the *ultimate* end of Eloquence, like that of any other Fine Art, is Beauty. The studies of the *Orator*, consequently, will take their main direction from this theory, and he will bestow undue attention upon those departments of human knowledge, and those species of literature, which have more affinity with the idea of the Beautiful, than with the ideas of the True and the Good. These higher ideas will be made to take a secondary place in his mind, and his culture will be characterized more and more by superficiality, and lack of vigorous strength. He will become more and more interested in works of Art, and the lighter forms of Literature, and less and less interested in Science, Philosophy, and Theology.

But the natural tendency of that theory of Eloquence which regards it as essentially moral rather than aesthetic, which sets up for it an outward and practical end, and does not for an instant allow it an *artistic* indifference in respect to an outward and prac-

tical impression, which connects Eloquence far more with the ideas of the True and the Good than with the idea of the Beautiful,— the natural tendency, and strong direct influence, of *such* a theory of Eloquence is to promote the graver and higher studies in the Orator. The more profound and central powers of the mind will be continually exercised, and thus the foundation for a powerful and impressive mental activity will be laid. Such an Orator, like Pericles of old, will study and meditate upon the dark problems of philosophy and religion, and while, like the patron of Phidias and the decorator of Athens, he will not by any means be indifferent to Beauty and to Art in their proper place, he will yet derive that commanding and overwhelming eloquence, that Olympian power attributed to the great Grecian, from these loftier themes, these more profound departments of human inquiry and effort.*

2. Again, the influence of that theory of Eloquence which regards it as ethical, rather than either scientific or æsthetic, is most excellent, in respect to *the models of the Orator*.

The general influence of the ethical theory of Eloquence upon the *taste* is to render it strict and pure. The Orator whose mind has been moulded by it, naturally selects models from the very highest range of Oratory, and thereby feels the very choicest influence of the department. His models, consequently, are few in number, but they are such as can never be outgrown and left behind in his onward progress. A single model like Demosthenes contains, for the mind that is prepared for it by a strict and high theory of Eloquence, more educational power than myriads of inferior models. Such a model is a standard and permanent one.

* Soc. Κινδυνεύει, ὃ ἄριστε, εἰκότως δὲ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι. Phaed. Τι δή; Soc. Πᾶσαι δύσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν, προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι. τό γὰρ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ τό πάντη τελεσιουργικὸν ἔοικεν ἐντεῦθεν ποδὲν εἰσιέναι. δέ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυῆς εἶναι ἐκτήσατο. προσπεσὼν γάρ, οἷμαι, τοιούτῳ ὅντι Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς, καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος (ῶν δή πέρι τὸν πολὺν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας) ἐντεῦθεν εἴλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τό πρόσφορον αὐτῷ.—Phaedrus, 270.

But in order that the first-class models may be apprehended and appreciated, a severe taste must have been engendered in the student. He must have been so disciplined by a high theory that he has acquired an indifference towards second-rate productions, and a positive disrelish for those more glaring and showy qualities which are found in works that are for a day only, and not for all time. He must have attained such an intellectual temper, such a style and tone of literary culture, as can find pleasure only in those calmer, grander, and loftier efforts which do not so much strike and startle by their brilliancy, as develop and stir the human soul by their depth, fervor, and power.

Now, the theory in question tends directly to the production of such an intellectual taste in the Orator. It is a high and austere theory. It is a theory which checks extravagance, and prunes luxuriance, by subjecting the whole oratorical process to the restraints of ethics. It subordinates the beauty of poetry, and even the truth of philosophy, to the practical ends of morality. If there is any danger in the theory, it is in the direction of severity and intense truthfulness. If there is any error in the theory, it is upon the safe side. It cannot be denied that the entire influence of it is to induce such mental habits, such mental tastes, and such a mental tone, as both prepare the student for a genial appreciation of the highest models, and a free and original reproduction of them. The mind which has been developed and trained by the ethical theory of Eloquence will prefer Demosthenes to Aeschines, Cicero to Hortensius, Massillon to Bossuet, Mirabeau to Lamartine, Burke and Fox to Sheridan and Phillips.

But the excellence of the influence exerted by the theory in question, in rendering the taste pure and strict, is seen more particularly in reference to current productions, and current styles and schools. The principal danger to which the Rhetorician or the Orator is exposed, arises from the influence of contemporaneous Rhetoric and contemporaneous Eloquence. Dazzling and brilliant, but superficial and transitory, products, always have their day; and during their day, minds that have not been highly trained are taken captive by them. Such minds become copyists and

mannerists ; and copyists and mannerists never are, and never can be, eloquent. But a pure taste, and a genuine relish for the excellences of those great masters and models which like the sun are always the same in all ages, is an infallible preservative against this pernicious influence of contemporaries. There is a strength and reserve in that intellectual character which has been formed by high theories, by the contemplation of grand ideals, which no storm of popular applause, no fury of fashion, can overcome or exhaust. Such a mind is self-possessed, and self-reliant. Such a mind is eagle-eyed, and critical. Such a mind calmly stands the glare of false Rhetoric and false Eloquence, while the weak, unarmed eye of the half-educated is dazzled and blinks. This austere judgment, this clear calm criticism, looks by and beyond all the showy and gaudy products that are temporarily bewitching the popular taste, to those serene, grand, and absolutely beautiful Forms, the *Dii majorum gentium*, in all the great literatures of the Past and the Present, and in them alone finds its models, and upon them alone expends its enthusiasm.

II. Having thus discussed the nature of Eloquence, we proceed, in the remainder of this Essay, to consider *the general nature of Rhetoric*, and particularly *its position and influence in the system of liberal education*.

In passing to the consideration of that branch of discipline whose object it is to produce and promote Eloquence, we are struck in the outset with the fact that it has ever been regarded an essential part of a symmetrical system of education. If we look into the ancient world, all culture seems to have culminated in Rhetoric and Oratory. The whole end and aim of study, even in other and higher departments, appears to have been to make the educated man a Rhetorician, — using the term in its best and technical signification. The goal had in the eye, during the whole of his education, by the young Athenian, or the young Roman, was the bema or the rostrum. It was thought that unless culture enabled the mind to give expression to itself, to reveal and embody its knowledge in a form that would impress and influence other minds, it was worthless. Hence even philosophy was

made subservient to oratory, as in the example of Pericles, who studied under Anaxagoras, one of the most subtle of the Greek philosophers, in order to prepare himself for the practical life of a statesman and orator. The walks of the Academy and Lyceum led directly to the Agora and the Forum.

In Grecian and Roman education, consequently, Rhetoric occupied a high position. It was not only a distinct department, but one of great influence. Genuine rhetorical power, the ability to express and impress, was regarded as the last and highest accomplishment of the educated citizen. And the same holds true, to a considerable extent, of the system of education in vogue in the modern world. If Rhetoric, within the last hundred years, has somewhat sunk down from its former "pride of place," it is mainly because of the false view that has been taken of its essential nature, and the false method in which it has been taught. During the two centuries that succeeded the revival of learning, however, its claims were never higher, or more willingly allowed. The minuteness of detail, and, we may add, the comprehensiveness on the whole of outline, exhibited by the rhetorical treatises composed two hundred years ago, are ample evidence that then, at least, there was no disposition to undervalue this branch of discipline. Indeed the over-estimate which came to be put upon it, together with the dry and mechanical method into which the somewhat formal, and yet substantially sound, rhetoric of Aristotle had degenerated, contributed to that reaction which followed, and which for the last hundred years has led to an under-estimate of the whole department. Yet Rhetoric is still honored in that system of instruction by which the modern mind is being educated. Rhetoric is still one branch of human learning, one department of instruction; and whenever it is pursued in the spirit, and by the method, which its own real nature and distinguishing characteristics prescribe, it is still found to minister to the sound and vigorous development of the mind.

In discriminating the distinctive nature of Rhetoric, and in assigning it its position in the curriculum of discipline, it is

necessary in the first place to direct attention to that generic classification of the sciences which so greatly assists the investigator in locating any particular one of them.

Human knowledge may be divided into two grand divisions, which very exactly and conveniently distinguish the immense variety that enters into this great sum-total. Knowledge is either material or formal.* A *material* department of knowledge is one in which the matter is primary, and the form is secondary. A *formal* department is one in which the form is primary, and the matter secondary. The *material* sciences have also been termed *real* sciences, to denote that in them the reality or substance of human knowledge is to be found. For the *formal* sciences are not independent, and self-sufficient. They have no positive character, no substantial contents of their own, such as the material or real sciences have. They derive all the interest and worth they possess from their connection with these latter. They exist only for these latter; because the form exists only for the substance, the manner for the matter.

Take those portions of the general department of Philosophy which go under the names of Physics and Ethics, as examples of branches of *material* or *real* knowledge, and consider what they contain. Here we have no hollow and empty divisions which must be filled up from other divisions in order that they may have solidity; no mere *form* of knowledge, to be filled up with knowledge itself. Natural and Moral Philosophy have each substantial contents of their own. The nature and operations of the

* "All rational knowledge is either *material*, and contemplates some one object, or *formal*, and is occupied merely with the forms of the understanding, and of the reason itself,—with the universal laws of thinking generally without regard to the objects of thought. Formal philosophy is denominated *Logic*; but material philosophy, which has to do with determinate objects, and the laws and principles to which they are subjected, is twofold. For these laws are either laws of *Nature* or of *Spirit*. The science of the first is denominated *Physics*, that of the latter is *Ethics*; the former is also termed the doctrine of *Nature*, the latter the doctrine of *Morals*." — *Kant's Practical Reason (Vorrede.)*.

human mind, and of the Divine Mind, so far as it is cognizable by man, and the laws and principles of the material world, — these and such like are the subject matter of these two subdivisions of real science. In whatever direction the moral or natural philosopher advances, he meets with real entities and essences ; he is occupied with substantial verities. Truth itself, fact itself, and thought itself, is the staple and substance of his investigations. The *form* is for him an altogether secondary thing ; the *matter* is everything. He does not ask, “*how* is it ?” but “*what* is it ?”

But take again the department of Logic, and we have a branch of *formal* knowledge. The logician establishes no one particular truth, but merely shows how any truth may be established. He does not exhibit the actual contents of the human mind, its ideas, sentiments, and beliefs, but only those laws of mental activity in accordance with which these contents are *formed*. It is not the province of Logic to exhibit thought itself, but only the process of thinking. Logic generates no fountain of living waters ; it merely indicates the channel in which they must flow, if they flow at all. In investigating such departments as Physics and Psychology, we are occupied with the *Real*, — with truths that are matters of actual consciousness, or actual intuition ; with the contents of our own minds. But in studying such a subject as Logic, we are occupied with the *Formal* — with the mere abstract notions and forms of the understanding ; with the ways in which, rather than the things which, it perceives.

To see the distinction in question still more clearly, compare an entire department like Fine Art with an entire department like Science or Religion. The end and aim of Art is to embody some Idea in a Form suited to express it. With the nature and origin of this Idea it does not concern itself. It takes it as it finds it, and leaves the analysis and investigation of its interior structure to the philosopher or the theologian. The artist may, it is true, contemplate this subject matter of his Art philosophically, or theologically, but only in subordination to the purposes of his profession ; only in order to be able to clothe the Idea in a more beautiful Form. He does not, like the votary of the real

sciences, rest in the subject matter, being satisfied with having unfolded and developed the truth in his own mind; he cannot rest until he has given expression to it in an outward embodiment. Hence we say that Fine Art is *formal* in its nature and character. It subordinates everything to this its ultimate and constituent end. For it, the material is secondary.

In reference then to this general division of the various departments of human knowledge and inquiry, Rhetoric is a formal department. It is the science of Form, so far as human discourse is concerned. It is an "organic" art, as Milton terms it; * an art which furnishes the organ or instrument for communicating thought most effectively to other minds. Rhetoric, strictly speaking, is not to supply the matter, the thought itself, but is to put the material when supplied into as appropriate and fine forms as possible. The thought itself of the Rhetorician must be drawn from deeper fountains than those of Rhetoric. If by thorough collegiate and professional training he has not first filled his mind with the materials for discourse, rhetorical training and preparation will only disclose his emptiness. From the *material* departments of human knowledge, from the *real* sciences, he must have first acquired a profound and comprehensive culture, before he is qualified to become a Rhetorician.

Rhetorical discipline being thus formal in its nature presupposes on the part of the student a preparation for it. It postulates a full mind and a full heart. It takes the individual at that point in his course of education when the materials have been originated by other methods of discipline, when they are in a stir and fermentation, struggling for utterance and demanding an outflow, and teaches him *delivery*, — teaches him the method of embodying these conscious and living contents of his mind, in rounded and symmetrical forms. If, therefore, Plato had reason for writing over the door of his Academy, "let no one who is not a geometrician enter here," the Rhetorician has equal reason

* Tract on Education.

for inscribing upon the rostrum, "let no one ascend here, who is not a scholar and a thinker."

It is of great importance here to observe the fact, that although Rhetoric is a formal department of knowledge, it must not be isolated from the real sciences, either in theory or practice. This has been the error in this department for the last century. That part of Rhetoric which is termed Invention,— that part which treats of the supply of thought,— has been greatly neglected in many modern treatises, so that the whole art has degenerated into a collection of rules relating to expression, or Elocution, merely. The Rhetorician has been too exclusively occupied with the externals of his subject. No grand and vital Eloquence can originate on a theory which in this manner separates the form from the matter, the style from the thought. As in the natural world there is no growth and no fruit except as the living principle and the outward form constitute a unity, an identity of existence, so in the intellectual world the idea and the form in which it is manifested must inhere in each other, and interpenetrate each other, in order to real excellence of any sort. The student cannot therefore cultivate thinking by itself, isolated from the expression of his thoughts; neither can he cultivate the expression of thought isolated from the process of thinking. Both processes, the philosophical and the rhetorical, must proceed *pari passu*, and simultaneously, and the result be a unity that is neither wholly formal nor wholly material in its nature. An oration considered as a rhetorical product does not consist of thought alone, any more than of expression alone. It is thought *and* expression, matter *and* form, in one common identity. Pure thought, alone and by itself, exists only in the conscious mind. Pure form, alone and by itself, exists no where. It is a mere notion or abstraction of the understanding, to which there is no objective correspondent. A *mere* form is a ghost, and a ghost possesses neither being nor reality.

Now, by virtue of this intercommunication of Rhetoric with all the solid material branches of knowledge, it stands mid-

way between the pure sciences and the practical arts. It is neither wholly speculative, nor wholly practical. It is a most intimate and thorough mingling of these two qualities. Rhetoric serves, therefore, as a bond of connection between the more abstract branches, and the plain practical knowledge of common life. It is the mediator between the recondite theories of the philosopher, and the simple, spontaneous thinking of the uneducated man. What indeed is the orator, or the discourser generally, but a man who stands midway between the schools and the market place, and interprets the one to the other; a man whose function it is to give such an expression to the lore of the learned world, as will impress and influence the unlearned world? The orator, the discourser generally, is a middle-man, who brings these two great halves, the lettered and the unlettered, together, and thus contributes to that collision of mind with mind, which is the life and soul of human literature, and of human history. For it is this *communication* of thought, which is ever going on, that keeps the world alive and stirring. Mere pure thinking, that never found an utterance of itself, by tongue or pen, even if such a thing could be, would leave the world as dull and motionless as it found it. It is the *expressed* thought, the *written* or the *vocalized* idea, that stirs and impels the general mind.

Having, in this brief manner, directed attention to the distinction between the formal and real sciences, and having assigned to Rhetoric its place among the former, at the same time also observing its vital connection with the latter, we proceed in the remainder of this Essay to specify some of the advantages of this method of contemplating the general subject. .

1. In the first place, upon this method, the department obtains an accurate definition, and is confined to its own just limits.

There was once a time when Rhetoric was made to include vastly more than properly belongs to it; when indeed it was more like an encyclopædia of all arts and sciences, than a limited and specific branch of knowledge. Rhetoric, at one time, was almost as comprehensive a term as Philosophy is at the present day. The effect of this was to distract the mind by a

multiplicity of topics, and to preclude that singleness of aim, and unity of pursuit, which is the foundation of all good discourse. Such a variety and complexity as is exhibited by some of the mediaeval treatises upon Rhetoric, is destructive of all distinctness, neatness, and elegance of form. A style formed by such an instrument must be in the highest degree loose, rambling, and unrhetorical. As matter of fact, the composition which was the fruit of such rhetorical training is generally devoid, not merely of true grace and ornament but, of the more necessary qualities of good writing, perspicuity and vivacity. Sentences are constructed in the most clumsy manner; involved, parenthetic, and incomplete to the last degree; while the general style of the whole is heavy, dragging, and dull.

The defect in these treatises is the lack of a close and clear definition in the outset, of the nature of the Art itself. It was really regarded as a *material* branch of knowledge; and hence it was the duty of the Rhetorician to give positive instruction upon nearly all subjects. Inasmuch as the Orator needs all the knowledge he can possibly obtain; inasmuch as Eloquence can successfully employ a greater amount of information than any other department, not excepting even that of History; it was supposed to be the business of Rhetoric, and of the Rhetorician, to furnish it all. Hence the department, as we have remarked, become virtually an encyclopædia; not merely a material science, but all material science in one mass; the *omne scibile* itself. But such, we have seen, is not its nature. It is strictly, and really, a *formal* science. Its final end is simply to express, to communicate, to embody; and the more rigorously this is held to be the essential character of Rhetoric, the finer will be the forms and styles of composition that come into existence. No sharply-drawn outlines, no distinct definitions, no clean and clear developments, no round and full statements, can originate from a Rhetoric that is unlimited and undefined in its own nature. If Rhetoric includes everything, and is to furnish everything, then discourse will contain everything, and be full of everything. If, on the other hand, the term is strictly defined,

and the eye of the student is kept steadily directed to the production of a pure and noble *form*, for the materials with which his mind has been stored by other sciences, and other disciplines, then there will arise “a form and combination indeed,” a style and manner fit to be a model.

2. In the second place, this view of the nature and relative position of the department of Rhetoric protects it from a lifeless formality.

No branch of human knowledge is so liable to a dead formalism as Rhetoric. By its very definition, it is obliged to make the form, in distinction from the substance, the appropriate and final end of its investigations and instructions. It is not surprising, consequently, that this formal and formalizing tendency should become too strong in the course of time, and that Rhetoric should become a feeble and artificial department, instead of a vigorous and creative one. Human nature is hypocritical. Its tendency is to the form rather than to the substance; to the show rather than to the reality. This characteristic is not confined to the moral side of man's nature. It enters very largely into his intellectual being. Indeed, the effects of the apostasy are as plainly to be seen in the human intellect, as in the human heart. What is this formality, this lack of sincerity and genuineness, in our mental processes, but the effect of a corruption that has vitiated the mind, as well as the heart? If we closely examine ourselves, we shall find an absence of veracity, of integrity, of godly simplicity and sincerity, to be as marked and evident in our intellectual, as in our moral condition. The whole *head* is sick.

Now, when a department of human knowledge, by its very metaphysical nature, and vocation, falls in with this corrupt tendency of man's nature, it is no wonder that its history should be marked by degeneracy; that it should constantly grow more and more formal, and ungenuine, in its own nature and influence. When the theoretic definition harmonizes with the practical bent, when high abstract science is in unison with an actual tendency of man's nature, it is not surprising that the development, unchecked and unmodified by other agencies, should be in the

highest degree false and fatal. If the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch.

The history of Rhetoric, and we may add of the whole department of Fine Art, proves and illustrates the truth of this remark. We find in every nation which had an Eloquence, and an Art, one period of fresh powerful talent and activity in these departments, and then long periods of feeble, formal, and lifeless efforts. The form constantly encroached upon the idea, until it crowded it out. The distinction between formal and real science become a division, and a separation, so that each was pursued alone by itself, to the great injury of the former, and to the death and destruction of the latter. Compare, e. g., the eloquence of Demosthenes with the oratory of the Sophists. The former proceeds from thought, from truth, as the principle of all Eloquence, form and style being moulded and determined by it. The latter starts from form and style itself, which is continually subjected to a repetition of touches and re-touches, without any inward moulding, any living formation;

“Like shadows on a stream, the forms of Art
Impress their character on the smooth surface,
..... but no soul
Warmeth the inner frame.”*

But the view which has been presented of the nature of Rhetoric, and of its relation to the whole field of human knowledge and inquiry, is preclusive of this besetting bad tendency in the department. While recognizing the essentially formal character of Rhetoric, and thus giving it a distinct place in the circle of the sciences, and thereby confining it within its own limits; it, at the same time, directs attention to the deeper soil into which its roots must strike, and from which it must derive its nourishment and vigor. The Rhetorical training of the student, on this method, is concurrent with all his other training, and becomes the medium of its communication to other minds. His general culture is benefited by his discipline in this direction, for the whole body

* Schiller altered.

of it is set into motion, and action, by every effort to give form and expression to it.

3. It is obvious in the third place, that the view under consideration imparts an interest to the department of Rhetoric which it is entirely destitute of, upon any other theory.

For, as we have already remarked, no strictly formal department of knowledge is independent and self-subsistent. If we confine ourselves to a mere art, without respect to the more profound principles that lie under it, our minds soon become weary and spiritless. Such is the affinity between the human intellect and fundamental truth, such is the hungering after *substantial* knowledge and *real* science, that it cannot be permanently interested in any branch of inquiry, or of activity, that does not ultimately lead it down into these depths. Essential truth is the element, and the aliment, of a rational mind, and nothing short of this form of truth can long satisfy its wants. Unless, therefore, Rhetorical discipline conducts the mind ultimately to these perennial fountains of stimulation and nourishment, it will soon become irksome in its nature, and wearisome in its influence. All this training in the art of composition will only serve to drink up the vigorous juices, and kill out the life of the mind.

If, on the contrary, Rhetorical study and practice be grafted into the vigorous stock of a preexisting culture, if the student come to it with a well-trained and fully informed mind, the result of industry and fidelity in the academical, collegiate, and professional courses of instruction through which he has passed; then this part of his labor as an educated man will be the most interesting and congenial of all. We have, perhaps, experienced the exquisite pleasure which the intellect feels in the hour of vigorous creative production; the high swelling enthusiasm of the mind, as it careers over a field of noble and lofty thought. We have, perhaps, experienced that enlargement and elevation of soul, which accompanies the distinct intuition of principles, and a firm masterly grasp of them. "The highest joy," says Schiller, "is the freedom of the mind, in the living play of all its powers"; and there is no sphere in which this play of the intellect is so

full and so free, as that of authorship, as that of composition. None of the other processes in the course of education can compare with it, for depth and heartiness of interest. The processes of memorizing, of comparing, of judging, of analyzing, of combining, and of close attention,—the processes that occur in the classical, mathematical, historical, and philosophical disciplines,—are each and all of them inferior in fresh living interest for the mind, to the process of original production. In these former instances, the mind is more passive than active, and but a portion of its power is in exercise. But in the act and process of original authorship, the mind becomes a unit and unity, all its powers are concentrated into one, and the productive process is a most original and vital union of all the knowing, all the feeling, all the imagination, and all the moral force of the man. The historian Niebuhr, speaking of the historian's vocation, remarks that he who calls past ages into being enjoys a bliss analogous to that of creating.* With still more truth, may we say of that mind which is able, in the conscious awakening of all its powers, to give full and satisfactory utterance to its thick coming thoughts, that it enjoys the joy of a creator. If there is one bright particular hour in the life of the educated man, in the career of the scholar, it is that hour for which all other hours of student

* "I have found," he says in one of his letters, "my former experience irresistibly confirmed, that with me the body depends entirely on the mind, and that my indisposition almost always arises from some impediment to the free action of my mind, which seems to introduce disorder into all the functions of the bodily machine. When my mind is exerting itself freely and energetically upon a great subject, and I advance successfully from one point to another, displaying their mutual connection as I proceed, I either feel no physical inconveniences, or if they show themselves, they disappear again very quickly. No man can have a more vivid perception, that *creating* [i. e., authorship] is the true essence of life, than I have derived from my internal experience. But if I am altogether restricted to a passive state of mind, the whole machine comes to a stop, and my inward discomfort brings on an unhealthy condition of body, of which I have an unmistakable outward sign, in the contrast between the free and strong circulation of the blood in the former state, and its irregularity in the latter." — *Life and Letters*, p. 179.

life were made, — that hour in which he gives original and full *expression* to what has slowly been gendering within him. Now, what this bright hour is to the general life of the educated man, Rhetorical discipline and practice is to the sum-total of education. If pursued in the right method, and after the proper preparatory work has been done, it imparts an interest to general study and general culture, such as cannot exist without it. How dull and stupid is the life of a book-worm; of a mind which passes through all the stages of education, except that last and crowning one, by means of which it is put into *communication* with the great world of scholars and letters. Such a mind is always destitute of that most interesting and infallible sign of genuine culture, enthusiasm. It has done nothing for long years but *absorb*. Knowledge has had the same effect upon its inner fabric and structure, which the sweet rains of heaven have upon the rootless fallen pine. The noble shaft becomes struck with the sap-rot.

The history of literature furnishes many examples of men whose knowledge only increased their sorrow, because it never found an efflux from their own minds into the world. Knowledge uncommunicated is something like remorse unconfessed. The mind not being allowed to go out of itself, and to direct its energies towards an object and end greater and worthier than itself, turns back upon itself, and becomes morbidly self-reflecting and self-conscious. A studious and reflecting man of this class is characterized by an excessive fastidiousness, which makes him dissatisfied with all that he does himself, or sees done by others; which represses, and finally suppresses, all the buoyant and spirited activity of the intellect, leaving it sluggish as “the dull weed that rots by Lethe’s wharf.” The poet Gray is an example in point. In the instance of this in many respects highly interesting literary man, the acquisition of culture far outran the expression and communication of it. The scholar overlaid the author. Even the comparatively few attempts which this mind made to embody its thoughts were hampered by its excessive introspection. Had Gray thrown himself out with freedom and boldness upon the stream of original production, which might

have been made to flow from his richly-endowed and richly informed mind, he would have been stronger, greater, and happier as a literary man. Neither would his productions have lost that perfection of symmetry, and elaborate hard finish which they exhibit; while at the same time they would have had breathed into them that warm breath of life, which they do not now possess, and for the lack of which no mere art can ever compensate. Certain it is that a closer, warmer contact with the mind of his age, through a more daring and exuberant authorship on his part, would have imparted a spring and buoyancy to the literary character of Gray, which would have rendered it a far more influential and interesting one than it now is.

As an example of the freshening and invigorating influence of the constant and free communication of thought upon the intellect, take the late Sir Walter Scott. His mind was one of the healthiest, and most robust, that we meet with in the history of literature. It was also one of the happiest, the most free from morbid exercises and activities. Something was undoubtedly due to its native structure, but very much was owing to those habits of authorship which it early acquired, and long kept up. Suppose that Scott had immured himself in his library, had given free play to his acquisitive and antiquarian tendencies, without developing and using his originating and productive talent, can we suppose that his intellect would have been that warm, breezy, sunny spot that it always was? It is true that he finally broke his powers down, by attempting the Herculean task of rescuing the great publishing house with which he had become connected from bankruptcy; but this *dead lift* of the mental powers is not what we are speaking of. It is the moderate, and uniform, yet free and bold expression of the thoughts of an educated mind, in distinction from the dull, lethargic, uniform suppression of them, of which we are speaking, and for which we are pleading.

In this way, the ethical theory of Rhetoric, while resulting in a practical and energetic Eloquence, exerts a vivifying influence upon the entire culture of the student. It gives *employment* to

the sum total of his acquisitions, instead of permitting it to remain idle in his mind. It *elaborates* and *uses*, for the purposes of popular instruction and impression, all the material with which the mind is filled, instead of allowing it to remain a lifeless mass, a *caput mortuum*, by itself. Mathematical, classical, historical, philosophical, and theological knowledge, instead of being held in the memory from a mere feeling of vanity, is set to work from a sense of duty. The Rhetoric of the man has affinities with the scholarship of the man. It is homogeneous with it. It moulds it, and embodies it. For the Rhetorician, upon this theory, and under this training, is not one in whom two distinct disciplines exist side by side, with no interpenetration. He is not at one time a dull sluggish recipient of knowledge, and at another a dull formal communicator of knowledge ; discharging two functions which in him have no connection with each other. He is at all times a genial and vital receiver, and a genial vital communicator. It was once said of a famous jurist, that his knowledge had passed out of his memory into his judgment. We may say of the genuine Rhetorician, that his knowledge is continually passing out of his passive into his active nature. It enters into the circulation of the soul, and becomes vitalized by its living currents. The Scholar and the Orator are not separated from each other, but constitute one living personality.

But what an energy is imparted to culture, by a training that thus tasks to the utmost for acquisitions, and then vivifies those acquisitions to the utmost in order to popular oratorical impression ! It is safe to say that the literature of a nation is vigorous and alive, only in proportion as it has oratorical elements in it ; and that the very height of its living energy appears in its Eloquence and Oratory. What other portion of Greek literature throbs with such intense life as the speeches of Demosthenes ? If there be any of the *vis vivida vitae* in Roman literature, that literature which, unlike all others, was born old, and never exhibits any of the morn and liquid dew of youth, — if there be any fresh vital force in Roman letters, is it not to be found in the orations of Cicero ? And where, in the modern world, do the most vehement

and passionate energies of the human intellect expatriate and career, if not in the vastly widened arena of political and sacred Eloquence,— if not on that theatre where the active, practical interests of man for time and for eternity come up for discussion and decision?


The importance of a high and philosophic theory of Eloquence and Oratory, when considered in its bearings upon the education of the American mind, is plain and great. The American is sensitive to Eloquence, and is inclined to be influenced by the Rhetorician and Orator more than by the Poet or the Philosopher. We are in our youth as a nation; in that forming period which in Grecian, in Roman, and in English history, is marked by the ballad and romance literature. Unlike our predecessors we have not been much influenced by these lighter and imaginative species, but even in our infancy have sought a “manlier diet.” We affect Eloquence and Oratory, rather than the Ballad and the Romance. If we compare the literature of America with that of Europe, for the last seventy-five years, we find that our success has been altogether greatest in this department. During this period we have produced no Poetry equal to that of England, no Philosophy equal to that of Germany, and no Science equal to that of France. But the most unwilling admirer must acknowledge that we have produced a body of Eloquence and Oratory which, taken as a whole, is superior to anything in contemporaneous English or Continental Eloquence. The eloquence called out in the debates upon the adoption of the Constitution, and all along down from that time to the present, in expounding and defending it; the panegyrical eloquence of the country elicited by the commemoration of great events, or of patriotic men; nay even the ruder and less elaborate efforts incident to the political contests that occur so often: all these have called out, within the period of the last seventy-five years, in the republican States of America, a body of oratorical literature with which nothing could so successfully compare, as that which was called forth, (but which has not been handed down), in the Democracies of Greece, from the time when the Olympian

Pericles thundered in the Agora, to the time when Demosthenes sucked the poisoned quill.

The American mind ought therefore to be under the influence of a high theory, and a strict taste, in order that this tendency may receive its very best education ; and in order that American Eloquence may continue to be characterized, as it has been, by solid and sterling qualities. The national mind, thus far, has been too seriously occupied with great interests, to become meretricious in its Rhetoric and Eloquence. The Revolution that established liberty and the government, was no time for an inflated and bombastic display. Energy and thoughtfulness characterize our favorite and model orators. But peace, and prosperity, and perfect security, relax the mind and its theories. There is some danger that the form outrun the substance; that congressional debates, that judicial, panegyrical, and sacred Eloquence, all of them become less truthful and forceful in their character, while they become more florid and dazzling.

What better corrective, then, can there be, than a good educational theory, upon the whole subject, in both the individual and the public mind ; in both the auditor and the orator ? If audiences are intolerant of a Rhetoric that separates the form from the material, the style from the thought, the public speaker will know it, and act accordingly. If the auditor insists that Eloquence have a soul of truth, and of thought, within it, the orator will yield, and become a more thoughtful man, that he may minister to the public want. The result will be a Rhetoric and an Oratory that first patiently accumulates knowledge, and then thoroughly elaborates it, for the purposes of popular instruction and impression,— an Eloquence

“not like those rills from a height
Which sparkle and foam, and in vapor are o'er ;
But a current that works out its way into light
Through the filtering recesses of thought and of lore.”



ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE.

BOOK I. ON INVENTION.

CHAPTER I.

DESIGN AND USE OF THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION.

It has often surprised me that, while in modern times the theory of the Fine Arts, and especially of Poetry, has reached so high a degree of clearness and completeness, Rhetoric still consists of unconnected principles, and is not competent either to guide the practice of Eloquence by sure rules, or to give satisfactory information with respect to the nature and qualities of the subject of which it treats,—of Eloquence itself. Hence it has seemed to me not to be a superfluous attempt to endeavor to represent the gift of Eloquence as one of the fundamental powers of man, and to derive its laws from one of the higher philosophical sciences, so that everything uncertain and mutable may disappear from the theory as well as the practice of it.

I must, indeed, fear that such an undertaking will appear useless to many, and that I shall be asked, “What

is gained by theories generally ? Has all the philosophizing upon Art, in modern times, produced a more beautiful bloom of Poetry ? Did not Eloquence attain its highest perfection among the ancients, although probably among them, as among us, its highest principle either remained unknown, or, at least, never distinctly presented itself to the orator ? Only by means of rules which were drawn from experience, and which had respect to individual particulars in the formation of the oration, only by means of a constant practice which began in earliest youth and never ceased, and not by means of general theories, did Demosthenes and Cicero form themselves ; only by means of a similar discipline, and not by means of text-books, can Eloquence, which has sunk so very low among us, be raised up, if indeed it is to be raised up at all."

These objections would be perfectly well founded, if Eloquence, since the establishment of the Christian Church, had not appeared in a form entirely unknown to the ancients, and one to which we are obliged to have special reference. The political and civil relations amidst which, exclusively and alone, Eloquence appeared among the ancients, were sufficient of themselves to secure it from deviations from the true course, and to render more precise theories unnecessary. For him who spoke before the court, or in the popular assembly, upon a matter which would be decided immediately upon the close of his oration, the effect was the surest proof whether he had spoken well or not ; and when the highest personal interests were at stake, it was very natural that the orator should call forth all his powers in order to succeed, and that he would learn to understand and avoid those

faults which might draw after them the loss of wealth, influence, life, and freedom. The sacred orator, on the contrary, stands in a relation to his hearer, and treats of a subject, which does not allow of such decisive proof. Whether he has instructed, edified, improved, or has merely superficially pleased and moved his hearer, the effect of his sermons can very seldom inform him, since this, from its very nature, remains concealed in the mind, and almost never comes into sight. Since, therefore, he is not, like the orator before the court and in the popular assembly, impelled towards the prescribed end by a pressing danger ; since he is not shut up within such narrow limits which render deviation to the right or left almost impossible, he runs the greatest risk of error, if without settled theory and principles. He must be able to give the most accurate account, to his own mind, of all that he does, and that deeper insight into the principles of Eloquence, which the ancient orator did not need, is indispensable to him.

Moreover, many are of opinion that Eloquence, which in Greece and Rome reached so high a degree of perfection, disappeared from the earth with the destruction of ancient freedom, and never again found its home upon it. According to this opinion, Eloquence is therefore less an original impulse in man, than Poetry ; it is a creature of circumstances, by which it is not only more or less favored, but is produced and destroyed ; the republican constitutions of antiquity were necessary to its development ; and now, when social life, the spirit of the age, and the form of government, are so entirely different, that which we call Eloquence is either utterly unworthy of this name, or is only the mere shadow of that ancient

powerful faculty.* Whether this opinion is well founded or not, can be known only after such an investigation as we are intending to institute. If we do not succeed in showing that Eloquence is one of the fundamental powers in man, this opinion will stand unassailed, and whoever in modern times thinks himself to be an orator must simply give up his pretensions. But if we do succeed, and do actually point out a particular original power, whose development in a certain direction necessarily produces Eloquence, then Eloquence is no longer the ephemeral bloom of a particular age; and although it may conceal itself, and sometimes may appear under another name, it nevertheless lives a life just as real and forceful, in modern, as in ancient times.

Finally, there are men—and men, too, highly distinguished for learning and science—who set a very low estimate upon Eloquence, and would have nothing to do with it. For, in their opinion, it is perfectly clear that its purpose is to excite the feelings, which is always useless, and sometimes even injurious; nay, Eloquence commonly carries its pretensions still further, and, in the best orators, it is the design plainly prominent, and even acknowledged by themselves, to master the heart, to rule the will, and turn it whithersoever they wish. But this, from its very nature, whatever be the manner in which it is done, is not at all compatible with the relations in which man stands to his fellow-man, and is therefore, strictly considered, contrary to morality; and the more so, from the fact, that commonly the orator makes use of cunning and deceptive tricks of art, rather

* Magna ista et notabilis eloquentia . . . quæ in bene constitutis civitatibus non oritur.—*De Caus. Corr. Eloq.*, c. 40.

than honorable weapons. In their opinion, we should address the understanding alone, and satisfy it by means of stringent arguments ; all excitement of the feelings, and influencing of the will, were better omitted. This class of opponents, as has been remarked, is a very important one ; at its head stand names of distinction, — Aristotle* among the ancients, Kant† among the moderns ; their objections have the very strongest appearance of truth, and as yet have not been answered in a satisfactory manner by any of the modern advocates of Eloquence, who have made far too little of them. But this question also, whether there is anything contrary to morality in the attempt to acquire mastery over the minds of others, can be decided only by means of such an investigation as we contemplate. For, should it actually turn out to be impossible to derive each and all of the rules of Eloquence from one and the same fundamental principle ; if the

* Ἀλλ' ὅλης οὕσης πρός δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, οὐχ ὡς ὁρθῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον.

Rhetor., Lib. III., c. 1.

† I must confess that, while a beautiful poem always gives me pure pleasure, the perusal of the best orations of the popular orators of Rome, or the parliamentary or pulpit orators of the present time, is always accompanied with the disagreeable feeling of disapprobation towards a cunning art which understands how to move men like machines, to a judgment which, upon calm after-thought, must lose all its worth with them. Oratory, considered as the art of making use of the weaknesses of men, for its own purposes, (be these never so well meant, or be they actually good, as they are always intended to be,) is worthy of no respect at all. — *Kritik der Urheilskraft*, p. 202. Rosenkranz's Ed.

It is also said of Eloquence, in the Dialogue *De Caus. Corr. Eloq.*, c. 40, that it is “alumna licentiæ, quam stulti libertatem vocabant, comes seditionum, effrenati populi incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine servitute, contumax, temeraria, adrogans.”

theory of Eloquence should be found to consist only of some maxims derived from experience and observation, which can be brought together under no unity, this would certainly be a very strong presumption against it. The impossibility of constructing its fundamental principles philosophically, would greatly lower it, and would throw it into the same class with other abilities of an ambiguous nature, in relation to which this same thing occurs,—with Prudence, Skill, Hypocrisy, or, in the phrase of Plato,* with the art of Cookery. If, however, we succeed in laying down an all-comprehending principle as the ground of Eloquence, it will then appear of itself, whether this is good or bad ; although Eloquence would be acquitted of all charges on the score of being contrary to morality, from the mere philosophical form of its theory, since that which depends upon a fundamental power of man cannot possibly contradict his moral sense.

* Platonis Gorgias ed. Heindorf, p. 53.

CHAPTER II.

ELOQUENCE IS NOT AN INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN POETRY
AND PHILOSOPHY.

THREE different characteristics of Eloquence attract notice immediately upon the first examination. First, it is evident that Eloquence seeks to separate the true from the false, and to satisfy the understanding by argument. The powerful enthymemes of Demosthenes, the assertion of Aristotle that Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, and Cicero's affirmation that he had made himself an orator, not in the schools of the Rhetoricians, but in the walks of the Academy,* testify plainly enough to the affinity of Eloquence with Philosophy. Secondly, Eloquence approximates to Poetry also, through the liveliness of its representations, and the use of turns and figures which are similar to those of Poetry. But, thirdly, Eloquence is distinguished from Philosophy as well as Poetry by the outward end after which it strives,—by that mastery, over minds, which it does not quietly wait for, but obtains by a struggle, and by the innumerable references which must be regarded in such a striving, and which are entirely foreign to Philosophy as well as Poetry.

Characteristic marks of three kinds, therefore, are to be found in Eloquence: 1. An affinity with Philosophy;

* *Fateor me oratorem non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex academiæ spatiis extitisse.—Orator, c. 3.*

2. An affinity with Poetry; 3. A striving after an outward end. In order to find a fundamental principle of Eloquence, one of these three characteristics must be made predominant; for they cannot exist beside each other in equal dignity. Should it be affirmed that the Beautiful and the True, which in Poetry and Philosophy are principal, in Eloquence appear as adjuncts and subservient to outward ends, the difficulty is not yet removed; for the question ever returns, — What is the *law* according to which the True and the Beautiful may be used for the attainment of outward ends? So long as this is not given, Eloquence has not found its highest fundamental principle.

If we take our stand upon that point of view, where Eloquence appears as something fluctuating between Philosophy, Poetry, and mere Skill, the theory projected in accordance with this view cannot satisfy the philosopher; and just as little will it be a sure guide for the pupil in oratory.

First, the teacher says to him, " You must select a subject, and must endeavor to treat it fundamentally." This he does in all faithfulness, and thus, imperceptibly, there arises under his hands a philosophic essay. " This is good for nothing," says the teacher; " where is the rising sweep, the life, the poetic ornament, by which these truths are to make an entrance?" This censure seems just to him, and he now throws himself into the other extreme, and that which he produces is the most disagreeable of all caricatures, — poetic prose. Having once more failed, it is now said to him, " You discourse as if you were alone by yourself, with no hearers before you, into whose circumstances, into whose way of thinking, you must en-

ter!" Who will find fault with the pupil, if at this point he falls into a sort of desperation, and addresses his instructor somewhat after this manner: "In Heaven's name! what is it that you require of me? Am I to unite, in one, three things entirely different from each other: philosophic profundity, poetic ornament, and reference to an outward end? Tell me, first, if this union is possible; and, if it is, then give me the higher principle under which three so different requisitions can be brought into one; show me the rule which determines how much I may concede to the subject-matter, how much to beauty of form, how much to the hearer, in order that each may coëxist with all, and that an unlucky preponderance may not oscillate from one side to another. For I can now no longer cast my work in an old form, without troubling myself about the wherefore, without asking myself why that which I produce must look precisely thus, and whether it might not look entirely different; I wish in my oration, from beginning to end, to see the necessity of every single part. So then show me the principle which groups all others under itself, and from which all rules readily derive themselves."

CHAPTER III.

ELOQUENCE IS NEITHER POETRY NOR PHILOSOPHY.

IF, therefore, one of the three characteristic marks of Eloquence is to be made the fundamental one, it might be supposed that its affinity with Poetry is the one, and that the same fundamental principle which reigns in the representations of Poetry, must also guide in the practice of Oratory. But this would pre-suppose that Eloquence give up its striving after an outward end, as something incompatible with Poetry, which it cannot do without renouncing its own nature and peculiarity ; or else that Poetry adapt itself to this striving, and to all the references connected with it, which is equally impossible.

When Poetry clothes its ideas in forms, it can demand nothing more than the perception and acknowledgment that the idea is perfectly suited to the form, and the form to the idea ; its design can never be to *implant* the ideas, which it has wrought out with such pleasure to itself, in another mind ; the one process would injure the other ; in the two-fold effort to exhibit his own mind and to work upon the mind of another, the Poet would succeed in neither. Indeed, nothing is so very much suited to produce the feeling of displeasure and disgust as an oration overloaded with poetical ornament ; we pity the ignorance which selects means so unsuitable for its ends ; we are indignant at the profanation which would force

Poetry to subserve such outward ends. Eloquence, therefore, cannot be regarded as a part of Poetry.

But, secondly, is it not possible to make the Philosophic element in it the fundamental principle of Eloquence? Since in Eloquence, as in Philosophy, ideas are presented in a certain sequence and in a certain connection, its coincidence with the art of Philosophizing might be so great as that it should fall into this and constitute only a part of it. But here the very obstacle which rendered the union of Eloquence with Poetry impossible, shows itself again,— that striving, namely, after an outward end, which is just as essential to Eloquence as it is foreign to Philosophy. Philosophy can recognize no other law by which its representations are to be guided, than that which lies in the ideas themselves; these ideas themselves are simply to come forth in their greatest possible clearness, and in their greatest possible compass. The problem of Eloquence, on the contrary, is to gain over to its ideas a mind thus or thus disposed. The laws which Philosophy follows in its representations cannot therefore be the highest and sole rules of Eloquence, since, besides these, it has still others to obey which are imposed upon it by the outward end after which it strives.

This truth is of the greatest importance for the success of our investigation, and I must call attention to it the more, since from the great tendency of the Germans to Philosophizing, it is certainly to be feared that it will meet with opposition from many of my readers. "Is not," it may be objected, "this profound and powerful *development* of ideas, which is the essential element in the Philosophic representation, itself also the most infallible means of making an entrance for these ideas into

the minds of others, and thus of fulfilling all the requisitions of Eloquence?" Let one make this attempt, but let him make it with thoroughness, without suffering himself to be diverted by circumstances from the purpose once fixed upon. Let one lose himself entirely in the idea ; let him develop it in its whole compass ; let him not omit even the least of all that can serve to exhibit it still more clearly ; let him forget, as is fitting, the place where he stands ; let him confine himself to no definite time, but speak until his subject is exhausted ; let him not trouble himself about his hearers, about the degree of their culture, about their capacities, qualities, prejudices, and inclinations ; in a word, let him seek only to express his own mind, — will such a discourse be adapted to gain over an opposing mind and to transfer the sentiments of the orator into his hearers ? I think not. Hence no one who refers the Rhetorical manner and method to the Philosophical, is able in his practice to remain true to his theory. Imperceptibly he concedes something to time, to place, to the occasion, to the hearers ; and thus there arises a product which is neither Philosophical nor Rhetorical, and which can satisfy no one who is accustomed to judge of things with strictness.

If I understand it rightly, Aristotle makes this attempt, which must ever be a failure, to connect Eloquence with the art of Philosophizing, in order to obtain a simple, firm, constituent principle for it. In the very beginning of his work he lays down the position that Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, and it seems as if all is to be derived from this, and that Rhetoric is in this way to acquire a scientific unity. But this first assertion compels him to a second, by which Eloquence becomes strangely limited

in its sphere. "In Eloquence," he says, "which depends upon Dialectics, the arguments are the only thing pertaining to the art, and it should, properly, confine itself simply to showing whether a thing has or has not happened. It is owing to the imperfection of governments alone, that Eloquence has introduced the ideas of Justice and Injustice into its sphere, and assumes to excite the feelings." Now, it would be interesting to see what sort of a Rhetoric would have arisen, if Aristotle had strictly maintained and carried out this principle; but whether it was because an Eloquence so narrowly limited did not satisfy him, or because he felt himself obliged to take Eloquence as he found it in actual existence, he lets the principle drop again immediately. Hence we are not a little surprised to see how soon he is no longer content with the purely dialectic arguments, but, besides these, calls in those means of persuasion also which lie in the moral state of the orator and in the inward condition into which the hearer has been brought. But, in order to the apprehension of these, Dialectics no longer suffices; the knowledge of the virtues and the affections is requisite for this, and Aristotle finds himself compelled to the acknowledgment that Eloquence is no longer akin to Dialectics alone, but also to the Ethical science called Politics. Thus he gets a fundamental principle having a two-fold nature, and destructive of all scientific unity,—a quality, moreover, that is not to be met with again in the whole work.

CHAPTER IV.

ELOQUENCE IS A VIRTUE.

SINCE, therefore, Rhetoric cannot acquire a scientific form, if Eloquence is to be regarded as a fluctuating intermediate between Poetry and Philosophy; and since, furthermore, it cannot be subordinated either to Poetry or Philosophy, there is only one way left to find its highest fundamental principle, if it has one, namely, to examine the third of the characteristic qualities noticed in it, the *striving after an outward end*, and to see if it will not lead to a firm fundamental principle.

Production in Poetry and Philosophy is a species of activity which may be denominated the isolated, or that which retreats into itself again. For it simply unfolds an idea, and in the process has no other end but this idea and its unfolding. That which has been formed in this way can, indeed, like all that exists, exert an outward influence; yet it never owes its origin to the *design* of exerting such an influence.

There is another species of activity, which always aims at an outward change, either in the sentiments and conduct of individual men, or in the social and family relations, or in the civil and ecclesiastical. Now, to this species of *practical* activity — the sum-total of which constitutes social life — Eloquence also belongs; and it

is so entirely implicated in the circumstances existing at the particular time, that even in thought it cannot be separated from them. For although it is easy enough in the case of a tragedy of Sophocles, to contemplate it as something existing for itself, and to think of it as separated from all the social and civil relations of the poet, such a separation in the case of an oration of Demosthenes cannot be so effected in the least degree. Nothing in it is an isolated piece of art; nothing can be torn out from the web of circumstances in which it was spoken; only in connection with these does it constitute a unity, which again was nothing but an *act*, a point in the political career of the orator. When the ancient orators appeared, their discourse was an *action** in the strictest

* "True Eloquence, indeed," says Webster, "does not consist in speech. Patriotism is eloquent; self-devotion is eloquent. The clear conception outrunning the deductions of logic, the high purpose, the firm resolve, the dauntless spirit, speaking on the tongue, beaming from the eye, informing every feature, and urging the whole man onward, right onward, to his object, — this is eloquence; or rather it is something greater and higher than all eloquence, — it is *action*, noble, sublime, godlike *action*."

Bolingbroke has noticed this implication of Eloquence, with the active and practical circumstances in the midst of which it takes its rise, in a passage which is worthy of being quoted, not less because he had no theory to support, than because of its masculine vigor and force. "Eloquence," he remarks, "has charms to lead mankind, and gives a nobler superiority than power, that every dunce may use, or fraud, that every knave may employ. But eloquence must flow like a stream that is fed by an abundant spring, and not spout forth like a frothy water on some gaudy day, and remain dry the rest of the year. The famous orators of Greece and Rome were the *statesmen* and *ministers* of those commonwealths. The nature of their governments, and the humor of those ages, made elaborate orations necessary. They harangued oftener than they debated; and the *ars dicendi* required more study and more exercise of mind, and of body, too, among them, than are necessary among us. But, as much pains as they took in learning how to conduct the stream of eloquence, they took more to enlarge the fountain from which it flowed. Hear Demosthenes, hear Cicero, thunder against

and most common signification of the word; an action that was none the less worthy of the name, and none the less powerful, because they made use of speech instead

Philip, Catiline, and Antony. I choose the example of the first, rather than that of Pericles, whom he imitated, or of Phocion, whom he opposed, or of any other considerable personage in Greece; and the example of Cicero rather than that of Crassus, or of Hortensius, or of any other of the great men of Rome; because the eloquence of these two has been so celebrated, that we are accustomed to look upon them almost as *mere* orators. They were orators indeed, and no man who has a soul can read their orations, after the revolution of so many ages, after the extinction of the governments and of the people for whom they were composed, without feeling, at this hour, the passions they were designed to move, and the spirit they were designed to raise. But if we look into the history of these two men, and consider the parts they acted, we shall see them in another light, and admire them in a higher sphere of action. Demosthenes had been neglected, in his education, by the same tutors who cheated him of his inheritance. Cicero was bred with greater advantage, and Plutarch, I think, says, that when he first appeared, the people used to call him, by way of derision, the Greek, and the scholar. But whatever advantage of this kind the latter might have over the former, and to which of them soever you ascribe the superior genius, the progress which both of them made in every part of political knowledge, by their industry and application, was marvellous. Cicero might be a better philosopher, but Demosthenes was no less a statesman: and both of them performed actions, and acquired fame, above the reach of eloquence alone. Demosthenes used to compare eloquence to a weapon, aptly enough; for eloquence, like every other weapon, is of little use to the owner, unless he have the power and the skill to use it. This force and skill Demosthenes had in an eminent degree. Observe them in one instance among many. It was of mighty importance to Philip, to prevent the accession of Thebes to the grand alliance that Demosthenes, at the head of the Athenian commonwealth, formed against the growing power of the Macedonians. Philip had his emissaries and ambassadors on the spot, to oppose to those of Athens, and we may be assured that he neglected none of those arts upon that occasion, that he employed so successfully on others. The struggle was great, but Demosthenes prevailed, and the Thebans engaged in the war against Philip. Was it by his eloquence alone that he prevailed in a divided State, over all the subtilty of intrigue, all the dexterity of negotiation, all the seduction, all the corruption, and all the

of limbs, weapons, or other instruments. Nay, even in our unrhetorical times, if one were to regard the discourses of a sacred orator as a series of little separate

terrors, that the ablest and most powerful prince could employ ? Was Demosthenes wholly taken up with composing orations, and haranguing the people in this remarkable crisis ? He harangued them, no doubt, at Thebes, as well as at Athens, and in the rest of Greece, where all the great resolutions of making alliances, waging war, or concluding peace, were determined in democratical assemblies. But yet haranguing was, no doubt, the least part of his business, and eloquence was neither the sole nor the principal talent, as the style of writers would lead us to believe, on which his success depended. He must have been master of other arts, subserviently to which his eloquence was employed ; and must have had a thorough knowledge of his own State and of the other States of Greece, of their dispositions, and of their interests relatively to one another, and relatively to their neighbors, to the Persians particularly, with whom he held a correspondence, not much to his honor in appearance, whatever he might intend by it : I say he must have been master of many other arts, and possessed an immense fund of knowledge, to make his eloquence in every case successful, and even pertinent or seasonable in some, as well as to direct it, and to furnish with matter whenever he thought proper to employ this weapon.

Let us consider Tully on the greatest theatre of the known world, and in the most difficult circumstances. We are better acquainted with him than we are with Demosthenes ; for we see him nearer, as it were, and in more different lights. How perfect a knowledge had he acquired of the Roman constitution of government, ecclesiastical and civil ; of the origin and progress, of the general reasons and particular occasions of the laws and customs of his country ; of the great rules of equity, and the low practice of courts ; of the duty of every magistracy and office in the State, from the dictator down to the lictor ; and of all the steps by which Rome had risen from her infancy, to liberty, to power, and grandeur, and dominion, as well as of all those by which she began to decline, a little before his age, to that servitude which he died for opposing, but lived to see established, and in which not her liberty alone, but her power, and grandeur, and dominion were lost ! How well was he acquainted with the Roman colonies and provinces, with the allies and enemies of the empire, with the rights and privileges of the former, the dispositions and conditions of the latter, with the interests of them all relatively to Rome, and of the interests of Rome relatively to them ! How present to his mind were the anecdotes of former times concerning the Roman and other States, and how curious was he to observe the minut-

pieces of art, delivered every Sunday, everybody certainly would protest against such a view, and demand that his orations be regarded as individual attempts to influence

est circumstances that passed in his own! His works will answer sufficiently the questions I ask, and establish in the mind of every man who reads them the idea I would give of his capacity and knowledge, as well as that which is so universally taken of his eloquence. To a man fraught with all this stock of knowledge, and industrious to improve it daily, nothing could happen that was entirely new; nothing for which he was quite unprepared; scarce any effect whereof he had not considered the cause; scarce any cause wherein his sagacity could not discern the latent effect. His eloquence in private causes gave him first credit at Rome; but it was this knowledge, this experience, and the continued habits of business, that supported his reputation, enabled him to do much service to his country, and gave force and authority to his eloquence. To little purpose would he have attacked Catiline with all the vehemence that indignation, and even fear, added to eloquence, if he had trusted to this weapon alone. This weapon alone would have secured neither him nor the senate from the poniard of that assassin. He would have had no occasion to boast, that he had driven this infamous citizen out of the walls of Rome, *abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit*, if he had not made it, beforehand, impossible for him to continue any longer in them. As little occasion would he have had to assume the honor of defeating, without any tumult, or any disorder, the designs of those who conspired to murder the Roman people, to destroy the Roman empire, and to extinguish the Roman name; if he had not united, by skill and management, in the common cause of their country, orders of men the most averse to each other; if he had not watched all the machinations of the conspirators in silence, and prepared a strength sufficient to resist them at Rome, and in the provinces, before he opened this scene of villany to the senate and the people: in a word, if he had not made much more use of political prudence, that is, of the knowledge of mankind, and of the arts of government, which study and experience give, than of all the powers of his eloquence.

Such was Demosthenes, such was Cicero, such were all the great men whose memories are preserved in history, and such must every man be, or endeavor to be, if he has either sense or sentiment, who presumes to meddle in affairs of government,—of a free government, I mean,—and hopes to maintain a distinguished character in popular assemblies, whatever part he takes, whether that of supporting, or that of opposing.” — *On the Spirit of Patriotism. Bolingbroke's Works, IV., pp. 214-219.—Tr.*

his hearers, as individual acts in the discharge of his calling; whereby they would become lost in the sum-total of his social influence. But since all the activity of man in his various relations is, or should be, under the guidance of the moral law, the practice of Eloquence, if Eloquence is, in reality, an activity of this sort, can be subjected to no other than *Ethical* laws. Eloquence seeks to produce a change in the sentiments and conduct of other men. The inquiry after its fundamental principles, therefore, becomes changed quite naturally into this: What are the laws according to which a free being may exert influence upon other free beings? And the answer to this question can be derived only from Ethics.

We will attempt to answer it. And if it shall turn out that all the rules of Eloquence, which have been truly and correctly acknowledged as such, but which have been placed beside each other in no inward connection, can be derived from the laws according to which a free being may exert influence upon other free beings, there will be no doubt that Rhetoric, considered as the theory of Eloquence, is a part of Ethics, and that Eloquence itself is an ability to exert influence according to ethical laws,—that is to say, is a *Virtue*.

In this way, moreover, the perplexity will be removed in which theorizers find themselves when they would determine whether Eloquence is an Art or not, and, generally, what it is in reality. They cannot declare it to be an Art, since it is plain that it aims at the attainment of an outward end, and not at a free and uninterested representation of the Beautiful. To the level of a Trade, however, it cannot be degraded; hence a distinction is made

between fine and non-fine, æsthetic and non-æsthetic, Arts; strange expressions, and difficult to be understood!* Into this latter class Eloquence is thrown, with the additional remark, that it merits the name of an Art, in so far as we connect with this term the conception of a practised and cultivated capacity and ability to produce works whose individual parts in their closest connection unite for one and the same end. Under this conception, however, belongs also every talent of a mechanical kind, and hence nothing is added to the dignity of Eloquence by such a distinction. But if the view of Eloquence brought forward by us can be maintained, not only a much more settled and definite place would be secured to it, but also a place in the highest degree honorable. It would belong to that which is highest among men, to Virtue ; and could be called an Art only in so far as the name of Art could be given to Virtue itself.

But in saying that Eloquence is a Virtue, it is by no means meant that a certain degree of moral excellence is enough in order to Eloquence, and all that is usually derived from art, learning, and science, can be dispensed with. It is only meant that the arrangement and definition of that which Eloquence derives to itself from these different departments, belongs peculiarly to *ethical* laws ; but this is the very thing that is demanded of a highest fundamental principle. Who, for example, would deny that the imagination is the highest lawgiver for the painter ? And yet no painting can be completed by the

* *Schott's Theory of Eloquence*, 1807, p. 17. *Fundamental Principles of Rhetoric and Homiletics*, by the same, 1815, p. 420.—A condensed summary of the first mentioned work of *Schott*, by Prof. *Park*, may be found in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.—TR.

imagination alone. There is needed, besides, mechanical skill, knowledge of colors, of perspective, of anatomy, of history; the imagination, as the highest fundamental principle, merely determines *how* each of these knowledges and abilities shall be applied. In like manner, means of various kinds are necessary to the orator, according to the different relations which he sustains, and according to the different ends which he proposes to himself, which are to be obtained only by study and practice; but that which determines *where*, *how*, and *in what degree*, each of the existing means shall be applied, is the ethical law, to which belongs every judgment regarding our relations, our ends, and our social influence. So that here the moral law does not merely point out the time for the action, leaving the guidance of the action to another principle, as would be the case in the practice of any particular art; but Eloquence, in all its various forms, is nothing but the development of the Ethical impulse itself.

CHAPTER V.

IDEAS.

BUT what is the tenor of this highest law of Eloquence, which, according to what has been said, must necessarily be an ethical one? It does not seem to us to be necessary here to unfold from the bottom a new and peculiar system of morals; it will be sufficient to consider closely the relation which the orator sustains to the hearer. The few positions which we shall lay down, will, it is hoped, meet with a confirmatory response in the moral feeling of every cultivated man.

The orator has plans and designs which he would realize, and to this end he must first overcome the sluggishness of indifferent minds, and give them an impulse to action; and secondly, he must overcome those who openly oppose, and carry them along with him. But he has no compulsory authority at all over the minds of others; he is not a law-giver, who ordains the relations of men, and thus gives them direction in a mediate, yet sure and irresistible manner; he is not a ruler, who leads a whole people hither and thither, because he has control over the possessions, life, and standing of every individual. He stands upon a perfect equality with those upon whom he would exert an influence; and since his relation to them ensures him no open authority over their freedom, he may not surreptitiously obtain it in any secret manner; he must respect their freedom, and

neither by exciting their emotions, nor deluding their understandings, deprive them of this prerogative. The hearer who is carried away, must, at the same time, act independently also ; and while he follows the will of the orator, he must not merely believe that he is following his own will, but must actually follow it. But how is the solution of such a difficult, and, as it would seem, insoluble problem, rendered possible ? From the fact that there is something altogether universal and necessary which all men will, something which they must will, from their moral nature ; from the fact that the true freedom of man is constantly striving after the realization of certain Ideas, which can be enumerated and distinctly pointed out. The orator, therefore, has satisfied all the requisitions of morality, as soon as he has carried back his present design to one of those Ideas which every individual of his hearers wishes to realize. For, in this way, the freedom of one man is not destroyed by the influence of another upon him ; he only fulfils, from an impulse from without, what he is constantly seeking to fulfil from an inward impulse. The highest law of Eloquence, therefore, is this : *the particular Idea which the orator wishes to realize, is to be carried back to the necessary Ideas of the hearer.*

Of these necessary Ideas we must now obtain a more distinct apprehension. Ideas, generally, are productive thoughts, which impel to production and action, and are themselves the germ of that which is to be produced, as well as the rule by which its form is to be constructed. As there are plastic,* musical, poetic Ideas, from which

* Plastic is here used in its strict signification, to denote that which pertains to sculpture, including works both in stone and bronze. — TR.

the creations in each of these spheres of art originate; so there are also ethical Ideas, which are destined to be embodied in life, which lie in the reason, must be presupposed to be in every man considered as a being endowed with reason, and are, moreover, actually indwelling in every one, though not in equal clearness and liveliness. For the mind in action, these Ideas flow together into one, and form a whole, which flames before it as the one Ideal Perfection, after which it strives, and which is capable of an outward realization in its action. But in reflection, and in verbal statement, the Perfect divides into three different Ideas, according as reference is had to the *circumstances* under which action occurs, or to the *character* of the person who acts, or to the necessary inward and outward *consequences* of the action. Every man wills the Perfect, in so far as it is specifically determined and conditioned by his peculiar relations; this is the Idea of *Duty*. Every man wills to be inclined and able to realize the Perfect at all times, and everywhere; this is the Idea of *Virtue*. Every man wills that each and every one of his actions result in a series of internal and external consequences that will render the realization of the perfect Ideal easier for him in future; this is the Idea of *Happiness*. In a word, every man wills to fulfil his duty, wills to form himself to virtue, wills to promote his own happiness.* These

* The author here means to say that man wills to fulfil his duty, to form himself to virtue, and to promote his own real happiness, *ideally*, not actually. By virtue of his moral constitution, he wills and must will this, though by reason of sin he actually does not. But the orator must address man as he came from his Creator, and not as he has made himself; he must appeal to that which is highest in him, even although it does not find a realization in his actual life. Only in this way can he profoundly move or elevate his hearer. — TR.

are the necessary practical Ideas which are to be met with in every man, and freedom consists only in following these Ideas unconditionally.

It is plain now, in what consists the first duty of the orator. The hearer, while he is borne along, is, nevertheless, to remain free, and through the whole of his oration the orator is to carry back the particular Idea everywhere present in it, to these necessary Ideas of the hearer. He in this way shows them how, in order to fulfil their duty, in order to elevate themselves to virtue, in order to promote their happiness, they must also realize his propositions ; how the Ideas of Duty, of Virtue, of Happiness, of themselves necessarily produce this very disposition, necessarily impel them to the very conduct to which he would urge them. In this way, the orator not only respects the freedom of the hearer, but while he seems to overpower and utterly subject him, raises him, through the enlivenment of his Ideas, to the very highest grade of an independent self-consciousness. It is for this reason, also, that men who abhor all compulsion, and are ready to resist all compulsory violence, love the orator, and follow him gladly, because he gives them a direction, by means of Ideas, the most powerful and certain, yet, at the same time, most innocent force by which men are controlled. “Whoever feels himself to be compelled,” says Xenophon, “hates, as if he were deprived of some good ; whoever is persuaded, loves, as if he had received a benefit.”*

* Memor. I. 2, 10.

CHAPTER VI.

THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FORM OF PRACTICAL IDEAS.

But only in the most general relations,—relations in which men meet each other as free beings merely, and before any relation of a more limited sort has developed itself from this original relation,—do the regulating Ideas of the Will appear as Duty, Virtue, and Happiness. Through every closer connection among men, by which that original relation is further developed and unfolded, these Ideas also obtain a stricter determination, a wider unfolding, and, consequently, another name. There are, however, two relations among men which have the common aim to render easy the realization of these practical Ideas, and which have both been established by God, the one in a supernatural manner, the other by a necessity of nature. The first is the Church; the second is the State.

We will, in the first place, consider what form the ethical Ideas assume in this latter relation. Since in the State the universal ethical law, in its application to particular cases, becomes more closely determined by positive laws and ordinances, Civil Law, or the Legally Right, here comes in, in the place of Duty. Since, furthermore, in the State, the happiness of every individual consists in his activity as a citizen being unrestricted, and since this cannot be unless there is a flourishing condition of the commonwealth, the ethical Idea of Hap-

piness becomes changed into the striving after the Common Weal. Lastly, Virtue here comes into notice only in so far as the realization of Ideal Perfection, to which it is inclined and suited, promotes the well-being of the commonwealth, and in this reference Virtue is called Merit. *Civil Law*, the *Common Weal*, and *Merit*, are consequently, the necessary Ideas, by which every member of State, as such, is guided in his conduct; and the first duty of the orator, if he is dealing with his hearers as members of a State, consists in showing them how, through the execution of that which he proposes, Civil Law will be obeyed, the Common Weal will be promoted, and Civic Merit will be acquired.

But these Ideas attain a perfect unfolding, neither in the general ethical relations, nor in the particular political, since in these they remain shut up within the sphere of the earthly, which can never satisfy man, from his very nature. They acquire their highest dignity only through religion, and through their reference to the Deity, who imparts this reference to them. Hence they appear in the Church, where the Christian, as such, exercises an influence upon the Christian, regards his own activity as an efflux from the Deity, or as a striving to return back into Him, and thereby imparts to these ideas an actuating power, both for himself and others, of which they are always destitute when man does not rise above and beyond his own individuality.

In the Church, however, a divine institution, and under divine guidance, the human reason cannot be regarded as the highest law-giver; God alone is the supreme law-giver who speaks to us through his natural word in the conscience, and his revealed word in the gospel, and gives us a rule of conduct; what, therefore, this com-

mands in a particular instance, is not merely Duty (an idea that carries man back no further than to himself merely), but the Will of God. Furthermore, when the Christian contemplates that disposition of the soul which is constantly applying itself to good works, and is able to perform them, he cannot possibly stop at mere Virtue; for this denotes that degree of moral perfection to which man can raise himself, which he can attain by a constant struggle with sin. But the Christian knows of something higher; he beholds moral perfection as it reigns, without struggle, and without conflict, in the divine Being; and hence this perfect condition of the soul can for him consist only in resemblance to God, or, since the invisible God has become man, and has lived and acted in human relationships, in resemblance to Christ. Happiness, again, he cannot possibly seek in a series of states and conditions, each one of which renders the production of the highest good easier in the next following; instead of this, his eye, pressing forward into eternity, beholds the final goal to which this series conducts, namely, intimate union with God, or Blessedness; he, therefore, as his guiding Idea, chooses this alone as the ultimate goal, and not Happiness, which, conceived of in its highest ethical purity, can constitute only the way to this goal.

Hence, when an orator contemplates himself and his hearers as members of the Church, his first duty consists in bringing the Idea which he would impart to them, into connection with the Ideas which he must necessarily presuppose in them; and these, according to the foregoing, are the *Divine Will*, *Godlikeness*, and *Blessedness*. If no one of these is prominent in a sermon, as the point from which everything is viewed, so much is

certain at least, the sermon does not belong to the sphere of Eloquence. But the sacred orator should not deem it unworthy of his office to be at home in this sphere, since, according to what has been said before, Eloquence is not only the most innocent of all influences, but is Virtue itself. It has shown itself to be such thus far, and, it is hoped, will prove itself to be such, still more, in what is to follow.

I must here beg my readers to carefully note a result which flows with the greatest certainty from the investigation thus far, the truth of which, however, has never been strictly proved, nay, has been doubted by most,—namely, that ecclesiastical Eloquence is entirely one and the same with political, as to its Ideas; that is, as to its nature.

In saying this, however, we do not deny that they differ from one another in their outward form, in an important degree; for Church and State are very different relationships, and relationships always exert a material influence upon every species of moral activity.*

It is apparent furthermore, that even if it be granted that the political and judicial Eloquence of the Ancients has perished, still only one form of the thing, and not the very thing itself, has perished; for this has risen again in ecclesiastical Eloquence with a still higher splendor; the Ideas upon which Eloquence is based have been made more splendid by passing through the

* Herder says, in his letters upon the study of Theology, (letter 40,) "Whoever takes the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Cicero as an absolute model for his sermons, has no true conception either of a sermon or of a judicial oration; he does not understand the true end of either." True, if he makes them an *absolute* model. But as I have presented the matter, this objection would not, it is hoped, apply to my view.

medium of Religion, and whatever deficiency modern Eloquence may have in perfection of form, when compared with ancient, it is compensated for by the superiority of its subject-matter, while, at the same time, it is to be remembered that perfection in the outward form is far more easily attained when the subject is of a less elevated nature, than when it is of the absolutely highest. Finally, it is apparent, that even if it be granted that ecclesiastical Eloquence itself has disappeared, as is actually asserted by some, still Eloquence itself is not destroyed, but must be sought for in the intercourse of men, in their daily society. In a word, Eloquence is eternal, for it rests upon that which is eternal in man, upon his ethical Ideas.*

* L'éloquence peut se trouver dans les entretiens et dans tout genre d'écrire. Elle est rarement, où on la cherche, et elle est quelquefois où on ne la cherche point. — *La Bruyère*

CHAPTER VII.

THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ELOQUENCE.

ALTHOUGH all three of these Ideas may be employed very properly on one and the same occasion, as motive grounds, yet most commonly, the aim of the orator has a more easy reference to one of them, which is then predominant, and to which the others, when they are employed, are subordinated. This circumstance led the Ancients to assume three species of orations, of which one has Legality and Illegality, another, Public Advantage and Public Detriment, and the third, Civic Merit and Civic Demerit, for its subject-matter. The first is the oration before the court of justice; the second, the deliberative or political oration; the third, the panegyrical or demonstrative oration. Correct as this division is, the Ancients have nevertheless, so far as I am aware, given no satisfactory ground for it, as indeed they were in general well fitted for comprehending and analyzing, but were less successful in referring to higher principles. For that which Aristotle, from whom the later rhetoricians derive this division,* offers in its justification,† has in truth more resemblance to a jest, however earnest he may have been in it. There are, says he, as many species of orations as there are species of hearers; but

* Quintil. III. 4.

† *Rheto.* I. 3. Cicero derives this division in the same way.—*De Partitione*, III.

the hearer is either a spectator or a judge, and this latter again, in respect to the future, or in respect to the past; hence there arise the demonstrative, the deliberative, and the judicial orations. This supposition, of a hearer who is merely a spectator, is most remarkable. The demonstrative orations of the Sophists, (that is, discourses having no other aim but to strike by the jingle of words,) were indeed listened to with applause in the time of Aristotle; but this must be regarded only as a piece of bad taste, and not as a natural impulse in man, upon which to build philosophically. Furthermore, although the relations in which the hearers usually stood to the orator in the ancient republics, are imperfectly indeed denoted by this passing of judgment on the past or the future, yet it is by no means shown thereby, that there were only so many and could be no more of such relations.*

On the contrary, if these three species of orations are placed beside the three Ideas above-mentioned, it is apparent that these are the only ground upon which the division in question rests. For since among the Ancients, only the political relation reached any good degree of perfection, these Ideas could be actualized among them only under the form of the Legal and the Illegal, the Weal and the Detriment of the State, Civic Merit and its contrary, and this very relation is also assigned as the subject-matter of the three species.

If divisions are to be made at all in Eloquence, the different species cannot be determined by a reference to the Form and Matter, and to the manner in which both

* That also does not seem to be satisfactory which occurs to Quintilian, *cuncta rimanti III. 4.*

interpenetrate each other. In Poetry this can be done; in Eloquence it cannot be,* for the reason, that the Form and the Matter vary with the relations which the orator and the hearer sustain, and these relations are too numerous to be specified. The leading Ideas are the permanent in Eloquence, the only thing which does not change; and on this account, they of themselves alone furnish a ground of division.

If these three species constitute a valid division in political Eloquence, they must be found in sacred Eloquence also, since the fundamental Ideas are the same in both. To counsel for the well-being of the State, and to point out the way to eternal well-being, is a moral activity of one and the same kind; as also there is no practical difference between accusing a criminal and inveighing against a vice, between praising a meritorious man and recommending a virtue. It is only to be regretted that the names by which the Ancients designated these species are suited to political Eloquence alone; and it could be wished, that appellations of an entirely general character might be introduced, which could be applied indiscriminately to both political and sacred Eloquence.

That species of oration which is based upon the Idea of Virtue was developed latest; it first received its complete unfolding through the Church, to which the State was always unfavorable. For this reason, also, this species was never known among the Ancients in its purity. Aristotle apprehends it merely on the side of the praise and blame which it dispenses, and makes

* *Oratorum genera esse dicuntur tamquam poetarum. Id secus est.* — Cicero *De optimo genere oratorum*, I.

it a demonstrative oration without any practical aim. Cicero, who adheres closely to this same view, doubts whether it can be regarded as a species at all, and whether it is necessary to give rules concerning it.* And contemplated from this point of view, it certainly does not belong to Eloquence. If a writer praises and censures with no other purpose but to praise and censure, productions of two kinds can arise; a lyrical poem, if the writer surrenders himself to his feelings; or an historical representation, if he follows the thread of a narrative. It will be an oration only in case the purpose to awaken a certain disposition in the hearer, to determine him to a certain course of conduct, is connected with the praise and the censure. The Idea of Virtue is employed in this way certainly by the Ancients; yet it is seldom predominant, and commonly is subordinate merely, as when Demosthenes places before the Athenians the example of their forefathers as an incitement to great deeds, or pictures the worthlessness of an opponent in order to give greater weight to his defence or accusation.

A particular species of oration, based upon the Idea of Virtue, was first formed in the Christian Church; here the moral perfection, which is conceived of as being in God, which was manifested in Christ, and after which whole companies of saints strove, was exhibited to believers for imitation. With the panegyrical oration in praise of the saints, was soon conjoined the funeral oration, which is also constructed upon the Idea of Virtue, and which deserves the name of an oration only when,

* *De Oratore*, II. c. 11. "All panegyrics," says Swift, "are mingled with an infusion of poppy."—TR.

through commendation of the deceased, it seeks to impel the hearer to good inclinations and resolutions. Every department of literature, nevertheless, has its limits, where it borders upon some other; thus this species of oration, based upon the Idea of Virtue, forms the transition from Eloquence to the Lyrical Poem, on the one hand, and to Historical Representation on the other. For this reason, the greatest care is requisite in the orator at this point, in order not to lose himself in one or the other. It would be forgetfulness of the relations in which he stands to his hearers, and, consequently, contrary to morality, if, without thinking of their benefit, he should give himself up entirely to his feelings, or should follow out a Historical Representation; either of which may be done only so far as it contributes to the attainment of an ethical end. It is difficult, I acknowledge, for the orator to describe his hero with some good degree of completeness, and still bring all under such a practical point of view as that he can be sure of exerting an influence upon the hearer. Yet the solution of this problem is not impossible, as the great models show.

CHAPTER VIII.

VIRTUE IS ALSO GOOD SENSE.

IN case the orator satisfies the requisitions of duty, by referring the end he has in view to the ethical Ideas of the hearer, the question arises, whether this course is also in accordance with good sense, or whether there are not other and far more effectual means of gaining entrance to men's minds, and of giving them a direction. Should this be found to be the case; should it be found that the orator in reality has only to choose between acting contrary to good sense, by following out moral principles, or acting contrary to good morals, by following out the rules of good sense; we must then give up the design of giving a systematic form to the theory of Eloquence, since nothing is capable of a systematic form which is either essentially incomplete in itself, or stands in open contradiction to one of the fundamental impulses in man, namely, the moral. But, furthermore, this question itself could not even arise, if the science of morals were only a little more developed than, strange to say, it actually is, although man has been employed in its unfolding for so many centuries. We should, in that case, see that Ethics, since it includes the whole conduct of man, must also furnish the *means* requisite to attain rational ends; that it cannot exist at all as a science; that there can be, absolutely, no conduct in conformity with principles, if the same laws which pre-

scribe our actions do not, at the same time, also point out the way and means whereby they will best succeed. In accordance, however, with views now prevailing, we hear much of good sense, as an attribute which often leads aside from the path of morals, and which, in its resources, shrewdly derived from experience and personal observation, furnishes us the surest means of attaining our ends. Whether this is so or not, I leave undecided; but that for the orator the moral action is also good sense, that is, is the true way of attaining his ends, is already apparent, from the investigation thus far. For we have found this to be a law, namely, that the orator must make his design subserve the moral Ideas of his hearers, otherwise he must not attempt to give them a direction. But so very much is Virtue one with good sense, that this very reference to the moral Ideas of the hearer is the only infallible means of giving him a direction. Will one here say, "No! the orator must address himself to the passions of men; he must make use of them where he finds them excited; he must arouse them where he cannot pre-suppose their existence, for only in this way are minds and hearts swayed. Who will deny that they are not very often swayed in this way, and that a practised orator, who understands how to inflame the passions, is able to get the victory over a less practised orator, who aims only to awaken moral Ideas?" The case, however, must not be stated in this way, but we must imagine two men of equal talents, one of whom takes hold of the hearer in the way prescribed by us, on the side of his moral Ideas, that is, on his stronger side, and the other of whom endeavors to seize him on his weak side, to

corrupt, to blind, to deceive him; the first, I affirm, will always succeed, the second will always fail.

And, indeed, for the following reasons. First, because by virtue of his human nature, moral Ideas are indwelling in every individual hearer; while, on the contrary, the possession of a human nature does not imply that man is controlled at all times by passion, or even that he is peculiarly liable to be. Consequently, if the orator presupposes the presence of passion, it is very possible for him to be mistaken; and if the orator endeavors to excite passion, such an undertaking is always very doubtful, since a firm point to which he can fasten is wanting. This point, on the contrary, is always found, and the orator is always sure to awaken interest, as soon as he claims to have morality on his side.

Secondly, even supposing that the passions exist as universally in the hearer as the moral Ideas, yet these latter possess this advantage over the former, that they are the same in all, while the passions, on the contrary, are different in each individual. But the orator cannot address himself to each particular individual; one and the same effect is to be produced in the most diverse minds by one and the same oration. Now, how wanting in good sense would the orator be, if he should neglect the universal interest grounded in human nature, in order to speak of the particular interest grounded in a passion which could affect only some particular mind, and with respect to which the most would be cold and indifferent!

In the third place, in addition to this, a very true remark, and one that is very much to the honor of man, applies here; namely, that taken singly, men may,

indeed, be full of little passions, but so soon as they are collected in great masses, each one seems to give up the base portion of his individuality, in order to preserve the purely human in it, which is always good. When man loses himself in a multitude, he is no longer the narrow-hearted creature governed by desire and self-seeking; but his interests melt in with those of all the others, and, consequently, cannot be other than pure and noble. The greater, therefore, the assemblage is, the more large-minded must the orator be, or it is all over with him.

Nay, even the deception which is so often employed by popular orators, proves that a direction can be imparted to men only by means of moral Ideas; for how does the orator succeed even in this case? By no means by appealing to Avarice or Revenge, directly, and endeavoring to inflame these passions; for no one has ever been able to carry away a great multitude by this means. On the contrary, the art of the deceiver of the people has ever consisted in clothing the desires growing out of their particular passions in the garb of requirements based upon the universal moral Ideas. Thus the demagogues in the French Revolution were able to bring about their great results only by concealing their selfish designs under the Ideas of Justice, the Common Weal, that is, under moral Ideas; and they could not but succeed, for owing to the misfortune of the times, there were none who were able to exhibit these Ideas in their pure form with equal force. But that the pure moral Ideas, when they are presented with power, gain the victory, (even in the most frivolous and corrupt minds,) over that false play with Ideas, the case of Demosthenes proves, who beat down his opponent, not

merely by means of his massive style and his perfect declamation, but mainly by means of the purity of his Will, and the power of his moral Ideas.

Fourthly, it is to be remembered that every hearer is by nature suspicious, particularly when he perceives that the right to influence his mind is claimed, and when he reflects that he should yield himself up only to one who appears to him to be an honest man. It is for this reason, also, that teachers of Rhetoric attach so much importance to the way in which the speaker appears to the hearer, and to the first impression which the hearer receives from the orator. But nothing is so difficult as to play the honest man, and one is far more readily taken for an honest man, if he really is one. For the consciousness of being in the right imparts a coloring to the style, and an emphasis to the tone, which an evil conscience can imitate only in part, never perfectly; and the morally bad which peers through, will always induce a suspiciousness in the hearer, which renders him less susceptible to influence. Hence, when Rousseau advised a young and afterwards very distinguished French advocate, Loiseau de Mauleon, to undertake the defence of only such causes as he was convinced were just, this was a Rhetorical rule, for the very reason that it was an Ethical rule, and adapted to promote, in the same degree, both integrity and eloquence.*

* "We ought to be able to persuade on opposite sides of a question; as also we ought in the case of arguing by syllogism; not that we should practise both, for it is not right to persuade to what is wrong; but in order that the bearing of the case may not escape us, and that when another makes an unfair use of these reasonings we may be able to solve them. The true and better side of the question is always *naturally* of a more easy inference and has, generally speaking, a greater tendency to persuade." — *Aristotle's Rhetoric*, B. I. c. 1. — TR.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SUBORDINATE IDEAS, OR CATEGORIES.

THE orator, in this moral striving to connect his particular Idea with the universal and necessary Ideas of his hearers, is liable to meet with obstacles of three different kinds. First, there are the obscure and undeveloped conceptions which the hearer forms of the nature of things, whereby he may be prevented from recognizing something which the orator holds out (as *e. g.* Duty, Virtue, or Happiness,) as really being such, and so from taking it up into his own Ideas. Secondly, the hearer, from a defective knowledge of existing relations, and of the present state of things, may be in doubt whether an Idea, from which in other respects he does not dissent, is practicable. Lastly, the hearer may form a different opinion with respect to the actual reality of a matter to which the orator would apply one of the higher Ideas, or, to speak generally, may not be convinced of its real historical existence. Hence arises the necessity for the orator, first, to instruct the hearer in the true nature and quality of things; secondly, to make clear to him the practicability of the proposed undertaking; thirdly, to show him that the matter in question has been actually realized, or to convince him of its historical certainty. Hence arise, for the theory of Eloquence, three subordinate Ideas, or Categories, as I would rather call them: *Truth, Possibility, Actuality.* And here it is evident that

moral attributes alone do not suffice for the management of these Categories, but that philosophic culture, and a great compass of solid knowledge, is requisite. If it is asked by what right, then, we bring these Categories into a theory of Eloquence grounded upon ethical principles, I would reply: Because the moral maxim, that the orator should refer his particular Idea to the universal Ideas of the hearer, can be followed out, only in case the doubts, or false views of the hearer, in relation to the Categories, Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, are removed; and this work, since it is under the guidance of a moral principle, must also be regarded as moral in its nature. And secondly, because the orator, in case he did not possess the scientific culture and the substantial knowledge which are requisite, would be morally obliged to attain them, since they are the necessary means, in order to the execution of a moral undertaking. The orator, even if he acquires philosophic culture and historical knowledge, to the full extent permitted and required by the highest ethico-rhetorical principles, does not thereby become a philosopher or a historian, but must ever be regarded as one whose sphere is action, and who seeks to exert an influence externally.

CHAPTER X.

THE CATEGORY, TRUTH.

IF we should make *Truth*, *i. e.*, the exhibition of the essential nature of a thing, the ultimate end in Eloquence, Eloquence would thereby become entirely identical with Philosophy. But we regard it only as a subordinate Category, to which the higher moral Ideas lead. In this way Eloquence maintains its ethical character, and at the same time its affinity with Philosophy is explained.

It is therefore allowable, and oftentimes necessary, for the orator to philosophize, whether the need of the Truth, as such, becomes apparent only after the conflict between the practical Ideas of the orator and the hearer has begun,—in which case, Truth merely furnishes the intermediate positions by which the former are the more easily made to harmonize with the latter; or whether the orator begins with the exhibition of the Truth,—a thing that may be done if it accords with the aim and the circumstances of the orator, and if the moral impulse from which it originates and the moral design for which it is done, are plainly to be seen. Then this impulse itself and this design will set the bounds within which the Rhetorical presentation of Truth must be kept, and by which it is distinguished from the Philosophical, which aims at the mere development of Ideas without reference to anything farther.

The exhibition of Truth is an object of prime importance in sacred Eloquence, and is one of the characteristics by which it is specially distinguished from secular Eloquence. In secular Eloquence, only one deed, one single resolve, is sought to be produced by the orator. This determines, and of necessity limits very narrowly, all that belongs to the mere development of a subject, and the mere informing of the mind. The problem of the sacred orator, on the contrary, is to conduct man to eternal life through the knowledge of God and of His Son, and to mould his spirit in such a way that not merely one good deed, but a complete change of the inner man, and a whole series of good deeds, may be the result. Reflections upon human nature and its relation to God, so far as they are referred back to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, are therefore perfectly in place in the sacred oration.

Nevertheless, the Rhetorical presentation of Truth is entirely different from the Philosophical ; for, in Philosophy, Truth is moulded wholly, and on all sides, in a statuesque manner so to speak, so that as in the case of a statue, there is no particular point of view, no perspective, for it, but it presents a perfect form to the beholder wherever he stands. In Eloquence, on the contrary, Truth appears only in a picturesque manner, and in profile, so to speak, for the orator presents only so much of it to the hearer, as is necessary to convince him, and as the theme requires. While, therefore, Duty commands the orator to strive after scientific culture, it also bids him to forget and sacrifice all the sensible, profound, and excellent thought he may have upon a topic, if it is not indispensably necessary to the attainment of his end.

CHAPTER XI.

THE RHETORICAL DEMONSTRATION OF TRUTH.

Two points, therefore, have been fixed with respect to Philosophizing in Eloquence: first, that some exhibition of political, ethical, and religious Truth is necessary in Eloquence; second, that this exhibition cannot be made with the completeness of Philosophy. From this it follows, further, that the strict demonstration of a proposition,—*i. e.*, its derivation from the one highest principle of all knowledge,—is not allowable in an oration;* since by a method of this sort, the practical aim of the oration would either be destroyed entirely, or at best would only faintly glimmer through. Here, therefore, arises the difficult question: How is Truth to be established in Eloquence, if it is not allowable to demonstrate it Philosophically?

In answer, it is to be noted in the first place, that there are many truths which do not need such a demonstration, and to which the orator can gain the assent of all hearers by a plain explication, by a happy illustration, by a fitting application to a circumstance in plain view.

If this is not possible, then doubt respecting any particular truth, since it cannot be removed by means of a demonstration, must be removed by means of Authority; that is, the Authority of the hearer himself or the Au-

* “To demand demonstrations from an orator, would be very much like allowing a mathematician to employ persuasion.” Aristotle’s Ethics, Book I. c. 3.—TR.

thority of another. And this latter, again, is either human or divine.

The orator cites the Authority of the hearer himself, when he shows him that, in rejecting a certain truth, he stands in contradiction to himself, and to convictions to which he has given expression upon other occasions. This species of argument, which, from its brevity and convincing power, has such a great advantage over philosophical demonstrations, is to be strongly recommended to the orator, and in order to be able to apply it with success, he must have the views and opinions of the general mass constantly in view, and as much as possible must enter into them. Herein, I believe, partly consists the *popularizing power* so highly praised, and always required, in the orator. I am not afraid that the orator, in thus constantly referring to the innate convictions of his hearers, will find that which is false and degrading. It would indeed be degrading to proceed from an Ideal which the orator himself regards as absurd, for the sake of pleasing the hearer; but why are the opinions diffused among the mass of men to be regarded as false and absurd, as a matter of course? On the contrary, is it not an essential characteristic of the human understanding that the truth can never utterly die out of it, but that a portion of it is ever preserved pure and genuine? And why should not the orator present what he has to say, in this form, rather than in a systematic argument? Since, moreover, the freedom of the hearer must be respected, it will be respected far more if I mould him, so to speak, from within outward, and by means of the development which I impart to his own Ideas, than if I lace him up in a system foreign to him. And I shall have less reason for attempting this

last, because, by joining on upon his own inward conviction, I can with less difficulty gain him over to a salutary truth; and because, on the contrary, the finest philosophical explication would perhaps only weary him and render him indifferent to his own true well-being, and the practical aim of my oration. Hence, if an orator in the expression of his Ideas, seeks to please himself simply, and for this reason forgets his hearers and the end which he has or should have in view, I affirm that this is not only contrary to good sense, since he can never in this way attain his end, but it is also contrary to morality; it is reprehensible self-seeking. And the evidence that it is contrary to morality, is found in the very fact, that it defeats his undertaking. For the orator, with all his powers, is now in the Ethical domain, and consequently, that which aids these powers must be morally good, and that which thwarts them must be morally bad. The distinctive character therefore, of oratorical discourse, is *Popularity*, using the term in its highest sense; and the orator is to join on upon the truth as it exists among the mass of the people, and to esteem the general form in which he finds it here, more highly than that particular form which he has given to it in his philosophical system.

If, however, there should be no one among the Ideas of the hearer which the orator can employ as the basis of his argumentation, then, since a scientific investigation is entirely forbidden him, he must betake himself to human or divine Authority. And, indeed, nothing is more frequent than the employment of the former of these in speeches upon legal cases and affairs of state. If the orator thinks that the enlivenment of the ethical Ideas of the judge is not sufficient in order to obtain

from him the desired decision, he cites the Authority of the law ; and if an opinion which is being maintained is not in accordance with the conceptions of a political assemblage, it must then be shown that, in a similar case, a statesman of acknowledged wisdom thought or spoke in the very same way.

To sacred Eloquence, in particular, Authority, and indeed a divine Authority, is so necessary, that this species of Eloquence would not have arisen, and, even now, cannot exist, without it. The highest of all truths, those pertaining to the relation of God to man, are here presented to view, in order to serve as a guide to man in his striving after happiness, and as motives to sanctification. Even granting, what, however, is not to be granted, that these truths can be reached by philosophic deduction alone, yet this method is not to be followed by the orator ; for, although knowledge, indeed, might be imparted in this way, yet all the practical benefits of knowledge would be lost, or, at best, would be but scantily reaped. Furthermore, neither the Authority of the hearer, nor that of any man whatever, is a sufficient foundation upon which to base truths of such importance, and which lie entirely beyond the ordinary field of view. They need, therefore, a divine Authority, when they are employed in public discourse, to promote the sanctification and blessedness of men. It was for this reason that, among the Ancients, who were destitute of a positive Revelation, not even a purely moral Eloquence could be developed along with political Eloquence, notwithstanding the high degree of excellence which characterizes their ethical systems, and that a religio-moral Eloquence did not appear until Christianity appeared. This species of Eloquence rises and sets

according as faith in a divine Revelation grows stronger or weaker ; and, from the very nature of the case, in proportion as the sacred orator loses the conviction of the divine Authority of the Bible, his Eloquence, also, must lose in power and dignity. Let one imagine to himself a pulpit orator endowed with the finest talents, but who places his own individual reason not beneath, but above Revelation, and who, consequently, in determining the relations which God sustains to man, and which men should sustain to each other, can appeal to no higher divine Authority. If the predominant bent of his mind is philosophic, he will make it his principal business to exhibit, to explain, and, as far as possible, to demonstrate, the principles of his religious and ethical systems. Now, passing over the objection to such an undertaking, that it is ordinarily not suited to the average degree of culture in a promiscuous assembly, I ask what, at most, can be the result, even supposing that the hearer rightly apprehends all the views of the speaker ? Scientific culture, indeed ; but the improvement of the heart and life of the hearer, and not scientific culture, was the design of the orator, and he must miss of this, since his whole time has been taken up in the endeavor to establish certain truths, and none is left, to connect them with the higher practical Ideas of the hearer. He will, perhaps, attempt to do this in the conclusion ; but if the whole of the oration, up to the conclusion, has not been planned with the design to awaken moral interest, the orator will in vain labor after this in the application of his discourse.

Furthermore, it seems to me that one can never have so firm and unshaken confidence in the religious and practical views which he derives from a human system,

be it his own or another's, as in those truths which, having acknowledged a Revelation, he receives on its Authority. Hence, there will always be in the minds of pulpit orators who are sceptical respecting a Revelation, a certain embarrassment, scarcely perceived by themselves, which will betray itself in their presentation of truth, now by a cold, indifferent tone, now by unnatural effort and distorted zeal; and thus the truths presented by them, however excellent they may be, will never acquire the influence over the feelings and the will which a calmer, more powerful emphasis would have imparted.

But what carries this embarrassment to the highest pitch, and must, in the utmost degree, weaken the Rhetorical power of a pulpit orator in the exhibition of truth, is the obscure feeling which will certainly press upon him, that, considering the relation which he sustains to his hearer, there is something contrary to uprightness in such a way of thinking; and this not merely because he is acting contrary to the designs of the State and the Church, who have appointed him to proclaim, not his own individual and human opinions, but divine truth,—although this seems to me to be a very well-founded scruple,—but principally because his office invests him with a dignity and respect which must appear as unwarrantable assumption in the case of every one who does not find his teaching on divine Authority. It is true, indeed, that when a man appears before other men, in order to prosecute the guilty, or defend the innocent, or to propose measures for the common weal, he needs no impulse from above, and no divine Authority, in order to do this. But it is difficult to understand how a man, with no basis but his own strength alone and not regarding himself as the ambas-

sador of a higher being, can dare to point out to his fellow-men, this, as the road to salvation, and that, as the road to perdition, and now, to urge them on by the prospect of the punishment and retributions of a future world, and now, to hold them back. He can acquire the right to do this only through a wisdom and virtue higher than human; and who will venture to ascribe these perfections to himself? The higher the degree in which he does really possess them, the greater, it seems to me, must be his dread of being made vain, even in his feelings, by appearing in public. Moreover, he sees among his hearers persons who are his equals in moral and scientific culture, or, it may be, his superiors. Feeling as if, in this case, it would be unbecoming to seize with a strong grasp upon their minds, he seeks to say to his little public only what is pathetic, agreeable and entertaining; and if he describes a vice, he gives them to understand that he does not suspect any one of his hearers, but has in his eye certain other persons who are out of their circle. Emotion is everything for him, and the awakening of feeling that comes to nothing; he seeks to be brilliant by means of external attractions and an ornamental style;* and thus his discourses are deprived of power and usefulness by his scepticism.

Let one, on the contrary, imagine to himself a sacred orator of less talent, but who, to a sincere will to do good, joins an unshaken belief in the truths of the Christian religion; and let him see what a higher elevation and sweep his discourses will receive from this single circumstance. While he derives the sublimest truths from the Holy Scriptures, where they are given to

* Un clerc mondain ou irréligieux, s'il monte en chaire, est déclamateur.—*La Bruyère.*

him in the clearest, most popular form, he is, at the same time, through the divine Authority of the Bible, raised above all prolix developments and arguments, and without troubling himself about them, can apply his whole power to directly impressing the minds of his hearers. The truths exhibited by him will be the more readily believed, since he himself speaks only because he believes, and since his firm inward conviction gives an equally calm and moving emphasis to his tone, before which all doubt must disappear. With all the humility produced by a sense of the weakness of the human reason, as well as of his own moral deficiencies, he yet feels that, without assumption, he may address instruction, rebuke, and exhortation to his equals, nay, to those better and wiser than himself, since he speaks to them, not in his own, but in God's name ; and since as an ambassador of the Highest, he is raised above every one, be he who he may. Since, therefore, the design of the sacred orator to lead to Virtue and Happiness through the knowledge of the truth, is to be attained only through his belief in Revelation ; and since without this, the relation which he sustains to his hearers has not even a moral validity, it is plain that belief in Revelation in his case must not only be regarded as a religious characteristic, but as a moral excellence also, and should be strictly required in him. It is in this connection the more mournful to notice, that so many, from a groundless fear of giving displeasure by recognizing a divine Authority, either conceal their belief in it altogether, or else give only timid utterance to it, and thereby deprive their discourses of power, dignity, usefulness, and consequently in the end of the approbation of the public also.

To him who is animated by the lofty desire of rival-

ling the political Eloquence of the Greeks, and of speaking from the pulpit with Demosthenean power, I would say "Science, Learning, Style, Delivery, these all render easier the practice of Eloquence, but do not make the orator. Demosthenes became an orator through the greatness and solidity of his character, and these qualities are indispensable to you, too, in order to the attainment of your aim; but they are not all you need. Though the greatest perfection attainable here were yours, yet you are not free from human weakness, and who gives you the right to proclaim salvation or damnation to your brethren, who are not worse than yourself? This difficulty you will feel; you will not venture to speak to them with power; you will be compelled to content yourself with exciting their emotions, or enriching their stores of information with new views; you will perhaps, for a time, be listened to with applause by a mixed assembly; but the abiding, eternal renown, the salutary, ever-onward-rolling influence of your efforts, is gone. You are weak and fearful so long as you would rest upon yourself; dare to regard yourself as the organ of a higher Being, and you are all power and all courage. Faith plants you firm and sure; your teaching is no longer that of the Pharisees, unmeaning sound, and useless hair-splitting; you teach with power, like Jesus himself, for he spake the words of His Father, and you speak His. Appropriate each and every one of His words, as well as those which His Spirit gave to His Apostles; but take them in the very sense in which they take them. You do not believe it now, but your own experience will soon teach you, that in the doctrines of our religion lies hidden all the power of sacred Eloquence."

Would that many might understand me, and through Eloquence be led to Christianity! A great honor for Eloquence, and a glorious gain for Christianity! For were it not as well and fitting to attain to Christian faith through Eloquence, as by the ordinary way of adversity and suffering?

CHAPTER XII.

THE CATEGORIES, POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY.

As the higher Rhetorical Ideas lead the orator to the Category Truth, *i. e.*, to the exhibition of the nature of a thing, they also frequently demand the proof of the possibility and actual existence of a thing. And hence, in addition to Truth, Possibility and Actuality come into view as subordinate Rhetorical Ideas, or Categories.

The Idea of *Possibility* is employed in a special manner in the oration before deliberative bodies. In this case, however apparent the benefits are that accrue from the execution of the proposed undertaking, yet the courage of the hearer often falls on reflecting how difficult the undertaking is, and his indolence intrenches itself, so to speak, behind the objection that it is impossible. This objection must be removed, and the orator must show clearly the practicability of his proposition. As the hindrances which seem to stand in his way disappear, one after another, the ethical Idea in the hearer acquires vitality and force, and begins to impel him to action. Demosthenes would have employed all ethical motives in vain, in order to incite the Athenians to resist Philip, if he had not also, at the same time, made clear to them the practicability of his proposition, and the Possibility of success. We see what an amount of solid knowledge is requisite in the orator, how he must have

thoroughly examined all the relations of the State, and have calculated all its resources, in order to acquit himself well in respect to this point. It does not belong to my plan to mention all the cases which the Idea of Possibility includes ; and I content myself with remarking, in accordance with my main design, that this Idea, however weighty and important it may be, is yet subordinate to the ethical Idea of State Weal. For only through this is the orator led to the consideration of the Possibility of a thing ; and he can have no finer impelling motive to attain all the knowledge requisite for this, than that love of country by which he is inspired.

Moreover, this Idea is found in sacred Eloquence, also. Those acquainted with the human heart know how often we endeavor to quiet our conscience, when it brings to our notice our neglected duties, by the excuse that it was impossible for us to perform them. Hence, it is not enough for the orator to recommend a particular action as belonging to an ethically perfect course of conduct ; he must so understand mankind generally, and the condition of society around him, as to be able to enter into an examination of all their relations, and to show that that which he advocates, is, in the highest degree, adapted to their relations. In this way, the high religious Ideas are taken out of their abstract and universal forms, and put into the concrete and definite forms of human life ; and nothing imparts a more active life to the Ideas of the hearer, than this full unfolding of them, and nothing seizes more powerfully upon his mind. But a strong will is needed on the part of the orator, in order to compel the very same spirit which has soared up to the highest objects of thought, to descend suddenly to the minutest detail of human life, without thereby

losing its fire and elasticity. Few are able to do this, and hence, since it is easier, the orator often deems it more befitting to roam about among abstract and formless Ideas.

The category of *Actuality* is of peculiar importance in the judicial oration; for although the sentence of the law respecting a particular act, that of murder, *e. g.*, is not a matter of doubt in the least, yet the act itself sometimes is, and its actuality can be affirmed or denied. Here the wide field of narrative-proof and statement opens to the orator,—a part of Rhetoric upon which the issue of a cause depends and which the Ancients consequently cultivated with great care. Yet, however important it may be, the ethical Idea of Civil Law presides over it; without this Idea, the question respecting the actuality of a thing, would not arise in Eloquence, and it must ever be kept in view as the last goal to which the narrative-statement tends. Hence no objection against the ethical principle laid down by us as the foundation of Eloquence, can be brought from the fact that the historical element predominates in this species of oration; for the oration, before the court, still remains a moral procedure, in accordance with the Idea of positive Law, although this latter leads directly to the notion and exhibition of the Actuality of a thing.

This subordinate Idea is also found in sacred as well as in political Eloquence. In this department it exists in very close connection with the category *Truth*, the latter category very commonly leading to the former. For it is a peculiarity of Christianity that it establishes the truth, not by means of demonstration, but by means of facts; as, *e. g.*, the love of God, by the sacrifice of His Son, immortality, by the resurrection of Christ. If these facts

are doubted, they must be shown to be actual by means of a historical examination of witnesses. Such investigations are of the greatest interest, because the Truth established thereby stands in such close connection with the highest practical Ideas; with Duty, Happiness and Virtue. Furthermore, to this category belong those passages, whether in political or sacred oratory, in which the quality of a person, or a thing, is described, in order to apply to it one of the higher Ideas.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PLAN AND DIVISION OF AN ORATION.

By laying down the Rhetorical Ideas and Categories, we have, as it were, measured off the domain of Eloquence, and found the *matériel* on which it labors. By contemplating, therefore, these Ideas in their first movement, we also become acquainted with the Form, in its most general features, which the Rhetorical *matériel* assumes. This is the doctrine of the *Plan* and *Division* of an oration, respecting which, ordinarily, very good and correct, but for the most part merely logical, rules are given, which, consequently, relate only to the Form; teaching, it is true, how to distinguish the good from the bad in the Form, but not pointing out the way to find the former, and avoid the latter. We wish here to unite both, and to investigate this *matériel*, not only in a formal, but also in a real manner. We must needs succeed, since we conceive of Eloquence as a procedure according to Ideas, in which Ideas the Matter as well as the Form of that which is to be produced, is contained; and since, consequently, we never separate the Form from the Matter, and are, therefore, enabled to determine on this theory, not only *how* the division is to be made, but also, *what* is to be divided.

Let us, therefore, imagine to ourselves a man who possesses the ability to bring out ethical Ideas into his consciousness, in great power and vitality, and who is animated with the desire to represent these Ideas in actual life, or rather to mould the Actual into conformity with

these Ideas. Such an one can employ, for this purpose, no other means than the Ideas themselves, and their expression in language; and he knows that his undertaking will succeed only in case he is not subservient to the passions of his hearer, but rather subjects himself to the Ideas of the hearer,—to that which is Highest and Best in him. He, therefore, brings his hearer before his mind, at first with merely the main features of his ethical nature, and with those requisitions which every man imposes upon himself,—viz., to fulfil his Duty, to form himself to Virtue, to lay a foundation for Happiness. When he addresses members of the State or Church, he conceives these Ideas in the particular form given to them by each of these relations. Every citizen, the political orator presupposes, desires to have Law and Justice administered, the Common Weal promoted, and to acquire personal Merit; every Christian, the sacred orator presupposes, desires to fulfil the Law of God, to raise himself to Likeness with Him, and to become capable of Eternal Blessedness. That these Ideas are leading Ideas in each and every hearer, the orator presupposes; but even if he is mistaken, even if no one of them, in any one of the above specified forms, exists in the hearers,—a thing which we affirm to be impossible,—still this confident presupposition would be the best means by which to generate them; for in proportion as men are assumed to be better than they are, and are so treated, do they become better than they are.

When the orator has thus brought the hearer before him, he will find it adapted to his purpose, either to refer the particular Idea of his oration to one only of the above-mentioned Ideas, be it one of the higher or subordinate, or else to connect it with several of them. The

orations constructed in the former way, I would denominate simple; those in the latter, complex. In the simple oration, Happiness, or Virtue, or Duty, is the predominating Idea; or else Truth, or Possibility, or Actuality, shaped and moulded by one of these former. In the complex oration, Truth, *e.g.*, takes the lead, and Virtue and Happiness follow; or whatever may be the order found best adapted to the particular Idea of the oration, and to the relations peculiar to it.

And now the orator makes a perfectly simple and natural beginning, by specifying his general design, and designating the Ideas or Categories, whether one or more, to which he intends to refer. This, and nothing more than this, is the Exordium. Its distinguishing characteristics are clearness and plainness. The orator announces the contest to the hearer, and tells him at what point he intends to attack him; and the hearer can well engage in it, because the fight is with honorable weapons, and the advantage is always on the side of the vanquished.

Since, among the Ancients, the subject upon which the orator wished to speak was usually known to the hearers, the Exordium, so far as it contained an announcement of the subject, must naturally be very brief; and it became more extended only when the orator wished to present himself in a more advantageous light in the existing circumstances, or to remove certain prejudices respecting himself personally, which might hinder his success. This advantage, arising from the hearer's being acquainted with the subject, and from a set occasion, is afforded to the sacred orator by the Festival days in the Christian Church, and also, to some extent, at least, by the Scripture text. For this, provided it is rightly selected, already contains the particular Idea of the orator, which needs

only a slight explanation, in order to spring forth from it into plain view. Moreover, the text is often interwoven with the circumstances and relations to which it was applied at the time of its first utterance, and the orator needs only to realize them to himself, in order to discover the same or similar relations in the present time, upon which it shall exert its influence. Since, therefore, the text specifies not only the Idea, but also the environment in which it is to unfold itself, this important advantage enables the sacred orator to abridge his exordium, especially as he does not need, like the political orator, to fill it out with assurances that his purposes are pure. For, in the first place, the whole drift and connection of his sermon, and still more of his life, is the best evidence of this; and, in the second place, since he ever appears as the ambassador of a higher Being, and never in his own name, it is not befitting in him to be anxiously careful about himself. That which so often lengthens out the Exordium is the undue employment of the subordinate Categories; the exhibition of the Truth or the Actuality of a thing, *e. g.*,—the orator, with the design of interesting, addressing himself to man's mere desire for knowledge, without regard to the demands of his moral nature. I cannot favor this method, and believe that it may be followed only in rare instances. For, in the first place, time is in this way spent in merely paving the way for the Idea, which might be better employed in the development of the Idea itself. In the second place, the preliminary statements by which the orator would prepare the way for the theme, are often as remote from the minds of the hearers as the theme itself, so that he might just as well employ this as to introduce the former. Finally, in the third place, since the mere desire for knowledge is, or

should be, subordinate to the moral interest, the orator can hardly fail to interest the hearer in his main Idea, if he connects it immediately with one of the higher moral Ideas,—a thing that can be done without a long circumlocution.

At the end of the Introduction, the orator may announce the two or three parts which contain the development proper; for why should he not carefully employ this, as well as every other opportunity, to aid the hearer's attention, and to facilitate his comprehension of the whole? If the hearer is compelled to stretch his power of attention too much, he either slackens it altogether, or else the effect of the oration is exerted on the cognitive powers alone, and not on the will, which, for the orator's purposes, is tantamount to no effect at all.

If we do not find this practice observed in the orations of the Ancients, or any announcement of the Plan and Division, this may proceed from two reasons. First, the method to which they were obliged to accommodate themselves, was prescribed to them by the occasion on which they spoke, far more than is the case with the sacred orator, and since this method, especially in the instance of the orator before a court, was almost always one and the same, it seemed unnecessary to announce it formally. Secondly,—and this appears to me to be the chief reason,—such a formal statement of the Plan would have been evidence of study and previous preparation, the appearance of which they avoided as carefully as they sought to maintain that of extemporizing. For they had to deal with a suspicious audience who would have attributed such previous preparation only to the design to deceive. But the case is different with the sacred orator, who may allow the diligence which he has bestowed with

an honest intention to continually appear in his oration, since he will thereby excite in the hearer only the expectation of a mass of information all the more fundamental for this. If, however, the sacred orator would, for any reason, omit the formal mention of the grounds of his oration, of the plan which he has sketched for himself, he is free to do so; for though, indeed, it is absolutely necessary that he endeavor to arrange his thoughts in the clearest and best manner, it is not absolutely necessary that he specify beforehand how he has arranged them.

But what is the principle upon which the Division of an oration should proceed? Beginning with the simple oration, this contains as many heads as there are principal positions, by which the leading design of the orator is connected with one of the higher, or one of the subordinate Ideas, as the case may be. In the sermon of Reinhardt, *e. g.*, entitled, "The worthy celebration of the Sacrament is a source of the noblest enjoyment," the leading design of the orator is referred solely to the Idea of Happiness, and is connected with it by the following positions: The worthy celebration of the Holy Sacrament affords us a view of our Redeemer in the most affecting greatness of his character; it wakens us to the consciousness of the highest of vocations; it fills us with the feeling of the highest of fellowships; it makes us alive to the most blessed of all hopes. If Duty is the single predominant Idea, the oration divides into as many heads as there are principal positions employed by the orator, to make it apparent that the state of mind, or course of conduct, recommended by him, is a Duty. If Virtue is the predominant Idea, the oration may be divided according to the different motives existing for the practice of a particular Virtue, or according to the different character-

istic marks by which the particular Virtue is made to melt in, and become one, with the universal Idea of Virtue.

But the simple oration may also be constructed according to one of the subordinate Ideas,— Truth, Possibility, Actuality,— provided only its connection with the higher Ideas is, from the very beginning, clearly and definitely established. To illustrate: the false notions which Christians form of Divine Providence, or of the efficacy of Prayer, stand in the way of their religious and moral development; from this point of view, instruction respecting Providence and the efficacy of Prayer, according to the Idea or Category of Truth, may be the only object of the oration. Yet, such instruction should not degenerate into a complete treatise on these subjects, but the orator should bring forward, in his refutation or indoctrination, that only which is specially important in practical respects.

In a political oration, the whole may be referred to the Idea of Possibility, in order to show that the proposition in question, which confessedly promotes the Common-Weal, is also practicable. The same may be done in sacred oratory, in order to weaken the force of excuses for committing a fault, derived from the impossibility of avoiding it; or for neglecting a virtue from the impossibility of practising it. It is evident, moreover, that in this case the orator should combat those objections only, which the hearer actually makes, or, at least, may easily make. The positive reasons, on the other hand, for the practice of the Virtue then divide off into main masses by themselves which form the parts of the oration.

In like manner, also, the Idea of Actuality, referred to one of the higher Ideas, may be the predominant Idea in

an oration, as is most commonly the case before a court of justice. Here, the different proofs that a thing has or has not happened, fall into several classes, and these are the parts of the oration. The old Rhetoricians, however, give us information on this, with a minuteness of detail which leaves nothing to be desired. In the sacred oration, also, Actuality may be the sole predominant Idea ; first, when the orator wishes to prove a disputed fact belonging to sacred history ; and, secondly, when he would sketch a picture of an important personage or fact, that shall be fruitful in practical application. In the first instance, he will maintain such a particular fact, not against skepticism in general, but against the doubts of his contemporaries only ; he will not therefore take into view the objections of former times, but those only that are peculiar to their time ; he will make a selection, accordingly, from the mass of proofs which are at his command, and these are easily divided, according to their intrinsic character, into certain classes and divisions. In the second instance, the orator brings into notice those qualities and characteristics of a person or a thing which are most congruous with the practical Idea, which guides the whole oration. Thus, Actuality is the single predominant Idea in the sermon of Reinhardt upon "The characteristics of the Church of Christ as seen in its origin ;" and he describes this origin as pure in its sources, miraculous in its circumstances, noble in its aim, benificial in its consequences.

A peculiarity not so much in the manner of the division itself, as in the way of announcing it, is found in the French orators, especially in Massillon. When, namely, it is their principal business to combat the erroneous notions of their hearers,— and any one of the above-mentioned predominant Ideas may lead to this, although the three

higher less often than the three subordinate ; in such cases, I say, they are wont to announce, not those correct views which they wish to unfold, but the erroneous ones which they wish to combat. It is apparent that it amounts to the same thing in the end ; for the employment of this mode presupposes that the orator has divided the errors and their contrary truths into equal and correlative masses, and hence it makes no difference which of the two he announces specifically. There is always, however, something hazardous in this mode of proceeding, since it is easier to bring truths of which the speaker is himself thoroughly convinced, into a sure and certain connection, than the errors and doubts current among the multitude ; and if the orator has not so arranged these as that the threads of a full development of the truth can be wound upon them, he will not combat them with success. The want of connection, and the breaks, so frequently to be noticed in Massillon's sermons, are perhaps to be attributed to this manner of arranging the parts of an oration, which became an almost uniform habit with him ; hence only the practised and skilful orator, and he only rarely, should make use of this manner. It is always safest for the orator to present in the very outset his own conviction, having some reference however to prevalent errors, and to combat these only when they come up of themselves in the development of his own thoughts.

But the complex oration, in which several Ideas are placed beside each other in equal importance, is of more frequent occurrence than the simple oration, of the division of which we have been speaking. It is apparent, at the first glance, that this species of oration conducts, with much more force and certainty, to the end in view, than the other. For, if the orator brings his leading Idea into

connection with those of the hearer, only on one side, it is very possible for him to fail in the attempt to show its identity with them. In order to win over the hearer completely, the orator must lead him continually to one and the same goal from several points; the orator's Idea, if I may be allowed the expression, must continue to wind around the Idea of the hearer until it has become completely incorporated with it.

It is evident, now, that the complex oration has as many parts as there are predominant Ideas in it; and each one of these parts, again, may be regarded as a simple oration, and be divided according to the same rules, so that that which forms a main division in the simple oration, becomes a subdivision in the complex. A common method, here, is to begin with the Category of Truth or Actuality, in order to throw due light over the subject of which the orator would treat, and then, in order to waken a higher interest, to follow up with the Idea of Virtue, Happiness, or Duty. This is the almost too uniform mode of division, when the orator speaks, first, of the nature, and, secondly, of the effects. But unless the Categories Truth and Actuality are handled by a very skilful master, discourse based upon them often becomes somewhat cold and tedious, and the hearer remains indifferent towards a subject of which the orator indeed gives right conceptions, but the relation of which to the higher demands of his moral nature he does not make plain to him. Or else the orator, conscious himself of this coldness and dryness, allows himself to be led into the error of interweaving into this part of his oration those higher means of moving his hearers which should not be employed until later; and in this way he oversteps the limits which he has prescribed for himself, and anticipates the

contents of the divisions which are to follow, which he is now unable to fill out. Instead, therefore, of placing Truth and Actuality in an equal rank with the higher ethical Ideas, it may often be more suitable to subordinate them to these ; to make Happiness, Duty, or Virtue, principal parts, and to insert the representation of Truth and Actuality only when the need of it becomes plainly apparent in the course of the development of those higher Ideas. But, again, there are some subjects in which the Idea of Truth or Actuality has such a decided preponderance, that the orator must make it predominant throughout his oration, and must interweave what he has to say respecting Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, in the individual developments of the True or the Actual.

In this way, the six Rhetorical Ideas are associated with each other in an order and interchange the most manifold. The counter-action which the orator expects from the hearer, determines him to begin now with this and now with that Idea, and to follow up with the others, thus or so ; and hence no universal rule can be laid down regarding a Plan of this sort, since existing circumstances and relations have so great influence upon it. The Plan is, in fact, a resolution which the moral powers form, and which is shaped by the peculiar occasions and inducements which lead to it.

The course and movement of Ideas in a great orator animates to a similar pregnant and powerful movement in the auditor, in the same way that the example of the hero animates to virtue. Demosthenes, *e. g.*, in the first oration against Philip, begins with the Category of Possibility ; he shows how a more fortunate issue may be expected in the case of further expeditions ; and as he proceeds, the doubts of his hearers vanish, their breasts swell,

and fill with heart and hope. But the orator does not stop with considerations of a general nature; he goes into detail, and lays before the people a circumstantial plan of all that is to be done. In this way he satisfies the understandings of his hearers, elevates their minds, and renders them open to the higher Ideas of State-weal, and of Civic Merit, by which they are now carried captive at the will of the orator. But there is no course and movement of Ideas of such irresistible power as the one in the oration for Ctesiphon, in which, in accordance with the Category of Possibility, it is first shown that the speaker could not by any possibility have foreseen the issue of the battle at Chæronea, and then the Idea of Virtue follows with a startling rapidity, — the orator affirming that, even if he had foreseen all, he should nevertheless have given no different counsel. The well-known division of Cicero's oration for Milo, according to the Ideas of Actuality and Legality, has some resemblance to the wonderful method of this oration of Demosthenes.

In the oration of Demosthenes upon the affairs of the Chersonesus, the Idea of Public Advantage is not connected, but entangled, with that of Civil Law, in a highly singular manner. For, while according to the former he shows that the army which Diopeithes commanded in that country, should not be disbanded, he, at the same time, according to the latter, exculpates their general with respect to the acts of violence with which he was charged, — a procedure to which he was probably compelled by the circumstances of the case, and which he carries through with extraordinary self-confidence, but which I would recommend no one to imitate, since, of Ideas thus entangled, the one commonly would be prejudicial to the other.

CHAPTER XIV.

FIRST FEATURES TOWARDS A SKETCH OF THE ORATOR.

IT has been remarked, respecting the science of Morals, that there are three points from which it may be contemplated, and that a complete philosophic presentation of it is rendered possible only by connecting these different views. Morals, in the first place, may be regarded as the enumeration of all those *commandments* derived from the one highest law, by which the will ought to be directed, and of the duties imposed by them. Secondly, the question may arise with respect to that *character* in the agent, which inclines or enables him to fulfil all these duties; and developed in this direction, the science of Morals becomes a presentation of ideal virtue, or of ideal virtues. In the third place, again, the *product* may be contemplated, which perfect virtue produces by the fulfilment of all its duties, and this becomes the chief object in view, under the names of prosperity, happiness, the highest good. But, instead of connecting in one, these three different views, writers upon Morals commonly make but one of them prominent in their theories, which, consequently, must be one-sided and unsatisfactory. For does not the sum-total of all the different and scattered virtues presuppose an active agent, in whom they can concentrate and come into actual practice; and when this agent is seen acting, what is more natural than the inquiry after the product of his activity?

We make these well-known statements, in the first place, in order, by placing the three different forms of the system of Morals beside the three highest Rhetorical Ideas mentioned by us, to justify our having assumed these latter as fundamental Ideas; and in the second place, still more, for the reason that these fundamental Ideas furnish rules for the treatment of Rhetoric as a system. If Rhetoric, as we affirm, is only a more general unfolding of Morals, the selection of one particular point of view, alone, would be a fault in Rhetoric, as well as in Morals, and the combination of all the points of view becomes as necessary in the former as it is in the latter. We have thus far developed that part of Morals which is called Rhetoric, from the Idea of Duty, as a point of view. For we began with laying down a law, of which we have pointed out the application, and from which we have derived several individual rules; and we have believed it necessary to take this method, for the sake of greater intelligibleness. Cicero and Quintilian,—to compare those Philosophers who have developed Morals from the Idea of Virtue, as a point of departure,—it seems to us, have chiefly in view the representation of the model orator, whom Quintilian describes even from the time of his first instruction in school. But their representations are somewhat ambiguous, since, although in this way of treating the subject, we are, indeed, made sufficiently acquainted with the character and qualities of the orator, we can yet form no definite conception of his activity, because the rule by which it is to be judged of remains unknown. If, now, as we have said above, we have sought to avoid this fault by laying down firm fundamental principles, we must also guard against falling into the opposite

error of forgetting the character and qualities of the orator. The representation of these is the more important, since it might seem as if the mere knowledge and skilful application of the rules laid down by us were sufficient for the orator, and as if his moral character and qualities were to receive no farther notice; which, if it were actually the case, would frustrate our endeavor to construct Rhetoric as a part of Morals. But such is not the case; and furthermore, it is impossible to follow all these rules, unless there be moral strength of character, unless there be virtue, and, in the case of the sacred orator, unless there be the inner life of faith.

For the distinctive agency of the orator consists in giving a powerful impulse and direction to the minds of others, and he is not equal to this unless the goal to which he would direct them is plainly in his eye, and unless he earnestly desires to reach it himself. In a word, he must possess, so to speak, the faculty of moral Ideas, and these belong to character. The imagination, it is true, generates those Ideas from which the creations in the sphere of Art proceed; although, even in the case of Art, as it seems to me, the products are always somewhat lacking in body and firmness, unless they are set up by character. But, inasmuch, as the Will is the object which Eloquence seeks to influence, Eloquence must originate in the Will, in the moral state of the orator. Take the sacred orator, for instance: where will he find matter for his discourses, if his own sanctification, if the moral and religious condition of men does not lie near his heart, if he does not earnestly desire to improve human character? In him alone who is animated by these motives, who labors upon himself, and contemplates men around him with the design of

elevating them to a higher degree of perfection, only in such an one will Ideas that may be referred and applied easily to the highest aim and end of the human Will, be generated in their constant and abounding fulness; and such Ideas are, beyond question, motive-powers moral and Christian in their nature. Nay, they presuppose a higher grade of morality, one that is raised far above that which is commonly called virtue,—the mere abstaining, namely, from vice, and an irreproachable life. For if it is morally beautiful to will, at all times, that which is Highest and Worthiest, for its own sake, it is still more beautiful by far, to desire at the same time, in connection with this, that which is Highest and Worthiest for all mankind. This desire may be wanting in a man, and he not be morally bad in his life; but a far higher degree of moral perfection must be ascribed to him of whom it is the sole and actuating principle. Hence it is certainly no envious complaint, when a sacred oration is charged with being wanting in such moral Ideas as alone can beget a disposition of soul that is constantly employed in promoting the well-being of humanity. To give expression to one's self merely, to depict certain favorite views with self-complacency, cannot be represented as a vice exactly; but it is certainly proof of an imperfect nature, which is not able to forget itself, and to live only in the well-being of others; it indicates a want of that higher character by which the orator produces the stuff and material employed by him, and which, since the creative power in man is designated generally by the term genius, we would style moral genius. In vain, therefore, is the command: "Refer your Ideas to the highest human Ideas," addressed to him who, absorbed in his own emotions,

fancies and notions, does not feel the heroic impulse to seize upon the hearts of men, and to mould them into a nobler state; for he is lacking in the first and most necessary things,—in Ideas,—and instead of these, he will play with figures, dissolve in soft emotion, or bring forward information, which is quite entertaining, it may be, but which produces no effect upon the Will.

That which is true of the sacred orator, is true also of the civil orator. If he does not cling with disinterested love to his father-land, and is not impelled by this love to study closely the internal relations of his country, and to mark attentively the changes in its foreign relations, how is he, in important and difficult emergencies, to acquire correct views and to form salutary plans, without delay? He will be dumb, as was the case with the Athenian orators, on hearing that Philip had taken Elatæa. “For,” as Demosthenes said, “that day and that occasion demanded a man who had traced events from the beginning, and had formed a correct conclusion for what reason and for what end Philip had done that.” And how had—Demosthenes, the only one who spoke on this day, obtained this keener insight, except through his love of country, in which respect he was in advance of all his fellow-citizens? It may indeed be said, that in the absence of love of country, self-interest, hatred and friendship, preconceived opinions, political systems, will not leave the orator destitute of ideas and plans. Perhaps not; but here the great difficulty presents itself, that these very designs are to be subjected to the highest ends of the State, and not of the individual will; and this must be uncommonly difficult to accomplish, if they did not spring up in dependence upon and subjection to, the Common Weal, but were suggested by other and

less noble motives. In order that his selfish plans may succeed, the orator, as has been remarked, must bring them into connection with the highest moral Ideas; and if this connection is not a natural, but a forced one, talent of the first order will often fail in the endeavor to carry through the deception,* and the web of its argument will be torn into shreds by another orator, who perhaps speaks with less power, but whose Ideas have grown up out of the ground and soil of patriotism. A fine instance of this is afforded in the two orations, which, according to Sallust, were delivered by Cæsar and Cato in the Roman Senate, respecting the punishment of the fellow-conspirators of Catiline. What can be finer than the arrangement of Cæsar's oration; how cunningly does he understand how to render the Ideas of magnanimity, positive law, and public advantage, available in a case in which it was his sole aim to support the mere instruments of his own ambitious plans! With less art, but with greater power, the honest Cato forces his way through, and the whole Senate sides with him. And thus, finally, by our own examination and by the example of the younger Cato, that definition of the orator is justified, which, according to Quintilian,† originated with the elder Cato; and which is indisputably the best that has come down to us from antiquity, viz.: *The orator is an upright man who understands speaking.*

* A wrong design is betrayed by the contradictions in the course and connection of thought. Ἐπειδάν τις, οὖμαι, κακουργῶν ἐπὶ μὴ προσήκοντα πράγματα τοὺς λόγους μεταφέρῃ, δυσχερεῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι. — Demosth. *adversus Leptinem*, p. 100, ed. *Wolf*.

† *Instit. XII. 1.*

BOOK II.

ON ELOCUTION.

CHAPTER I.

AFFECTION AND PASSION.

BEFORE we proceed further, let us cast a glance over the path which we have opened.

It was our design to seek for a fundamental principle, that should bring unity and connection into the fragmentary and disconnected theory of Eloquence. In order to this, we made one of the characteristics of Eloquence, the striving to produce an influence outwardly, its essential characteristic, and in this way found that it stands upon an ethical basis and ground, and is an active process; that, as it proceeds only from Ideas, it can address itself only to Ideas. The development of this single thought has already led us to important results, and has combined into a systematic unity many assertions which in the common theories of Eloquence are laid down without proof; and we have also been enabled by it to correct many errors in the prevailing views on this subject. We have seen that there is but one Eloquence, and that civil Eloquence is connected with sacred by the unity of its constituent principle,

although each is differently modified by the particular relation in which it moves ; that the Ancients, in conformity with a feeling in the highest degree correct, have assumed three species of Eloquence, corresponding to the three highest Ideas ; by laying down Truth as a subordinate Rhetorical Idea, we have found again one of the characteristics of Eloquence, its inclination to Philosophy, but, at the same time, as we flatter ourselves, have thrown some light upon the difficult question respecting the dividing line between Philosophy and Eloquence ; we have given rules respecting the plan and division of an oration which proceed according to Ideas, and, therefore, are preferable to the common method of division, which proceeds merely according to fragmentary conceptions ; and, finally, in order to justify our ethical view, we have in different places made it apparent that the orator is capacitated for the performance of his proper business only by means of a truly moral state of heart.

And thus, as we believe, has our ethical principle maintained itself, so far as that part of Rhetoric is concerned which embraces the doctrine of Invention and Arrangement ; for all the rules which can properly be given respecting these subjects flow directly from the fundamental law laid down by us, which, in its development, has shown not only how each and everything in this part of Eloquence should be, but also why it should be so, and not otherwise. To maintain this principle with respect to that part of Rhetoric which is now to follow,— with respect to Elocution, so called,— seems a work of greater difficulty. For since the excitement of the Affections, or at least of the Passions, is that with which we have to do here, how, it may be asked, is this to take its origin from an ethical principle, nay, even to

be justified before it? Furthermore, we are here, and rightly too, to expect the outlines at least, of a theory of Prose; and it would seem that an ethical principle could in no way lead to it. It does, indeed, seem so; but it is seeming merely; for, in fact, this part of Rhetoric constitutes the very triumph of the ethical view, since problems are solved by it which can be solved by no other view.

But we must, in the first place, express our regret at the errors by which this part of the subject has been disfigured, and for which the Ancients, properly, are responsible, who, since they are now universally lauded, must here, at least, take home a merited blame. This blame falls, first, upon the Rhetoricians, who again can throw the accusation back upon the orators themselves, or rather, upon the circumstances amidst which they spoke. Ancient Eloquence owed its power and definiteness principally to the rapidity with which the effect followed immediately after the oration was ended; but in this very circumstance lay also a source of degeneration. For, since the orator contended for honor, property, and life, and since the possession or loss of these depended upon the effect of the oration, he would, in this his strait, find every means good, of whatever sort, provided it only led to the end in view; and he who could get hold of no noble means, must often content himself with bad ones, satisfied, if he only attained his end, and not considering that he would have attained it with much more certainty had he employed worthier means. Hence the orators allowed themselves in artifices of many sorts, in order to deceive the judges and the people, to dazzle them and excite their passions. This practice, which of necessity, must often succeed, passed over into the

theory of Eloquence, which, in this instance, as generally, was not able to rise above the existing practice. The artifices for stimulating the minds of the hearers were collected together and arranged in a connected series; and rhetoricians, who held the excitement of the passions to be necessary in their art, taught for this end, not the training of the mind, to use Plato's phrase,* but the actual deceiving of the mind. Aristotle does this in the section of his Rhetoric where he treats of the Passions; and Cicero speaks of the means which he employs for exciting them with a frankness at which we cannot but be surprised.†

But it is, perhaps, equally surprising that these writers, and those who have harmonized with them in sentiment, should have been implicitly believed, and that these artifices should have been held necessary and indispensable in secular Eloquence at least. The example of Demosthenes alone, it seems to me, could not but have led to the thought that they might be dispensed with, and that other means might be employed in their stead, which are not only much nobler but also much more reliable. If this orator had written a Rhetoric, it would certainly have been different from Cicero's rhetorical writings, and have been not unworthy of his instructor Plato, who, in the Gorgias, lays down such a strict view of Eloquence. But the Eloquence of Demosthenes, like his character, possesses an elevation, which, of necessity, must fail of being apprehended; and owing to their inability to rightly estimate the rhetorical means which he employs,

* Ψυχαγωγία.—*Phædrus*, p. 331 ed. Heindorf.

† Qua (miseratione) nos ita dolenter usi sumus, ut puerum infantem in manibus, perorantes tenuerimus; ut alia in causa, excitato reo nobili, sublato etiam filio parvo, plangore et lamentatione complerimus forum. *Orator* c. 38.

the Ancients, and we after them, have believed to have detected the very same artifices in him, which are plainly apparent in other orators.

In order to prepare the way for this part of Rhetoric, it is necessary to enter upon a psychological investigation, and to establish a distinction between two things, which, though very different from each other, are yet commonly confounded with each other,—namely, between *Affection* and *Passion*. The movements in our minds differ very much in their nature, their duration, and their importance, according as they are produced by external objects, or are generated from within outwards. An external object, or the representation of it, excites, if we desire or loathe it, a movement within us which is rightly called *Passion*, since we are passive in the matter, and yield ourselves up to an influence which operates upon us from without. This condition of the soul cannot, in strictness, be justified, since it supposes the inactivity of the Reason, a power which, indeed, cannot always prevent the reception of impressions from without, but which should, nevertheless, limit, elevate, and, if they are injurious, suppress them. Moreover, this inward condition is, in its nature, unquiet, perplexed, and painful to the mind, which is always troubled by the feeling of dependence upon external objects, and in its duration it is transient, since it is produced by a transitory object. Entirely different from this, is that excitement of the mind which owes its origin to an Idea; I call it *Affection*, (*Affekt*,) and not *Passion*, since the mind in this case affects itself through its own reflex activity, instead of passively receiving an impression from without, as in the other case. Yet this term *Affection*, which renders me liable to misapprehension, and is not, by any means,

adequate, I employ only because I know of no better one. What, however, I mean by it, will be clear from what follows. A mind in which an Idea has become living consciousness, cannot possibly retain that coldness which accompanies mere abstract representations or conceptions; for since the Idea contains within itself the notion of an activity of some sort, and the impulse to it, it must necessarily appropriate to itself all the powers of the soul, and set them in motion in one definite direction; and from this united working of all the faculties, from the exertion accompanying it, an inward state must arise, distinguished by a higher degree of warmth and life. In case a creation in the domain of Art results from the Idea, this inward state is denominated poetic or artistic inspiration, and is universally recognized and esteemed as fine and beautiful in its nature. But the same warmth and glow attends upon all ethical Ideas which strive to break forth into activity; nothing but the mere negative refraining from evil can have coldness of soul as its attendant; he who strives to produce something great and good, will never be without ardor, without affection. Yet we should never apply the name Passion to this fine mental manifestation; this term indicates the inactivity of the higher spiritual powers, while, on the contrary, Affection as distinguished from Passion, supposes the highest activity of the Reason, which is the parent of Ideas. Furthermore, the warmth of Passion is obscure and vague,—to use a comparison, is like a dimly burning fire; Affection, on the contrary, constantly conscious, constantly attentive to the slightest hint of Reason, capable of checking itself in the midst of the most rapid course, is to be compared to the sun-light, which brings even more clearness than warmth with it.

For this reason, and also because Affection does not, like Passion, divide the mind into two contending parties, but unites all the powers of the soul, and all the emotions of the heart, in finest harmony with the Reason, it is the happiest state by far to which man can raise himself. That it is also a perfectly moral state, it seems unnecessary to add. It is, especially when generated by ethical Ideas, man's moral nature itself, and that, too, in its finest splendor, its highest dignity, and elevated far above that coldness of soul which is sometimes denominated rational, although with great injustice, since a powerful activity of the Reason must necessarily banish all coldness. Finally, Affection is distinguished from Passion, by the fact that the former is as permanent as the latter is transient. For since the Idea which generates it can never be exhausted by a single exhibition, but only by a continued series of exhibitions, and, therefore, has a long-continued existence, nay, if it is a moral Idea, an eternal existence, for the contemplating mind, it imparts this attribute and duration to the mental affection which accompanies it.

Instead, however, of duly distinguishing between two mental manifestations so diverse as those above described, it is too common to denominate everything as Passionate, that is attended with any degree of fire and life; and it often happens that that which is beautiful and excellent in the highest degree, is degraded by the debasing conception which is connected with this word. We should, therefore, never ascribe to one who is given up to an art, or a science, as soon as he is capable of producing something within its sphere, by his own independent power, a Passion for this art or science; his love is an Affection which is generated by Ideas; and he,

alone, has a Passion for an art who merely desires to contemplate its creations for the sake of the pleasure they produce, without being excited to any activity of spirit by them. In the social relations of men, also, not all love is Passion. Love is Passion, or Lust, only when it strives after the possession of the loved object, as after the possession of a piece of property which it wishes to obtain and hold; it is something far higher, it is Affection, so soon as the Idea of a *perpetual* connection comes to lie at the bottom of it; an Idea which is neither disturbed by separating circumstances, nor grows cold from the earthly possession of the object. Speaking generally, the action of man should never be Passionate, but always Affectionate; it should never betray the fire which an external object has kindled, but should be constantly animated by that mild and clear warmth which accompanies all that springs from the inward depths of the spirit. And thus let us, in Eloquence also, distinguish the discourse of a man who is filled with an Idea, which he would impart to others in an equal degree of clearness and warmth, from the effort, ever to be condemned, to awaken their Passions.

CHAPTER II.

THE DUTY OF THE ORATOR TO SPEAK WITH AFFECTION
AND TO AWAKEN AFFECTION.

HAVING, in the foregoing, shown that true Affection as distinguished from Passion, is never morally wrong, but is always to be regarded as intrinsically beautiful and excellent, we now go still farther, and affirm, that it is absolutely necessary that the orator speak with Affection. For he goes before an assembly only in order to impart to it the Idea by which he is himself pervaded ; and this Idea, if it actually be an Idea, must be accompanied with Affection. If we find the orator wanting in this, we are justified in assuming that he is not animated by an Idea ; that he seems to purpose and undertake something, but in reality has no definite purpose, and, therefore, is in contradiction with himself ; that he pursues his business from necessity merely, like a day-laborer, or from by-ends like a demagogue, or from cold and chilling vanity, like a mere fine speaker ; and any one of these assumptions, if just and warranted, will prevent the hearer from respecting the man or opening his heart to him. What we have said, moreover, respecting the difference between Affection and Passion, will, it is hoped, protect us from the charge of demanding in the orator, feverish heat, sickly emotion, or strained animation ; we demand warmth with thoughtfulness, feeling with reason, emphasis without distortion, light and fire without vapor, — fine qualities, which even the common

hearer knows how to estimate, and readily distinguishes from the extravagant and artificial.

Every one who has ever come before the people, filled with a great Idea, has spoken with Affection; but with the greatest Affection by far, He who gave utterance to the greatest Ideas, namely, Christ. This Light of the World reveals eternal truth with an abiding inspiration, which is at one time mild and gentle, at another with thunder and crash; a great example for every sacred orator, and one that warrants him in dispensing with all so called philosophical calmness, and obligates him to speak with similar Affection.

Supposing, now, that there are means whereby Affection can be communicated to others, it is plain that the use of these means can never be injurious, but always and only beneficial. For they never rouse up mere blind feeling to a life and energy that renders Reason inactive; on the contrary, mere blind feeling is held in subordination, since the orator compels it to coöperate towards his ends, and in this way, there arises inward harmony, which is man's most perfect condition. The fear, also, that the orator may go too far in exciting Affection, seems to me to be entirely unfounded; for Affection is generated by a stronger activity of the Reason, in which there can be no excess, and the calm thought must at every moment lead back within its proper limits the discursive feeling. Passion most certainly may become too strong, or rather, it should never become so; but how the Ideas of the moral Reason can be accompanied with too lively Affection, or how it is possible for these same Ideas, sanctified by religion, to seize upon the mind with too great power, I, at least, cannot imagine. The orator, therefore, if he is able to excite Affection, need prescribe

no limits to himself while making the attempt; owing to human weakness, instead of going too far, he will ordinarily have to blame himself for having done too little. And if it is objected that Affection, like every lively frame of the soul, is transitory, I ask whether it is for this reason, merely, to be deemed worthless, and whether every single hour which is spent in the feeling of enthusiasm for the Highest and Best is not a positive gain, and a beautiful reward for the soul that is the subject of it? But this objection is without foundation; for Affection owes its existence to the heightened activity of Reason alone; and Reason, by means of the fuller development it has received in the process, is always of itself, independently, able to reproduce Affection.

Invariably excluding everything Passionate, and assuming that Affection can be imparted to the hearer, we can now, without any opposition whatever, we hope, lay down the assertion, that it is the duty of the orator to awaken Affection. In case, either from principle or from inability, he disclaims this obligation, his activity must be limited to that of which we have treated in the First Book; namely, to proving that the particular Idea of his oration is contained in the general Idea of the hearer, and that the hearer, if he wills Duty, or Virtue, or Happiness, must also will this or that procedure to which these Ideas lead. But what is accomplished by this? As good as nothing. This might indeed do, if in man, knowing, willing, and doing, were one and the same act. In this case, he would only need to know that he ought to will, in order to will, and would only need to will, in order to do. But such is not the case. There is a cold abstract knowing which generates no willing; there is a feeble willing which never passes over into doing. But

to what does this cold knowing and this feeble willing lead, and how can the orator be satisfied with producing it? For the very reason, that something is to be accomplished which is not yet accomplished; for the very reason that he finds the State and the Church in a corrupt, or at least an imperfect condition, and would have it changed for the better; for this, and no other reason, does he come forward as an orator; this is the end towards which he must labor, if he would not be in contradiction with himself; and if he does not attain it, he has spoken in vain. But in order to attain it, it is necessary, that the Idea of the hearer be raised to such a grade of vitality as that it can immediately pass over into act; for that blazing up of all the inward powers which we denominate Affection, indicates the moment when the Idea is breaking through and coming forth into Actuality. If the capacity of being conscious of ethical Ideas must be predicated of every man, and yet very few act in accordance with Ideas, this is only because Affection is wanting in them, the very link itself, which, in the chain of human activity, connects willing with doing. The sentiment which the orator labors to produce in his hearers, and the resolution which he seeks to have them take, are to be brought about immediately, not only when he speaks before the judge or before his fellow-citizens, but also when he speaks before a Christian assembly. For if it is not brought about immediately, when will it be? At another time? But why defer that which is in itself good? Or would the orator merely enlighten and cultivate the Reason under the conviction that well regulated action will then be developed of itself, from it? But experience proves the contrary; it shows us men of very cultivated Reason who either do

not act at all, or act wrongly. And, moreover, how is this gradual cultivation possible in the case of the orator, to whom, at this one particular moment, a mind is surrendering itself, which perhaps will never again fall within the sphere of his influence? Is nothing at all to be done for such an one, and how long is the orator to wait for something to be developed of itself, from the audience before him? Their ethical Ideas they bring with them; they are therefore, at this moment, just as susceptible to every good influence, as they will be years hence; for it is the individual who changes, the mass, on the whole, is ever the same. The objection in question proceeds from the false supposition that it is necessary for the orator to laboriously impart to men that intelligence which lies at the bottom of action; but he is spared this labor, since every man by nature possesses the ethical Ideas. Perhaps there is sometimes in the orator, as in the hearer, an aversion towards the exhibition of Affection, which conceals itself behind these objections, but which, after what has been said, can hardly pass as praiseworthy.

If now it be asked, in what does the business of the orator properly consist,—in conviction or persuasion,—I confess that I can declare decidedly neither for the one nor for the other, and that it seems to me the question ought not to be asked, since it is based upon a false view of Eloquence. So far as conviction is concerned, this is by no means sufficient to constitute the substance of Eloquence, if by it is understood the proof that the particular Idea of the orator is contained in the general Idea of the hearer. But this is hardly the meaning given to the word; it is generally taken to denote a demonstration, by means of which the whole philosophic

connection of thought in the orator is impressed on the hearer, in order that he may be excited to one particular act. Conviction of this sort seems to me to be an impossibility, and I believe that the best dialectician has not yet succeeded in entirely bringing over his opponent to his own standing-point. But even if it were a possibility, I should deem it useless for the orator to start from the highest principles of all knowledge and action, when he might directly, and with entire certainty of success, fasten on upon the ethical Ideas. It were also sad, in the highest degree, to be compelled to go through with a course in Philosophy with a man in order to move him to the performance of a good action. But this part of the subject, as I believe, has been sufficiently explained in the First Book. I can as little approve of persuasion, if by it is understood the distortion or darkening of representations, in order to excite the Passions ; no able orator will betake himself to this means, and we have shown that he has no need to do so. If, however, conviction may be taken to denote the production of the Idea in consciousness, and persuasion its elevation and transformation into Affection,—which, however, as I believe, the common use of language does not permit,— I would answer the question above by saying, that the business of the orator consists neither in conviction nor persuasion alone; but that his conviction should be persuasive, and his persuasion convincing.

CHAPTER III.

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF AFFECTION.

BEFORE we proceed to treat of the means of exciting the Affections, we must first become acquainted with the different kinds of Affections. Affection is not always one and the same; for, in the first place, the Ideas upon which it attends, although all of them of an ethical nature, may be very different from each other. In the second place, the character and qualities, as well of the subject or agent in whom the Idea is generated as of the object to which it is referred, vary. For example, the Idea of Duty may be generated in a guilty or in an innocent mind, may be applied to a guilty or an innocent man; and in relations so dissimilar, the Affection arising from the enlivenment of this Idea must assume different hues. Finally, in the third place, several Affections, in themselves different, may flow together, and by their union, form a third. The knowledge of these different kinds of Affections seems to us to be necessary, since, without it, it will be impossible to determine whether the means of exciting the Affections which we shall present, are sufficient or not. This knowledge will also enable us the better to distinguish the Affections from the Passions,—a distinction upon which I lay the greatest stress, since only through its observance can Eloquence be restored again to its proper rank. Indeed, it does not escape me, that I am here entering upon the dangerous ground of Psychology, so called, from which perhaps the fragments of so many unsuccessful under-

takings in the department of Rhetoric ought to deter me; yet the safe clue with which I venture into this domain, will perhaps preserve me from a similar failure. It is true, that nothing can be done in Psychology, if that observation of self and of others, from which it draws its truths, is pursued at hap-hazard, and without leading principles. But here we have something firm, universal, and sure, in the ethical Ideas, which we bring down into the lower region (so to speak) of the mind, only in order to observe what will result from their contact with the natural feelings and the different inward states of men. In this, or in a similar way, it may perhaps not be impossible to distinguish and to designate satisfactorily all the different movements in the mind which so interpenetrate and run through each other, and which no so-called empirical Psychology has as yet systematized. Yet, what we shall be able to do here can be regarded as only a slight contribution towards such an undertaking.

With regard now to the Idea of Duty, it is apparent that the inward state of a man who is warmed and enlivened by it, and who strives with all his powers to realize it in conduct, must be remarked as a peculiar Affection. It is denominated *Zeal*, and it is naturally the strongest in him who regards the law which he obeys from love, as a truly divine law; it is weaker in degree, yet not essentially different, in the mind of him who receives the law by which he regulates his conduct, from the State solely, or who believes that he imposes it upon himself. If, however, man does not strive after the realization of an Idea, but after the possession of an outward good, his *Zeal*, which at first was an Affection, degenerates into *Passion*. If the Idea of Duty has been

suppressed for a long time in a man's mind, and again acquires dominion within it, it begets, with reference to his past faulty state *Shame* and *Repentance*, the liveliness of which, like that of *Zeal*, is in proportion to the seriousness of the sphere in which the Duty is conceived to be obligatory, and which, like the Affection of *Zeal*, would cease to be pure Affections, if the individual, instead of charging himself with the positive neglect of duty, should charge upon himself merely the neglect to make use of a favorable opportunity to promote some earthly advantage. The perception, in the case of another, of the difference between what he actually does and what he ought to do, excites in different degrees the Affection of *Anger*, which, in order to remain a pure Affection, must never go farther than to the bad action itself, and which becomes a Passion so soon as it is directed against the person of the agent.

The Idea of Virtue, whether its perfection in God, in Christ, or the approximation to its perfection in a good man, be considered, through the Affection accompanying it becomes *Love*, *Friendship*, *Esteem*, *Benevolence*, *Emulation*, *Admiration*. These are pure expressions, from which the common use of language has already banished every notion of passionateness, with the exception only, that by *Love* is not always meant an Affection generated by the Idea of Virtue, for an object in which this Idea is perfectly or in part realized, but often, also, a passionate desire for that which stimulates unnaturally. *Love*, as an Affection, has the Godhead for its highest object, with which it strives to unite and become one, and can pass over to a human being only in case the human being manifests something divine. Accordingly, it is more perfect in its nature than *Friendship*, since it reveringly

recognizes the whole individuality of the loved object, while Friendship, on the contrary, is generated by esteem for only certain particular, mainly moral, qualities. Yet, as Love striyes after an abiding union with its object, so there is also in Friendship, the desire for community of feeling and action ; if this fails, *Esteem* remains, which is denominated *Benevolence*, when it is accompanied with the impulse to manifest itself in procuring some earthly advantage for the object of its regard. *Emulation* is inseparable from Love and Friendship, and in general, arises in a mind that is pervaded by the Idea of Virtue, on seeing its Ideal of excellence more perfectly realized in another being than itself. *Admiration* is the loving recognition of another's excellence, when it is unattainable by us, or, at least, when it seems so far removed from our own Ideal, that we cannot strive after it without renouncing our own Ideal, and ourselves, as it were. Thus the hero admires the poet, and the poet the hero, while each follows after a restricted Ideal, and one that is and must be foreign to the other. But no one admires either the invisible Godhead, or the Godhead as revealed in Christ, for the very reason that its perfection is without limits or restrictions, and consequently, may be taken as an Ideal by every man. The Idea of Virtue produces the Affection of *Contempt* and *Disesteem* towards those who seem to be destitute of the Idea of Virtue ; though Disesteem more properly has reference to the absence of Civic Merit, or desert in relation to the State. Contempt is a very harsh, and, therefore, an imperfect Affection ; he alone feels it who stands upon a low point of view, and who believes himself to be the creator of the virtue he possesses. He who is convinced that he has received it from God, without any merit

of his own, will be more inclined to Pity than Contempt in relation to the sinner.

Finally, in the third place, the following Affections are associated with the Idea of Happiness:— *Longing* after the highest Good, *Hope* to obtain it, *Gratitude* towards him who has rendered aid in obtaining it, *Pity* for the erring who does not strive after it at all, or in a false way, *Fear* of all that might deprive us of it, and *Abhorrence* of evil within ourselves, as the worst enemy of our true happiness. Yet, in order to preserve these affections pure, the Idea of Happiness must be conceived in its greatest purity; and it is for the very reason that this is seldom done, that the Affections at this point border so closely upon the Passions. He who stands upon the position of the mere moralist, and seeks his happiness in an unhindered activity, will detect in himself a displeasure, not altogether pure and unselfish, towards all who oppose him in any way. But these Affections most easily degenerate into Passions, when the Idea of Happiness is applied to political relations, and the individual animated by it is striving after the welfare of the State. So long as *Enthusiasm* only, is felt in relation to those who promote the welfare of the State, and *Displeasure* only, in relation to those who disturb it, these are beautiful Affections, and worthy of esteem; but, instead of Enthusiasm, there very easily arises blind *Adoration*, and instead of Displeasure, raging *Hatred*; and these political Passions, which presuppose a great obscuration of the rational Idea of Happiness, are the more frightful, because it is easy for every man to justify to himself, and to others, his own selfish efforts, under the appearance of a patriotic disposition. In like manner, *Enmity* against him who has done us some injury,

is never an Affection, but always a Passion. The same is true of *Envy*, in which the Begrudging another of his Happiness is connected with Hatred towards him for having it. Even Pity has something of Passion in it, if we deplore the case of an unhappy person, not for his own sake, but from a lurking, unconscious intimation, that possibly we may soon find ourselves in his condition. It is a true Affection only when, as has been said before, it springs from the pure Idea of Happiness dwelling in us, and in some degree realized in our own case, but which we miss in the striving of another; or when our feeling for the miserable is elevated and ennobled by the additional influence of the Ideas of Justice and of Virtue, as is the case on seeing an innocent man stricken with disease, or a man who, considering his high qualities, merited a better fate. As the sight of an innocent man, stricken with disease, calls forth an elevated Pity that is full of Affection, so the sight of prosperous Vice begets *Moral Indignation*,* which, like *Compassion*, is a mixed Affection, and springs from the connection of the Idea of Justice with the Idea of Happiness.

Aristotle, who, in the beginning of his Rhetoric, condemns the excitement of the Passions, but who afterwards, unable to carry out his theory independently, adapts himself to the necessities of the case, treats of the subject-matter of this chapter with evident interest, and with the precision in the specification of particulars peculiar to him. He assumes eleven Passions:—*Anger*, *Placability*, *Love*, *Hatred*, *Fear*, *Shame*, *Benevolence*, *Moral Indignation*, *Pity*, *Envy*, *Emulation*. It is easy to see how, in this enumeration, things the most diverse are brought together,—*e. g.*, the mean vice of Envy, with

* *Nemesis*.

the noble striving of Emulation, and, consequently, how necessary it is to distinguish between Affection and Passion. Let it also be noticed that this list of Aristotle is not more copious than our own, and, consequently, that we have not been compelled, in order to systematically arrange the actual phenomena of consciousness, to mutilate them in the least.

A P P E N D I X.

WIT.

If we, of right, require in the orator the ability to awaken Affection, we should also, perhaps, require that he have Wit. Wit is the destruction of Affection ; it is the bent of a mind, which, instead of being carried away by the Holy and the Great, makes it an object of its scrutiny, and entertains itself with the apparent contradictions and contrasts which are contained in it. The play of such a mind is much more sure and safe when it is directed against a Passion, which continually presents a great number of weak points, and which is always checked and abated whenever Wit gets the upper hand. It might, therefore, seem as if the weapon of Wit were necessary to the orator, not indeed for attack, but for defence against a Passion or an Affection awakened by his opponent, that is working against him. This is the only one, among the many shallow reasons mentioned by Cicero, for the employment of Wit in Elo-

quence, that is not utterly to be rejected.* And, indeed, it cannot be denied that a well-applied sally of wit is of great effect when the orator needs merely to free himself from some entanglement, to help himself quickly out of a momentary embarrassment, and by a brief word to get rid of a matter, especially if it does not pertain to the higher relations of human existence, and is of no special importance to any one. Yet, when the orator has in view the excitement of a great and powerfully moving Affection, Wit, however skilfully applied, can produce only an injurious effect. It may indeed deprive the reasoning of an opponent of its force, and extinguish the fire which he has kindled ; but the hearer is thereby put into an indifferent mental state that is destitute of Affection, and one in which he is more inclined to reflection than to action. But the orator should never let it come to this ; for while in this way he destroys the Affection or Passion which his opponent has called forth, he at the same time destroys that which has been produced by himself, and must, after an interruption so disturbing in its effects, begin his whole work over again. The intermingling of Wit in an oration, is therefore unworthy of a true orator ; and it seems to me the orator is upon true and high ground only when, without utterly annihilating the particular Affection which has been called forth in opposition, he throws it back with redoubled force upon his opponent. In this way, without any cold and indifferent state intervening, Affection follows upon Affection, and that awakened last is strengthened by the contrast with the preceding. It will not be more difficult, it

* *Quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, quod refutat.* — *De Oratore*, II. 58.

will rather be more easy, for him who speaks with the consciousness of the goodness of his cause, and can apply the whole power of the moral Ideas to his own purposes, to suddenly reverse a false feeling in the mind of the hearer, which is unfavorable to himself, than first to kill all feeling in him, and then reanimate him for his own purposes.

In order to clearly perceive how foreign Wit is from Eloquence, let one consider the nature of sacred Eloquence, and ask himself, What would be the effect of a witty sally, against an opposer of religion, for example, in the midst of a serious discourse? Would it not, of necessity, so destroy the whole impression of the discourse as that it would be impossible to think, even, of renewing it again? Of similar effect, also, is Wit in political Eloquence, although less hazardous, because the contrast with the main character of the discourse is not so sharp and striking. Upholding, to speak generally, is the proper function of the orator; he can therefore have to do with destroying, only in passing and briefly.

The tendency to Wit and the capability of employing it, were very slight, in the serious mind of Demosthenes, in which great affections were constantly dominant, while they were prominent qualities in Cicero. The latter took great pleasure in practising this talent, which flattered his vanity, while in the orations of Demosthenes no traces of it are to be met with, although he was often the subject of the witty sallies of his contemporaries. Quintilian, who in general is more prejudiced in favor of his countryman than he should be, in reference to this quality places him above Demosthenes; a totally false judgment, since he praises him on account of a quality which rather merits condemnation. Cicero is very en-

tertaining, perhaps, to the modern reader, in those passages in which he covers his opponent with wit and ridicule, but let one only observe how Demosthenes refutes his adversary with earnest vehemence, with what masterly ability he converts defence into an attack, and hurls back as an accusation the annihilated charge of his opponent, and then ask himself which method is most conformed to the end of the orator, most elevated and noble, most virtuous ? *

* Wit, in a deep and vehement nature, assumes the form of *sarcasm*, and *moral scorn*. When there is a perfectly clear perception of the thorough falsity of an opinion perversely defended by an opponent, it is accompanied in the earnest and truth-loving mind with an ethical indignation, which is too intense and strong for any merely light play like that of ridicule, and gives itself vent in that bolt-like denunciation of sarcasm which at once smites and withers. Wit is never found in the Scriptures ; but irony and sarcasm sometimes appear in their most incisive and awful force, as in the advice of Elijah to the priests of Baal (1 Kings xviii. 27 sq.), and in the description of idol-manufacturing by Isaiah (Isaiah xl. 19, 20 ; xli. 6, 7).

—TR.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MEANS OF EXCITING AFFECTION; OR THE RHETORICAL PRESENTATION OF THOUGHT.

THE way for the investigation of the important inquiry, by what means Affection can be excited, seems to have been sufficiently prepared, by what has been said in proof of the moral dignity and worth of this mental state, and of the duty of the orator to call it into existence. We do not treat of the excitement of the Passions, because it is a subject which can find a place only in a Rhetoric constructed according to entirely false, or, at least, imperfect principles. Aristotle, upon this subject, imparts an amount of instruction which, in completeness and fulness of rich and fine remark, can hardly be surpassed. Yet it all amounts simply to this, that each Passion has its particular object by which it can be excited, if it be depicted in lively colors, and placed vividly before the view. A little imagination and so-called knowledge of human nature, accompanied with a versatile character, or an evil will, is often sufficient in order to succeed in this. It is not even necessary that the orator himself feel the Passion which he would enkindle; nay, this might rather be a hindrance to him, since it would destroy his coolness and self-possession. We acknowledge, moreover, that in many circumstances, and having to do with certain characters, it may be much easier to allow a Passion to blaze forth, than to produce an Affection; nay, that the former, in comparison with

the latter, is mere child's play. But besides that such a procedure is not moral in its nature, it is also a highly uncertain and deceptive means in order to attain a rhetorical end, as we have already shown; so that good sense, which goes hand-in-hand with duty, limits the activity of the orator to the educating of Ideas, and their enlivenment into Affections.

While now a Passion may be made to blaze forth, by one who is destitute of Passion himself, he alone, on the other hand, is able to awaken an Affection, who is himself enlivened and pervaded by it. For the aim, in this case, is not to render the mind of the hearer susceptible to the stimulus of an external object,—in order to which, it is not indispensably necessary that the orator himself be strongly affected by it,—but to transfer something that has been generated in the depths of the soul, into another person, which can be done only in proportion as the orator himself possesses that which is to be produced. Furthermore, it has been shown, that in the mind of the orator, the Affection is most intimately connected with the Idea, and that it arises only as an effect of the Idea, and in proportion to the degree in which the Idea is unfolded and developed. In like manner, it can never be produced in the mind of the hearer by means which lie without the Idea, but only by means of the Idea itself, and its presentation. Only when the orator succeeds in imparting the Idea, which is living and creative in his own mind, to the hearer, in an equal degree of force and clearness, will the Idea break forth into activity in both speaker and hearer with equal power, *i. e.*, be accompanied with the same Affection in each. If, therefore, we can discover a particular and peculiar manner of presentation, by which an ethical Idea may be gradually carried

up to its highest completeness in the mind of another, we shall have discovered the true means of awakening Affection. I say a particular and peculiar manner of presentation, for at this point especially, it must be evident that it can be neither a Philosophical nor a Poetical manner. For although Philosophy exhibits Ideas in themselves, and Poetry, an Idea in a sensuous dress, yet neither strives to excite an Affection from which a sudden revolution, either in the inward state of a man, or in the outward condition of human society, may proceed ; and even if anything similar to this results from the Philosophical or Poetical manner of presenting Ideas, yet the *design* to attain it, forms no part of this manner of presentation, and exerts no influence upon it, when it is pure and perfect in its character and execution. But the Rhetorical manner of presenting Ideas has the excitement of Affection for its peculair aim and end ; and I affirm that this is the only point of view from which we can proceed, if we would consecutively and systematically derive its rules and laws. After having treated, in the First Book, of the Plan and Division, we shall therefore now endeavor to penetrate more deeply into the secret of Rhetorical Composition.

The success of our attempt to refer the theory of Eloquence to ethical principles, would be very doubtful, if we should now find ourselves compelled to leave the path which we have hitherto trodden, and to deduce the laws of the Rhetorical presentation of thought, which have for their aim the awakening of Affection, from some other domain than that of Ethics ; perhaps from a newly-invented theory of the Beautiful and Sublime, which we had connected as a little addendum with the main system, or perhaps from the theory of the Emo-

tions, and some shrewd empirical rules for exerting an influence upon the human mind. But we find ourselves in no such desperate position, but take up our investigation again, precisely at the same point where we dropped it in order to explain some subjects which presented themselves, by the aid of the principles which had been established, and proceed in the deduction of the laws, according to which a free being may exert influence upon other free beings. The first was : the orator must subordinate his particular Idea to the universal and necessary Ideas of his hearers ; and upon this was based all that we have thus far developed. It is now incumbent upon us to lay down the remaining laws which are to be observed in this case, and to show how they, and they only, are the best and sole means of attaining the end which the orator must of necessity prescribe to himself, viz., the production of Affection.

He, therefore, who, as a free being, would work upon other free beings, and has already brought his particular Idea into harmony with their innate and necessary Ideas, must, in the first place, closely adapt his method of treating the subject to existing circumstances and relations. He must, in the second place, with all this reference to the position in which he finds himself, with all the resistance or avoidance of the obstacles which he meets in his path, at the same time be shut up and continue in one constant, unceasing, progressive process. But since, in the third place, through this advancing movement, the entire relation of the orator is every moment changing, assuming another form and shape, every element of his activity must likewise be distinguished by a particular form and shape ; and as his method, as a whole, was adapted to the relations which he found already existing,

so each of the steps in it must be in harmony with these changes brought about by himself.

These three laws, — the first of which we denominate the law of *Adaptation*, the second the law of *Constant Progress*, the third the law of *Vivacity*, — we shall now examine, and endeavor to apply to Eloquence, as the means of exciting Affection.

CHAPTER V.

THE LAW OF ADAPTATION.

It is not merely a maxim of good sense, it is an ethical law, that our influence upon others should be adapted to the circumstances under which it is attempted to be exercised. These circumstances are no other than our relations to our fellow-men, which again are determined by their particular individuality, and by all that is connected with this. But every man demands that his individuality be respected, and although he acknowledges that it can and must undergo modifications, he nevertheless demands that these consist not in the suppression, but in the cultivation and elevation of what is already existing within him. Since this is a demand which every man makes, and since it is a moral law, that we so harmonize our claims with those of others, that they can coëxist with each other, this same law imposes upon us the obligation to respect their individuality, *i. e.*, in our method of procedure to adapt ourselves to existing relations and circumstances. For in endeavoring to realize an Idea, we assert and maintain our own individuality ; but in order that this may not be done at the expense, or by the suppression, of the individuality of others, the preponderance which we are endeavoring to acquire must be made easy and compensated for, by the closest possible insinuation of our own individuality into that of our hearers. Hence arose the first duty to fuse our Ideas with theirs ; hence arises, now, the second duty

of recognizing their individuality while asserting our own, and of employing the greatest carefulness while penetrating into anything that can possibly be regarded as belonging to it. But since, according to what we have before affirmed, the highest virtue is also the highest good sense, the employment of this moral adaptation, while we are endeavoring to exert an influence upon others, will be the surest means, and the necessary condition, of securing a successful result. It is this by which the *practical* man, in the higher and better sense of the word, is distinguished; and if his method is uniformly characterized by this quality, and for this reason is never fruitless, we should, while ascribing good sense to him, at the same time not overlook the moral ground and source of this quality. There are men who at first sight inspire confidence, because they assert a distinctive and superior individuality with dignity, and set it forth with modesty, while at the same time they concede its full rights to the individuality of every other man. Hardly have they commenced the management of a difficult case, when all obstacles and opposition vanish, because every hearer, on seeing them proceed, is soon convinced that their influence upon him can result only in his own benefit. These are the men who control and give direction to social life, and to such examples must we look if we would obtain a true and lively notion of the distinctive peculiarity of the orator. On the contrary, there are persons who are ever ready and desirous to exert a good influence upon others, but who, because they always bring forward their propositions at the wrong time, and are not able to adapt them to the individual peculiarities of those with whom they have to do, invariably fail in their plans and enterprises; good men, per-

haps, and yet, without doubt, men who need a higher moral cultivation. They are the genuinely unrhetorical natures, exactly adapted to place clearly and plainly before the eye, what the orator should *not* be.

Now the law of *Adaptation* is as valid in relation to a rhetorical, as it is in relation to a moral procedure, and imparts to it, if it is formed after it, certain qualities which are of an ethical origin, and which, at the same time, may be regarded as the best means of exciting Affection.

In the first place, an oration adapted to existing relations, will be so suited to the hearer's power of comprehension, as that it will neither strain it to over-exertion, nor leave it unemployed. For the power of comprehension depends upon the learning and intellectual cultivation of the hearer, along with which it forms a part, and indeed a very essential part, of his individuality, which is to be respected by the orator, and which he would offend against in an inexcusable manner, if he should fatigue it by too great obscurity, or too great plainness, in his discourse. And since, in order to avoid both these faults, a very accurate acquaintance with the Public whom he addresses is necessary, and one which he cannot obtain without a diligent study of it, he is obligated to engage in this study; otherwise, he would incur the very same blame which he does, who undertakes a particular business, and neglects to acquire the knowledge necessary to its prosecution. It is indeed true, that, even among the same class of hearers, the degree of cultivation in each one is different; yet, it is easy to strike a mean, and from this to form the image, if I may so say, of a universal or model hearer; and this image, if the orator keep it constantly before him, and

address all he has to say to it, will keep him from the two extremes above mentioned.

If an orator is not able to form a correct judgment respecting the Public which he is to address, or to occupy their attention in a manner adapted to their power of attention, this cannot be regarded as a natural and unavoidable defect, and so be merely matter of regret, but must be considered as a moral defect ; for his inadequateness ought not to have escaped his notice, and he should have given up a profession to which he had not become equal, especially since, in the majority of cases, he might have made up for what was wanting in natural talent, by persevering diligence. Nay, even if the orator possesses the greatest natural talents, it will be impossible for him to form a correct judgment respecting the intellectual state of cultivated hearers, and to adapt his conceptions to theirs, unless he possesses scientific and learned culture ; this, therefore, he should acquire ; ignorance in him is to be regarded as weakness of moral character, and as such, is to incur moral condemnation. Here, again, we see how, in the case of the orator, the activity of all his powers is, or should be, under the guidance of a moral principle.

In the acquisition of learned and scientific culture, he is to set no limits to himself ; let him go as far as he may and can ; let him keep even step with his age, or let him press on before it ; only let him never forget that learning and science, for him as an orator, are only means, and not ends, and that he may not put the exhibition of what he has made his own in these departments, in the place of the moral Ideas which he is to set before the popular mind. This would be a vanity intrinsically contrary to morality ; it would cause him to lose sight

entirely of the hearer's power of comprehension, and oftentimes to present things that would weary the attention of his audience to no purpose, or only awaken obscure images, instead of distinct conceptions; and this is the second, and, as it appears from investigation, very culpable error, which the law of Adaptation forbids, in respect to the hearer's power of comprehension.

In this adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of comprehension, which, as we have seen, is of an ethical origin, we find the first means of exciting Affection. In order that the hearer may be induced to take part in a series of conceptions, it is absolutely necessary that the activity which is required of him be not fatiguing in its nature; in case it were fatiguing, it would soon become irksome to him, and he would surrender himself to an inactivity that would render all further efforts of the orator fruitless. And even if the hearer should be willing to exert himself, to attentively follow a discourse which taxed his powers to the utmost by its obscurity, yet the too great stretch of the power of comprehension would exert a deadening influence upon feeling and imagination, and would render it impossible to excite them. But the power of attention is weakened by the too great plainness, as well as the too great obscurity, of that which is presented to it, and the gentler stirrings of Affection will ever disdain to wake at the bidding of an orator who cannot even satisfy the understanding.

Here, I fear, I shall be met with the objection, that he who has good sense enough to see the correctness of the remarks just made, will need nothing more than this good sense itself, in order to direct himself accordingly, and to impart to his oration the right relation to the hearer's powers of comprehension, so that the moral qual-

ities and character of the orator need not come into account at all. This may have actually been the case in Athens, and in Rome, with many a demagogue; yet, such an example would prove nothing here; for he who in Athens, or Rome, should have set forth something utterly unintelligible, would have been immediately driven off from the bema by the scorn and laughter of his impatient hearers. Under these circumstances, therefore, where the necessity of following the rules above mentioned was so clear and pressing, the moral character and qualities requisite in other circumstances, might, perhaps, have been dispensed with in the orator; but from the fact, that a bad man may be compelled, by circumstances of a highly pressing nature, to a certain method of procedure, it cannot be inferred that this method of procedure is not of an ethical nature, and that, other things being equal, the bad man can succeed in it as well as the good. For only contemplate, for a moment, the sacred orator of our own times, whose relation to his hearers is far more unhampered than that of the ancient orator, since they cannot react upon him in a manner so totally destructive of success, as in the case above mentioned, and how difficult, nay, how impossible, it often seems, even for men of the shrewdest good sense, men whom no one can deny to be capable of forming a correct estimate of the capacity of their audience, to keep themselves in their discourse upon the right level, and neither too high nor too low. Carried away by complacency in something which they have learned or originated, they at one time require impossibilities of the hearer's power of comprehension; at another, from mere habit, sticking to common-places, they set forth that which is perfectly well known to their

audience, in a prolix and wearisome manner. Does not the former testify of too great vanity and self-complacency, which are certainly faults of a moral nature; and does not the latter, as does all supine yielding to mere habit, presuppose a lack of strength and elasticity in the character?

Thus it is apparent that even this excellence in an oration — viz., that it is adapted to the hearer's power of comprehension — although it is only a very subordinate excellence, cannot be reached without qualities in the orator that are morally good. If I have succeeded in demonstrating the truth of this assertion, I believe I have thereby done those young men no little service, who are devoting themselves to Eloquence. Science and learning prepare them beforehand for an office in which science and learning can no longer be the principal object of their endeavors, but must be subordinated to the higher aim, to the attainment of which they are subservient. That this higher aim is actually a higher, it will be very difficult for them to understand, especially since the instruction at the common and higher schools, as these have hitherto been constituted, exhibits learning and science to them as the highest of all things, to which nothing, religion and morality not excepted, should be preferred. In vain, therefore, are they now urged to banish everything purely scientific, both in Matter and Form, from their discourses; they despise this rule, which appears to them only as timid concession, and which, it cannot be denied, is commonly represented to them as such, by their teachers; in default of the Professor's chair, they would employ the Pulpit instead of it, and would make the bold attempt to raise the people to the heights where they themselves are soaring. If

they finally come back from their error, yet the loss of heart and inspiration often causes them to sink down into superficiality and common-place. If, on the contrary, this accommodation of discourse to the hearer's power of comprehension is not a mere shrewd and skilful concession, but a perfectly moral procedure, if the opposite to it is contrary to duty, and if it is exhibited from this point of view, a young and noble mind will readily follow a rule, the observance of which it believes does not degrade, but, on the contrary, elevates and ennobles.

Yet the law of Adaptation requires not only that the oration be adapted to the capacity of the hearer, but also that the orator have reference to his whole individuality, to his position, his relations, to the occurrences which enter deeply into, and determine, his fortune and fate. And this kind of adaptation is far more difficult to attain than the first. In order to this, it is necessary that the orator know, and have before his eye, the innumerable elements which enter into the civil, moral, and religious condition of man; namely, the circle of his ideas and experiences, the thoughts that are common or foreign to him, the images with which his imagination is commonly employed, the more or less perfect Ideal of happiness, of civil, moral, religious perfection, which floats before him, his virtues and vices, his wishes and desires, together with all the more intimate modifications imparted to his individuality by standing in society, by wealth, by political events, by the condition of the Church and State to which he belongs.

This Adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of comprehension, the best teachers of Rhetoric seem to have recognized as a means of exciting the Affections

(in their sense indeed, according to which they were merely Passions); at least, I know no other reason why Aristotle in his Rhetoric, immediately after presenting the theory of the Passions, follows with a description of the manners of men, according to their age, rank, and wealth,* although he does not explain what use the orator is to make of this latter knowledge.

Cicero, also, would have the orator be a shrewd and subtle man, who has thoroughly scrutinized the character and mode of thought of his hearers, according to their age and standing in society,† and he only errs in expecting of shrewdness and subtlety what may be best accomplished by morality. A crafty man may indeed succeed in detecting this or that weak side of a character, in order to attach to it the threads by which he would lead it; but in order to so enter into, and feel, the views, the sentiments, and the position of a man, as to be able to address his whole individuality in a manner to benefit and elevate, something more than craftiness is needed; shrewd good sense is indeed needed, but such as is under the guidance of moral feeling, and that disinterested benevolence which readily surrenders itself up to sympathy with men, and to the contemplation of the objects in which they are interested.

Furthermore, the knowledge of the hearer's capacity thus obtained, should not be used to favor his errors and to flatter his passions, but it should be employed to

* *Rhet. Lib. II. c. xii.—xvii.*

† Acuto homine nobis opus est, et natura usque callido, qui sagaciter pervestiget, quid sui cives, iique homines quibus aliquid dicendo persuadere velit, cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, expectent. Teneat oportet venas cujusque generis, ætatis, ordinis, et eorum apud quos aliquid ager aut erit acutus, mentes sensusque degustet. — *De Orat. I. 51*

excite the Affections in a negative way at first, — *i. e.*, to avoid all that might displease, and so injure the hearer as such, or that might render things in themselves indifferent to him matters of offence. Without this care beforehand, the excitement of Affection is not to be thought of. In vain does the orator speak with fire and emphasis ; in vain is the hearer inclined to suffer himself to be warmed and animated by the Idea which the orator imparts to him, if the orator detains or wearies him, in the way to the goal in view, by a thousand minor matters irksome in their nature. And this is no undue or sickly sensibility on the part of the hearer, for the claim itself, which I as an orator make upon him, to entirely surrender himself in one respect to me, imposes the duty upon me to spare him as much as possible in all other respects. Hence, the orator also, if he is endowed with true moral wisdom, must know how to go around all the difficulties which he cannot at the moment overcome ; this is at once duty and good sense. Thus, the Apostle Paul, in order the better to reach his great aim, spared the prejudices of his contemporaries, and *became all things to all men, if by any means he might save some.*

The orators of antiquity, Demosthenes perhaps alone excepted, because they did not apprehend the true ground of this Adaptation in the oration, sometimes practised a species of artifice and trickery as unworthy of a high-minded man, as it was useless towards the attainment of their aim. When Cicero pretended that he could not call to mind the name of Polycletus, and it was mentioned to him aloud by one of the bystanders,* he, with-

* Verrina, IV. 3. — Wolf ad Leptineam, p. 300.

out doubt, intended by this seeming ignorance of the history of Grecian Art, to fall in with the notion of his fellow-citizens, that to employ one's self with such objects as those of Art was unworthy of a statesman. For my part, I can see in this only an excess of Rhetorical Adaptation, and, consequently, something contrary to morality. Moreover, I do not understand of what use this little piece of trickery could be to a man who knew how to set such mighty springs in motion. But it is the fate of all one-sided endeavors, to soon degenerate into the production of mere form without substance. This was very soon the case with ancient Eloquence, because the Ancients misapprehended the moral nature of Eloquence, and regarded it only as an instrument for the attainment of ambitious designs.*

* An artifice similar to this of Cicero's, only still more shrewd and cunning, is attributed to Demosthenes, in order to explain the following passage in the oration for Ctesiphon: "For I (thus he addresses Æschines), and all these with me, call you a hireling, first of Philip and now of Alexander! If you doubt, ask these present; but I will rather do it for you. Does it seem to you, Athenians, that Æschines is a hireling or a guest of Alexander? Do you hear what they say?" — *Von Raumer's Translation*, p. 122. — Here, say the Scholiasts, Demosthenes purposely pronounced the word *μισθωτός*, with an incorrect accent, and represented the exclamation of the hearers, who repeated the word in order to correct the pronunciation, as an answer to his question, and as a declaration on their part that they regarded Æschines as an hireling. This explanation is given upon the authority of the Scholiasts, and, so far as I know, is accepted by many, because the reader is particularly delighted with discovering such artifices in orators; but that it is the correct one, I doubt. Certainly such a misplacing of the accent would have offended the ears of the Athenians extremely, and might have occasioned an exclamatory correction on their part; but could this same excitable public have thus coolly entered into the deception, and pretended to pronounce a judgment respecting Æschines, when they only corrected Demosthenes? It seems to me, that Demosthenes, by this artifice, in reality so impertinent to the occasion, would not have won over the minds of his hearers, but would have only exasperated them. But besides this, while exam-

If such an extreme Adaptation on the part of the orator is to be condemned, the opposite fault, namely, striking violently against existing and unalterable relations, is likewise to be regarded as contrary to morality, and contrary to good sense. A shock of this kind annihilates immediately the effect of the most powerful oration, and we need only to examine the sort of displeasure which is excited by it, in order to see that the orator who has committed the fault in question, is chargeable, not with a defect in good sense, or in productive genius, but, what is far worse, in moral feeling. If an audience should be so obtuse as not to be offended by mistakes of this kind,— and this is oftener the case than one would think,— this indeed renders the labor of the orator easier on the one side, but it renders it more difficult on the other; for, as the audience does not perceive the want of Adaptation, neither will it perceive the presence of Adaptation in an oration. The orator, therefore, should congratulate himself only in an audience that is cultivated enough to be displeased with the slightest unbefitting expression; if he does not find his audience to be of such a character, he must seek to elevate it to this height, while he shows it a respect which it will certainly learn more and more to estimate and understand.

ining the orations of Demosthenes, we should at least consider what is due to his character, the dignity of which, even though but half recognized, must protect him from the suspicion of having meddled with such miserable conceits; we should consider that in this most tragic hour of his life, his strongly exercised soul could only hurl bolt-like ideas and not play with accents. Moreover, what is more natural than to suppose, as an explanation of this passage, that he could from the first reckon upon a strong party among the audience, and might anticipate that they would answer the question according to his wishes? This much more befitting explanation is also found in the Scholiasts, who ascribe this answer to a friend of the orator, the comic poet Menander.

But with respect to what he may venture upon, and what he may not venture upon, let the orator decide, not according to the conjectures of worldly shrewdness and sense, but according to moral principles; the hardest and strongest statements, provided only they are adapted and suitable, provided only the orator is called upon by virtue of his office and his calling to make them, will never do injury; they will never weaken, but will always strengthen the effect of his oration, and the Affection which he would produce. How cultivated was the feeling for the Becoming and the Adapted, in the Athenians in the time of Demosthenes, and yet this orator never feared to charge home upon them, with the greatest force and impressiveness, their degeneracy, their failures and weaknesses; and I am not aware that he ever injured the effect of his orations by the freedom which was so unmistakably connected with his love for his country and the existing constitution. Still less should the sacred orator fear to depict moral and religious corruption, according to its true reality, and to terrify the impenitent sinner by the retributions of the future life. He who omits to do this from fear of estranging his audience from himself, does not consider that the hearer altogether involuntarily judges of the orator according to moral rules, and allows him to venture upon all that he may rightfully venture upon; that the most vehement charges do not exasperate him, provided only he sees that the orator, by virtue of the relation in which he stands to himself, is justified therein; nay, that there is a propensity in the moral and religious nature of man, which is closely akin to the propensity for the Terrible and Sublime, by virtue of which he is better pleased with a merited humiliation, that may lead to better senti-

ments, than with that superficial emotion which is generated by flattering and specious discourse. Thus the renowned orators who spoke before Louis XIV. and his court,—an auditory who surely would never have pardoned the slightest impropriety in them,—often employed and applied all the terrors of religion, and all the censorial power of their office, and always with the greatest effect.

While, on the one hand, Adaptation in the oration prevents every offence that might suppress Affection in the hearer, on the other it contributes directly to the awakening of Affection. If, namely, the orator moves in a circle of such thoughts, images, and allusions, as recall into memory the experiences of the hearer himself, and the scenes of which he was himself a witness, the oration must influence with double power. For in this way the Idea is not merely made clear and distinct to his mind, but since the orator associates it with all that the hearer has himself thought and felt, the whole inner being of the hearer is taken possession of, and that inward fermentation, which we denominate Affection, is awakened. There may be many forms of expression suitable to the thought, and intelligible to the hearer; but there is perhaps still another in particular, by which a region of his mind enveloped in darkness may be suddenly filled with light, and which at least strikes some of the manifold threads of which the web of his feelings consist; this latter form the orator should know how to find, and he will be enabled to find it by means of that study of his hearers which is grounded in an interest for their well-being. If he should prefer another mode of presentation, to this form of clothing his thought, this would be an egotistic procedure that would punish itself by the

inefficiency of the oration. But the occasional oration shows how strong the impression is, which can be produced by the wise use of feelings already existing in its hearers. If the preacher speaks on the occasion of the opening of a campaign, or of a festival in commemoration of a victory or a peace, he may, in this instance, presuppose the existence in the hearers of certain prevailing views and opinions, certain hopes and fears, certain feelings of joy and thankfulness, with greater certainty than in the case of ordinary discourses, when the relations that exist are not so determinate and precise ; and if he understands, with only moderate wisdom, how to converge all these different rays into the focus of his leading Idea, he will be able to raise his Idea to a very high grade of Affection in the mind of the auditor. This is the reason why the effect of sermons on festival occasions is always greater than that of ordinary discourses on the Sabbath. In the former case, the hearer, however unfavorable his mental state may be for the purposes of the orator, nevertheless, always brings with him some sentiments of a religious character, upon which the orator can very easily fasten.

It also belongs to this Adaptation in the oration, that the orator never rise into expressions, phrases, and images that are above the language of cultivated society, even before an auditory that would be able to follow a higher style of thought, and to understand more exquisite modes of speech. I mention this for the sake of those who think they impart a peculiar dignity and force to their discourse, by the use of poetic ornament, by employing words which they bring forth from the dust of past centuries, and by constructions which are foreign to pure prose. But this is always only a cold show without

power,— if power, as I affirm, can mean nothing else than the efficiency of the oration in exciting Affection. In the throng of active life, amidst heart-rending misfortunes, during the silent hours of contemplation, does the hearer make known his thoughts and feelings to himself and to others, in a highly flowery style, and in strange, unusual phraseology? Certainly not. The style of expression which spontaneously associates itself with the silent emotions of our heart, when they come forth into consciousness, is always as noble as it is simple; if, therefore, the orator would penetrate into our inner life, and renew again the traces of forgotten thoughts and feelings, if he would actually *address* us, he must employ the very same well-known and customary language in which we are wont to commune with ourselves. Every strange expression, nay, every unusual phrase, tears us away from ourselves, instead of leading us back into ourselves; and the stream of inward harmonies, which perhaps was on the point of flowing forth, suddenly breaks upon such unexpected obstacles, and is dissipated. Moreover, with the disturbance of this flow is connected displeasure towards a man who decks himself out in a showy costume of sounding phrases, which, after all, are not so very difficult to collect together, instead of employing my common, every-day language along with me, to his own true advantage, as well as mine. Those very rare instances when the speaker selects an unusual expression for an unusual thought, are of course excepted here; but to allow one's self in even the slightest departure from ordinary language, unless there is some particular reason to justify it, seems to me to be unadapted to the oration, and contrary to its aim, and is therefore, according to

the theory of Eloquence here laid down, morally blame-worthy.

It will of course be understood in this connection, that I do not intend to disapprove of the use of Bible language ; on the contrary, I would recommend to all sacred orators the frequent employment of the expressions and images of the sacred Scriptures, as a highly adapted and effectual means of exciting Affection, provided only they be not brought in merely to fill up empty space, but are fused into the discourse, retaining their whole dignity and force. They are highly adapted ; for the language of the Bible can never become antiquated, because it affords so many highly significant expressions for the manifold conditions of human life and states of the human heart, many of which appear as proverbial phrases in the language of common intercourse ; and however much religious education, and the reading of the Bible, may have been neglected, the orator may yet, in the case of the generality of hearers, reckon with certainty upon a thought being understood sooner in a Biblical than in a Philosophical dress. But the great power of Bible language, in awakening Affection, consists principally in this : that, in it, the expression for the understanding, and the expression for the feelings, are not different, as in merely human representations, but are always one and the same. The figures, so frequent in the Bible, while they have all the precision of an abstract terminology, at the same time transfer the idea into the web of human relationships, and clothe it with all that can exert influence upon the mind ; they are a ray which unites in one, both light and heat, and passes over from the mind into the heart, thus kindling the whole man. If now, as is often the case, a sentence

from the Bible, on our first meeting with it, or upon after-occasions, has awakened a whole series of pious emotions, the orator, by citing it as he passes on, can evoke anew the Affection which has already become connected with it, and can apply it to the purposes of his oration. On account of this great advantage, I would advise the employment of the language of the Bible, even though the orator cannot presuppose that the hearer is acquainted with it, or that it has ever contributed to awaken his inward life; for by this frequent employment of it, this closer acquaintance, and this influence upon the mind, will be brought about by degrees.

But that which prevents the orator from entering into the conceptions of his hearers, speaking to them in their own language, and exciting Affection by the Adaptation of his discourse to the individuality, is, in the last analysis of it, nothing but a moral defect. In the main, it is that self-complacent vanity which only desires the pleasure of expressing itself strikingly and agreeably, and which shrinks from the difficult and oftentimes violent effort which is requisite in order to go out from self, and into another individuality. From this weakness arise, in sacred Eloquence, the loosely constructed, flowery orations, which, indeed, since they are adapted to excite the fancy of the hearer, often meet with enthusiastic applause (inasmuch as men generally, blinded by their own vanity, seldom set such an estimate upon the vanity of others, and chastise it, as it deserves), yet whose idle play of thoughts and images can never produce a noble Affection urging on to great resolves. Secondly, there is also a certain aversion to the process in question, which may be found even in noble and tender

minds, and which prevents them from entering into the relations of their hearers, seizing their hearts with a strong grasp, and thus giving to their discourse that Adaptation which awakens Affection. If an orator absorbs himself entirely in the Idea, and develops it with great carefulness, but touches only superficially and generally upon the relations in which it is to be realized, in order not to strike against any obstacle, or to give offence to any one, we may presuppose with certainty the existence of the very aversion above mentioned. Thirdly, too great yielding on the part of the orator in sacrificing his Idea and his individuality, and in employing himself solely with the relations and inclinations of his hearers, in order to say something agreeable and pleasing to them, deserves the very same, if not greater, moral condemnation, with the faults already mentioned, and exerts the same debilitating influence upon the discourse. An orator who is thus moved, often lets his hearers melt away in powerless emotion ; but he will never kindle in them a true Affection, since the clear ray of his Idea, by which alone this is to be accomplished, never breaks through the veil which surrounds it. Thus we have specified three errors : absorption in self, absorption in the Idea of the oration, absorption in the relations of the hearers. If a Rhetorical presentation of thought has a decided preponderance to one of these three sides, it lacks Adaptation, and is so far powerless. In order, therefore, to speak with perfect Adaptation, the orator must so bring together, unite, and reconcile these three different claims, which his own individuality, the Idea of his oration, and the relations of his hearers, make upon him, as that each one of them be satisfied without any disparagement to the others : and in order

to do this, nothing more is necessary, than is required in order to any truly moral action,—namely, a constantly clear consciousness of our own individuality, of the Idea according to which, and of the relations in which, we act. But in order to the solution of this problem, extremely great strength of character in rhetorical as well as in moral respects, is necessary; and how very much both are one and the same in essence is seen in the fact, that orations, which are excellent both as rhetorical and moral processes, are not distinguished by any outward brilliancy and splendor; for when the three different elements above mentioned are fused together, their colors flow into each other, while, on the contrary, imperfect orations, for the very reason that some one of these elements appears separated from the others, provided they are elaborated with any tolerable degree of ability, readily acquire a brilliancy which astonishes the ignorant hearer, but which truly enlivens neither him nor any one else.

In this respect Demosthenes deserves the very highest praise, since no orator has ever united with such a dignified presentation of his own individuality, and such a transparent development of his Idea, such an all-comprehending reference to existing relations; and from the constant fusion of these three constituents originates his forcible simplicity, which would have been totally destroyed, if, in his orations, the lyrical and the philosophical elements had ever been separated from the real and practical. On the other hand, Cicero, is far less deserving of being set up as a model of Adaptation in the oration; not that he ever rises above his hearer's power of comprehension, or brings forward anything unbefitting and offensive, but at one time his own individuality, at another, his Idea, at another, the existing circumstances, are too prominent; and that one of these

three elements which is predominant at any time, throws the other two into the shade. But on account of this very fault, his coloring is more brilliant than that of Demosthenes, and he can, in general, be understood with less laborious study into the relations of the age in which he appeared.*

Without wishing in the least to compare Massillon with Demosthenes, or Bossuet with Cicero, they nevertheless have this similarity: that Massillon, like the Greecian orator, without giving up himself and his Idea, realizes to himself, in the most accurate manner, the life of his hearers; on the contrary, Bossuet, and indeed, as I conjecture, on account of a less pure character, almost entirely neglects this latter reference. For this reason, Massillon inspires us, and we forget to admire him,—the highest praise that can be given to the orator; on the contrary, Bossuet excites, even by his most sublime religious elevation, nothing but cold admiration, or, at most, an inflammation of the fancy that is morally useless. If, moreover, the French themselves almost always place Bossuet before Massillon, this only proves, like many other judgments of their critics, how little they know how to recognize and estimate that which is truly excellent in their own literature.

APPENDIX.

TASTE.

What Taste properly is, is as much a matter of dispute, as is the place which it should hold in a theory of Art, and the influence which should be conceded to it in the production and criticism of works of Art. Indeed,

* See Note I., page 207.

the attempt has been made in modern times to bring it into utter condemnation, and to strip it of all influence, as a perverted principle which we have derived from the French; yet since the Public, however much it may have been enjoined upon it not to exercise Taste in its judgments, does not, nevertheless, cease to regard its requisitions as valid, and since, moreover, Taste sometimes unconsciously influences the judgments of those who despise it, it would seem that it only needs to be seen in the right light, and to be placed in the right position, in order to be universally recognized. It can, indeed, find no place in such theories as recognize no other rules for Art but those which the imagination imposes upon itself; for Taste will never have any connection with the imagination, so long as the imagination works separate from the other faculties of the soul. But in this very separation lies the fault; for how is it possible that Art, which, from its nature, is to seize upon the whole man, should excite into action the imagination alone, and not the other powers also? And even if this should be the case, still the ethical power, although it will not indeed predominate in Art as it does in Rhetoric, will certainly not be without influence upon the impulse of the imagination predominant in it.

In the ability, then, of working according to ethical Ideas, I would seek the source of Taste, and affirm that Taste is nothing but the selection of the Becoming and Adapted (*τό πρέπον*), guided by ethical Ideas. Its proper home, therefore, is within the sphere of Eloquence; or rather, its sphere should be extended over the whole practical life of the orator, since regard for the individual peculiarities of his fellow-men, and for the relations in which he finds himself to them, should accompany him

at all times. But if Taste has become a moral habit in him, I do not see how he can suddenly drop it, when he turns back from the circle of his outward activity into himself, in order to unfold the Ideas of his imagination, and how he can here speak with himself in a language, and make use of a manner of representation, which he would never allow himself in, in his relations to his fellow-men. Taste, in the above-given sense, should therefore extend itself over all Poetry; the Ideas of the imagination must be made to pass through this medium; and if this is done, they will themselves gain in liveliness, and their embodiment in power and perfection. For in order to make his work a living whole, in order to give it individuality, the artist must impart to it characteristics of the most precise stamp; and some of them will always be failures, unless, besides the other relations in which the work originated, the moral relations also are to be recognized in it by the regard paid to them. But Eloquence, in respect to Taste, must always differ from Poetry, in that, in the case of Eloquence, the selection of the Becoming and Adapted is accompanied with the *design* of exciting Affection, while Taste in the poet, on the contrary, is a quality that works without any design in view, except the mere production of Beauty. Moreover, the term *Taste*, so offensive to many, would not be so unsuitable to denote such a separating, selecting principle as has been spoken of; while, at the same time, it would occur to us, that as the sensuous Taste manifests itself differently in different persons, so also the moral Taste does not pass the same judgments in Eloquence and Poetry, in different ages and relations; for although the rule remains ever the same, it is modified by circumstances in the most manifold way.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LAW OF CONSTANT PROGRESS.

AFTER having previously become acquainted with the main parts into which the oration divides, we have now also seen what should be the nature of the subordinate representations by which the Ideas are developed. But the question now arises, as well in respect to those main parts, as to these subordinate representations: By what law are their order and succession determined? We set forth here the law of constant *Progress*, and have, in the first place, to show that this is an ethical principle.

Not only should the inward moral development of man, considered as a striving after perfection never to be absolutely reached, be a constant progress, but also when in active life he attempts the actualization of an ethical Idea, he should seek to approach continually, and without intermission, the prescribed goal. If the difficulties that stand in the way, determine him to entirely give up his plan, or if, occupying himself with secondary things, he suffers himself to be turned aside from the path upon which he has entered, so that he returns back into it late, and with spent energies, we justly charge him with being wanting in that heart, that constancy, that force of character which is an essential constituent of virtue. He cannot, it is true, approach his goal always in a straight line, so to speak, and with even pace; he will sometimes advance slower, because he must remove the obstructions which oppose him, out of his way,

or because he must slowly prepare the way for a work which cannot succeed at once. But even while making these elaborate preparations, the eye should never lose sight of the goal, and the striving to reach it must be plainly apparent even in the greatest digressions. But this progress itself receives its perfection from the steady constancy prevailing in it,—*i. e.*, from the easy connection and fusion of the parts of the process, so that each particular part, as it was occasioned and prepared for, by what preceded, so in its turn serves as the occasion and preparation for what follows. If this essential requisite be wanting, and the movement of the discourse is only by leaps and impulses, individual brilliant fragments may, indeed, be the result, but no continuous ethical life.

From Ethics, therefore, we derive the law of constant Progress (for it is contained necessarily and essentially in Ethics), and not from the mode of representation employed in Philosophy or Poetry, in which it is to be met with only under many limitations, nay, is often forced out by the opposite principle. For the activity of the poet, like that of the philosopher, returns back into itself, because of the effort to impart roundness and finish to its creations, and is accompanied with a rest and satisfaction which is grounded in the consciousness of the possibility of perfectly representing its Idea. The ethical striving, on the contrary, in the consciousness that it can never reach its Ideal of perfection, nay, can never exhibit even a single Idea perfectly realized in actual existence, is never to give itself up to rest and self-satisfaction, but with abiding zeal, though with reflection, is to hasten on immediately from each step in the process that has been taken to a new one. And if

the law of constant Progress is found in certain species of Poetry, as for example, the Drama, it must not be supposed that Rhetoric borrowed it from them ; on the contrary, it imparted it to them, since the Drama is the representation of the ethical activity of men, and must therefore retain something of the ethical element in it.

As, therefore, the individual actions in a complete moral process join on upon one another, so also in the oration should the ethical Ideas and the adapted representations which serve to develop them, be methodically arranged. So unceasing and vehement is the progress of the genuine orator, that he detests every thought, every word, that does not bring him nearer the goal, as a weakness, a fault, nay, as a sin, and casts it from him. If it is necessary to instruct the hearer in things of secondary importance, that might have influence upon his decision, to moderate his excited feelings, to obviate an objection, he checks for a moment the rapidity of his course, yet only in order to be able to advance with so much the greater speed ; nay, it may sometimes seem as if he were deviating entirely from his path, yet, even in his deviation, the movement towards the goal is constantly apparent, and it is soon seen that he turned aside into the by-path, only in order to reach the goal the sooner. And in this movement, sometimes vehement, sometimes gentle, thought without effort joins on upon thought, so that, from the first to the last, there is an unbroken chain, in which not the least break, either for the understanding or for the feelings, is discoverable.

Furthermore, it is plain, that by the application of this ethical principle to the Rhetorical presentation of thought, its chief aim, the production of Affection, is reached. If men find in themselves no enthusiasm for

a really great and beautiful Idea, the reason must be, either that they do not contemplate it in all its relations to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, or that they allow themselves to be too greatly dampened by the individual difficulties in the way of its realization. But if all the individual elements and relations of the Idea are made to pass before their minds, one after another, in rapid progression, so that they can take in at a glance all that is great, sublime, and rich in blessing, flowing from it, it is impossible that they should not warm towards it; every new representation on the part of the orator, is a new spur which urges them on to the realization of the Idea. At the same time, the mind depressed and bowed down by the presentation of difficulties and hindrances, is, as it were, freed from a burden, by the removal of its doubts, so that it no longer anxiously holds itself in reserve, but can freely and readily yield itself up to the influence which is exerted upon it. But in order that this warmth with which the mind begins to glow, may not grow cold, but may increase and constantly diffuse itself, it is necessary that this progress of the orator be also constant. If the thoughts are not closely linked together, so that the understanding perceives a defect in their connection; if it is difficult for the mind to change from one feeling already awakened, to another, or to pass from a feeling to thoughts not specially connected with it, there arises reflection in the hearer's mind, not upon the Idea, but upon the orator; and the effect of this reflection is so chilling, that all the warmth which had already been produced, perhaps, at once vanishes, and the orator must begin his work over again from the beginning. In the case of a constant Progress, on the contrary, the effect of what follows is strengthened and

favored by what precedes, and the effect of what precedes by the effect of what follows.*

Thus have we shown, as we flatter ourselves, that through this law of constant Progress, which is ethical in its origin, the chief aim of the Rhetorical presentation of thought, the excitement of Affection, is also reached. But in order to obtain a more thorough insight into the scope and application of the law, we subjoin in addition the following particulars.

In the first place, so far as respects this necessary progress in the oration, it is to be noticed that, though it admits of narration, it entirely excludes description. In *narration*, the different constituent parts of a subject follow one upon another, and the progress of the oration is not checked by it; but in *description*, on the contrary, these constituent parts stand beside each other, and form a quiet picture, whereby the swift, strong movement of the oration is stopped. Hence the orator, if called upon, as is very often the case, to describe the character of a person, or a particular posture of things in actual life, should never in his narration exhibit the different qualities of a person, or the different characteristics of things, beside each other, but he should find a historical thread, by means of which his representation may run off like a gradually developing history. It is exceedingly difficult to do this, since, in order to it, the orator is often obliged to do violence to the representation as it exists in his own mind, and to take objects which he has apprehended and contemplated as a quiet whole, out of this form, and put them into another. Yet this is absolutely necessary;

* Cicero seems to mean the same thing, when he says: *Deinde inventa, non solum ordine, sed etiam momento quodam atque judicio dispensare atque componere.* — *De Orat.*, I. 31.

unless it be done, the orator falls away from the Rhetorical into the Poetical representation, and allows himself and his hearers a rest that is destructive of all Affection. The descriptions in the orations of the Ancients are wrought entirely according to this principle; they are always narrative, never descriptive; in modern Rhetoric, the contrary is almost always the case, and hence the heavy dragging movement found in it.

The law of Progress also determines the extent of the development of each individual thought that appears in the rhetorical series. For the orator must not allow one thought to so expand and become prominent at the expense of another, as to produce a pause in the movement of the oration. The recondite nature of many thoughts, which require unfolding, explanations, arguments, may often lead to this fault. Hence the genuine orator will rather make up his discourse out of thoughts that need only to be enounced, not explained and proved. Strictly speaking, it is a fault to express the same thought in different language, the first time obscurely, the second time by explanation and circumlocution; for the law of Progress, strictly observed, requires that the development of the thought progress with every new sentence; the orator, therefore, must know how to find immediately, the plainest, most forcible expression, and to be satisfied with it once for all.

With respect to the arguments often necessary in Eloquence, it might seem as if they must stop the swift current of the oration, and impart to it that slow movement, returning into itself, which is peculiar to Philosophy. Yet this will not be the case, provided these arguments are brought forward according to the general

principles laid down in the First Book.* Would the orator show the possibility of a thing, he does it by proposing a plan, by citing an example, showing that in similar circumstances the like has already been done; would he prove the actuality of a fact, he cites testimony, and establishes its validity. In this way everything is made out by the exhibition of the real, of the plainly apparent, and there is no need of a slow tedious chain of abstract propositions. This is not necessary even when the truth of a thing is to be demonstrated; in this case, the orator refers to a universally recognized authority, the weight of which immediately decides the question; or he makes use of public opinion, which has already, on another occasion, decided according to truth, and shows his hearer, by means of a brief and readily apprehended enthymeme, that he cannot possibly judge differently, or decide differently, in the present case, from what he did in the former, without falling into self-contradiction. In this way Demosthenes constructs his formidable enthymematic trains of reasoning, which, so far from hindering the progress of the orator, are rather to be compared to the lightning, in force and rapidity.†

It often happens that a thought, in a position from which the logical arrangement would not displace it, exerts a retarding influence, and interrupts the continuity of the Rhetorical series, because it seems neither to have been sufficiently prepared for by what precedes, nor to sufficiently prepare for what follows. To avoid this case, and so to present every single thought as that it shall not only not retard, but accelerate the sweep of the oration, is one of the most difficult problems in Elo-

* Chapter XI.

† Note II., p. 213.

quence; yet it may be solved, as it seems to us, by the aid of the principles which we have laid down. In order to this, we must recognize a gradation in the relative rank of the Rhetorical Ideas. Though Duty, Virtue, and Happiness, are equal in importance, yet the three forms under which they present themselves are not. The first of these forms is the Religious, then follows the Ethical, and lastly the Political. Under these, again, stand the categories Truth, Possibility, and Actuality,* in the order in which they are here mentioned. Now, in every separate development of a subordinate Idea, if all that pertains to it is not fused with a higher Idea, and interwoven at all points with the development of it, the steady flow of the oration is retarded and checked. Suppose that a sacred orator is discoursing with reference to the categories Truth and Actuality,—e. g., that he wishes to present the events of his time from a religious point of view. Beginning with the development of Truth, he may, provided he has reached a proper place for it, cast a passing glance at Actuality; for description based upon this latter subordinate Idea, if he should begin with it, or should give it a development independent of that of Truth, would be a dead stop, and not progress, and could not well be connected either with what followed or with what preceded.

An orator before the court, or before the people, commits the same error, if, when he might make the higher Idea of Duty or of Virtue predominant, he neglects it, and allows himself in a development, entirely unconnected with it, of the Idea of Civil or Positive Law, which he ought to have employed only as a corollary and confirmation of the former. With all the modesty

* Book I., Chapters X., XII.

that becomes us Moderns in criticizing the great models of Antiquity, I venture to charge *Æschines* with committing this latter error in his oration against Ctesiphon. Inasmuch as his attack upon Demosthenes was in strictness based upon the Idea of Virtue, and inasmuch as he wished to represent his life and character as unworthy and detestable, it was a mistake to dwell so long, as he does, in the very beginning, upon the positive statutes that might take from his opponent the crown which had been decreed to him. We feel, in the perusal, how weak this whole first part of his oration is, and how little it prepares for the succeeding part, in which he examines the life of Demosthenes; nay, between these two parts there is a chasm over which he could not possibly carry his hearers without their minds becoming entirely cold and emotionless. That Demosthenes perceived this mistake, it seems to me is evident, from the circumstance that he protests in the very beginning of his oration, against the demand of his opponent, that he shall in the defence follow the same plan which he did in the attack; far from doing this, he rather sets forth the Idea of Virtue as the Idea upon which he shall found his oration, and not until after he has refuted a great portion of the objections brought against him, by a history of his past life, does he occupy himself with the examination of the positive laws which seem to be adverse to the proposition of Ctesiphon. Hence, from the beginning of this oration to the end, there is no pause to be perceived, but the mind is kept continually on the stretch, and borne along unceasingly from one important point to another.

To impart this constant flow to an oration, is perhaps the most difficult among the many difficult things in

Eloquence. A poem, like the poet himself, is born; in some fine moment of inspiration it stands out before him an articulated whole, and, so far as the plan at least is concerned, is completed without further effort. But as virtue is born with no man, but is acquired only through a long series of efforts, so likewise the oration, considered as a moral product, is never complete in its first origin, but becomes so only by means of labor and pains perseveringly applied to it. Nay, inasmuch as the activity even of the most virtuous man can never be wholly perfect, *i. e.*, can never be wholly conformed to the law and at the same time to existing relations, the question may arise, whether the oration, which, according to my assertion at least, is a moral act and process, can be perfect,—a question which I should answer in the negative. The Adaptation which has been spoken of in a former chapter, can itself be reached only approximately; for, in order to be perfect, an absolutely divine knowledge of all characters and relations would be requisite. The second law also, laid down by us, that of constant Progress, in its perfection can belong only to the action of God in the government of the world, but never to human action, which is ever imperfect. But be this as it may, so much is certain—and with respect to it every man will agree with me, and the more readily the better orator he is—that, in the plan of the oration as it is first presented to the mind, the thoughts are never found already arranged in this constant progressive flow, but must be afterwards wrought into it. As they first present themselves, they are hard, brittle, and separate particles; the mind must seize them, and, by grinding them incessantly upon each other, crush them, until the friction kindles the mass, and it runs like

molten ore. The higher Ideas, thrown, as it were, into this solution, take up the thoughts which belong to them, and which, now that they are fluid, obey the mystic power that attracts like to like, so that they form themselves into a firm chain.

Here the truth of our assertion becomes very apparent again, that it is the *Character* which makes the orator. Could the most brilliant Imagination, and the most profound and penetrating Reason, succeed in so elaborating the thoughts, if they were not guided and supported by the power of the moral Will? Both Imagination and Reason, taken by themselves alone, lead the orator away from the sharply-drawn line along which he should move, and seduce him into a useless pause, and an idle, undue unfolding of his thoughts. They can find no interest at all in the elaboration of the unpretending, highly simple conceptions borrowed from common life; at the same time, they grow weary, and, finally, try to exchange an irksome business for one more agreeable, unless they are actuated and urged on by another power. And this power is not the mere empty rage for shining before an assembly; for vanity is not capable of such a tension of mind; nay, vanity does not even feel itself to be called upon to make an effort, since it is satisfied with a loosely-constructed oration garnished with some showy passages. For the hearer is capable of criticizing such an oration, and of admiring it; but let him be ever so cultivated, he can never do full justice to an excellence lying so deep as the steady, unceasing sweep of thought. He only feels its effects upon him, like the breathing of the living Spirit, without knowing the cause; and for the very reason that so much that is Beautiful and Excellent arises in his own mind, he forgets that the orator has

spoken excellently. That Demosthenean determination, that iron diligence, which is requisite in order to the formation of the rhetorical, constantly progressive, train of thought, can spring only out of the endeavor to fill the minds of others with those great Ideas in which the orator has lost himself; the endeavor to satisfy his own conscience, and to employ only that which can rightfully contribute towards his success. And what is such an endeavor but the moral power of Character in its finest development and highest dignity ?

CHAPTER VII.

THE LAW OF VIVACITY.

In the beginning of this treatise, we attempted to seize the active process of the orator in its origin, as it unfolds itself under the guidance of certain definite moral Ideas. In this second part of the work, we have sought to become acquainted with the nature of the representations with which the leading Idea of the orator becomes encompassed, as well as with the rules in accordance with which these representations are linked together. We have now to conceive of the active process of the orator, as it comes forth into language from his inward being, and here we find that his progress in the development of his Idea, and the effect produced by it upon the hearers, cause his own relation to them, though remaining the same in substance, to change every moment in respect to individual circumstances; and we demand that this active process of his, without wavering in its essential character and purpose, do, nevertheless, through a constant variation in the form, keep company with all these different variations in his relations. This is the third and last law of the Rhetorical presentation of thought. We denominate it the law of *Vivacity*.* Like the former laws that have been mentioned, this law also

* The term in the original is *Lebendigkeit*, and is intended to denote a vital flexibility in thought and diction. The word Vivacity is an inadequate one.—TR.

is of Ethical origin, and wholly foreign to the Philosophical, as well as the Poetical, presentation of thought. In both of these latter the mind isolates itself, and since it is not its design to exert an influence upon the circumstances which surround it, so neither does it allow circumstances to exert an influence upon itself. Hence the unvarying uniformity of the state and condition in which it remains from the beginning to the end of its work, allows the mind, in these latter cases, to give to its products a fixed, unchangeable form. Moral activity, on the contrary, would entirely preclude such an isolation ; it is itself a constant reception of outward influences, and an equally constant reaction upon them ; and since all that is outward is never still, but fluctuates restlessly hither and thither, man, when in action, must change his position in respect to the outward every moment. This is not bending the Will to the force of circumstances, but is in reality the only means of obtaining dominion over them ; their constantly varying pressure would utterly overwhelm, if the manner of meeting them did not vary with equal rapidity. 'True virtue, on the side of law, is indeed unalterably the same, but on the side of life, is constantly changing and new. It would betray a want of elasticity in the character, if one should continue the same way of action in entirely different circumstances.

This change in the position and movements of the agent, peculiar to moral activity of all sorts, can be perceived in the case of the activity of the orator, only in the thoughts and the words, and in their constantly varying turns, since the orator makes use of thoughts and words only, in order to the realization of his Idea. These turns are the so-called rhetorical figures : an ex-

pression which must not be taken to denote mere ornaments coldly and artificially contrived to set off the discourse (to which the expression might indeed lead), but *turns* and lively *movements* in thought and language, prompted by the imagination under the guidance of rhetorical Affection in conflict with the opposing sentiments of the hearers; for which reason, perhaps, these latter expressions are preferable, because they are liable to no such misunderstanding. Similar turns arise easily and naturally in the social intercourse of cultivated and lively minds. For since social life of the higher order involves the mutual cultivation of minds through the interchange of views, each man alternately playing the part of the orator and the hearer, it is evident that although from the language of such social life nothing indeed is to be learned in relation to the rhetorical *series* of representations, because it is, of necessity, fragmentary in its matter, yet much is to be learned from it in relation to the turns of thoughts and words, which become more lively and forcible on account of the closer action and reäction within this sphere. The so-called figures which are employed by orators, and which are specifically enumerated by Rhetoricians, are in reality only such turns of thought and expression as arise in the active intercourse of men, elevated and polished in order to adapt them to a higher connection. Hence, if the orator would employ figures rightly, he should not borrow them from manuals of Rhetoric, or even from the most perfect works in Eloquence, but should go back to the language of common intercourse, and appropriate to his own purposes all those living movements and turns in thought and expression, the influence of which he has felt upon himself, and has also imparted to others. Or

rather, the orator must realize the hearer to himself with definite features, with all his opposing views and inclinations, and represent the whole oratorical process to himself, not monologically, but dialogically ; then he will know instinctively the proper time * to waken attention, to instruct, to exhort, to show the connection or the opposition of several thoughts, to meet an objection, to hurl it back again, to place a truth in clear light by an unexpected surprising turn, to pass from one truth to another, to restrain his feelings, to give them full play, etc. Having such a lively sense of his position and relations, and of the changes which he is producing in them by the progress which he is constantly making, his thoughts, and consequently their expression, will take on a different form at every step.

But if this alternation of forms in the rhetorical presentation of thought, is of ethical origin, as we have endeavored to show, it is also the most powerful and effectual means of all in exciting Affection.† For Affection in the hearer is kindled by Affection in the orator ; and how can the orator show more plainly that he is wholly animated by an Idea, and by the striving to impart it to others, than by exhausting all the most lively forms of presentation ? Adaptation, in the discourse, taken by itself alone, would not produce such an impression ; even the firmest and most labored chain of thought, unless each link in it were distinguished by a peculiar structure, would, in the end, only weary by a fixed uniformity. But by means of the peculiar, and often surprising turn, in which each new representation is announced, it is made to pierce more deeply into the

* Cicero, *Orator*, 39 et 40.

† Jam vero ad affectus nil magis ducit. — Quint. IX. 1.

mind, which, incessantly stimulated on so many sides, is compelled, in the end, to yield itself up without resistance to the exercise of Affection.

This influence upon the Affections is the distinguishing mark by which we can recognize Rhetorical figures, and can separate them from Poetical. The latter are created by the Imagination for the Imagination; they are a painting, a picturing, a representing. The Rhetorical figures are produced by the Mind, using this term to denote the whole inner being of man so far as it is under the guidance of the Will, for the Mind; they should seize, enchain, move, carry away. Poetical figures are brilliant and adorned, and poetic art delights in their splendor; Rhetorical figures are a naked power, which avoids all pomp, because its influence is liable to be hindered thereby, or to be directed to the Imagination instead of the Affections.* If the orator would acquire a quick feeling and an unerring sense for Rhetorical figures, let him read Demosthenes; for in respect to him, the Ancients boast that he never brought forward a thought without expressing it in some peculiar figure.† In reading Demosthenes, we shall also perceive most clearly, how great is the difference between Rhetorical and Poetical figures; for no style can be freer from all

* Aristotle (*Rhetic III.* 4) remarks that the simile is more suitable in poetry, and that the metaphor is the only ornament in which the orator may indulge. — The reason of this highly truthful and important remark lies in the fact, that the simile is too *detailed* for the rapid and practical movement of oratory. Eloquence requires that all illustrative matter be swift and glancing; simply flashing light, without impeding the progress. The metaphor is the condensed simile, and the simile is the expanded metaphor. Hence the former is the orator's figure, and the latter the poet's. — TR.

† Cicero *Orator*, c. 39. — Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam conformatione sententiae dicitur.

that we denominate poetry of expression, than that of Demosthenes. In saying this, however, we would by no means assert, that none of those figures which are commonly termed Poetical, are to be permitted in an oration. Everything depends upon the application, upon relative position and influence ; and it is very possible indeed, that in a different use and connection the figure would at one time depict to the Imagination, at another awaken Affection.

There being this difference between Poetical and Rhetorical figures, the specific enumeration of the former is as proper, as that of the latter is improper. Since the Imagination renders itself independent of the external world, and allows it no influence upon its creations, its forms are by no means innumerable in their manifoldness ; for their source is in the Imagination alone, which, notwithstanding all its opulence, is, like every human faculty, limited by certain definable laws. Hence, in the enumeration of the different species of poetry, as well as in the specification of Poetical figures, completeness is attainable. But since the moral activity of man, on the contrary, is constantly conditioned by his relations to the external world, all the changes of which can never be computed, it is impossible to enumerate with satisfactory completeness the forms under which this activity appears. For this reason, we may not in Eloquence, as in Poetry, assume certain species distinguished by Form and Matter ; and hence it was an absurd undertaking to attempt to bring under certain fixed rubrics the turns which the thoughts of the orator receive, under the influence of the constantly varying circumstances amidst which his activity is put forth. This mistake would never have been made if the ethical

character of Eloquence had been recognized, and if Eloquence had been properly distinguished from Poetry. That the undertaking was a failure is perfectly evident. There are fine and noble turns of thought in Demosthenes, which no Rhetorician has yet put on his list; and many have also been invented by orators of the Church, that were entirely unknown to the Ancients.

Owing to this confounding of Poetical and Rhetorical figures, there arose among the Ancients an entirely false view of the use and influence of the latter. Cicero and Quintilian agree in this, that they may, in part at least, be employed as adornment merely, of the oration, and to please the hearer.* But this should never be the purpose for which they are employed, if, as we affirm, they are not productions of the Imagination for the Imagination, but of the Mind for the Mind. Quintilian gives another excellent rule, but one that by no means harmonizes with his other statement just cited, when he says, that all that does not promote the design of the orator, hinders it; † and certainly, nothing so little promotes, and consequently so greatly hinders, the awakening of a strong Affection that seizes upon the whole mind, and breaks forth into acts, as that light play of the Imagination which leaps from figure to figure. Hence, we assert that no figure should be allowed in an oration, unless each and every word in it, according to the expression of Quintilian, ‡ awaken an Affection of some sort. Any other use of figures on the part of

* Ex collocatione verborum quæ sumuntur quasi lumina, magnum afferunt ornatum orationi. — Cicero, *Orator*, c. 39. — Major pars harum figurarum posita est in delectatione. — Quintilian, IX. 3.

† Obstat enim quidquid non adjuvat. — Quintilian, VIII. 6.

‡ Quot verba, totidem affectus. — Quint. IX. 3.

the orator would betray a departure from his purpose, *i. e.*, a moral weakness, and instead of contributing to his design, would only stand in its way, *i. e.*, would leave the mind cold, instead of warming it.

Furthermore, figures, which consist in peculiar turns of thought, are likewise subject to those laws of Adaptation and constant Progress, which we have laid down for the guidance of Rhetorical discourse generally. If the orator wastes the most impressive and powerful of these figures upon trivial occasions, or employs them imprudently at a time when the mind is not prepared for so violent an impression, this unsuitable application of them will hinder and destroy their influence. And since, in order to prevent Affection from becoming chilled, the thoughts themselves must run on in a continual series, it is also necessary, in order to the same end, that the turn which one thought has taken, easily and naturally lose itself in that which the following thought will assume. In this connection, it is also to be remarked, that the most perfect concatenation of figures loses its effect if it is repeated successively, after short intervals; for the mind once impressed, is immediately rid of the impression, by the repetition of that which produced it, and is led away to an idle contemplation of the mere Form, irrespective of the Matter; the constant recurrence of which would, in this case, produce only a poetico-musical enjoyment.

And as we have seen that every offence against the Rhetorical laws is to be regarded as a moral defect, so also the wrong use of figures is not to be ascribed to a want of genius, but only to a weakness of character. It is vanity, if the orator is profuse in figures for the sake of show and ornament; it is obtuseness of moral feeling,

if the orator employs them unsuitably; it is sluggishness, incapacity of enthusiasm in respect to lofty Ideas, if the orator does not understand how to give to a thought those forcible turns by which alone he can produce the designed impression. Hence, not by means of the mere knowledge of this or of other rules, but only by means of those moral excellences which are opposed to the faults above mentioned, will the orator be enabled to employ figures rightly and with effect. In order to this, a mind is needed which can warm towards moral Ideas; which, along with all its inspiration and enthusiasm, can keep up a calm, accurate survey of circumstances, and which is far more interested in the true advantage of the hearer, in his improvement and elevation, than in his applause.

CHAPTER VIII.

PROSE.

In the beginning of this Second Book, we promised to sketch the main features of a theory of Prose, and to derive them from the ethical principle which we have sought to establish as the foundation of Rhetoric. We now attempt to fulfil this promise.

We shall first set forth the distinguishing marks of Prose, while at the same time, for the sake of greater distinctness, we shall compare them with the peculiar characteristics of Poetic discourse.

The first difference between Poetry and Prose lies in the period. Not that the period is peculiar to Prose alone, and might be dispensed with in finished Poetry; but in Poetry it appears only as a necessary form in the connection of thoughts, upon which no special emphasis is laid. In Prose, on the contrary, while it retains this first original characteristic, it acquires a still higher significance, and seems to serve particular purposes. Hence we require in Prose, that each period be marked by something peculiar to itself, and be distinguished from what precedes and follows it, by its form, while in Poetry, we do not regard it as a fault, and hardly notice it, if several sentences exceedingly simple, and entirely similar in their structure, follow one another.

The second difference lies in the words used. In Poetry, every word has worth, not only by virtue of its sense, but also by virtue of its sound and its mere ex-

istence ; the most important and the most unimportant words, in respect to sense, as integral parts of the same whole, have equal rank, like citizens of a free State. In Prose, on the contrary, the worth of words differs according to their sense ; in every sentence there are one or more words which, by their peculiar position, are elevated and placed in the light, so that the others are subordinate to them, and seem to be designed only to elevate and minister to them.

The third difference lies in the relation between long and short syllables, which, in Poetry, is termed metre ; in Prose is termed number. The difference between the two may, perhaps, be best exhibited under the following general characteristics. Metre, though adapted to the Idea, yet appears as something independent in itself, and seeks to attract attention to itself, aside from the thoughts and feelings expressed through it. Hence it not merely determines, with the greatest exactness, the number and succession of long and short syllables ; it also separates them into individual metrical members, the frequent repetition of which, impresses their peculiar form so much the more, upon the ear and the mind. If the difference between long and short syllables is not duly marked in a sentence, Poetry makes up for what its form would lose thereby in peculiarity and independence of character, by counting and limiting the number of the syllables which compose the individual line, and by the regular recurrence of the same sound at the end of the verse. Number, on the contrary, far from separating itself from the thought, remains constantly subordinate to it, and it would be regarded as one of the greatest faults of a Prose period, if one of its parts, by a succession of tones too striking and too agreeable to the ear,

should attract attention from the Matter to the Form. Number, therefore, arranges the succession and number of long and short syllables, only so far as is necessary in order that the impression of the discourse upon the sensuous organs may be adapted to the impression which is to be produced upon the mind, so that the mind may not feel less, because the ear has either experienced no agreeable sensation at all, or has been offended.* And that number may not usurp an independence that does not belong to it, it is necessary, and is also universally required, that it be adjusted most accurately to the Matter, as well as the Form ; that it vary with every new thought, nay, every new period, and thus flow forth in constant manifoldness.

If, as I believe, the peculiar characteristics of Prose have been sufficiently exhibited in what has been said, the question now arises : From what principles can we deduce such a form of discourse, and show that it must be constituted so, and not otherwise ? This problem seems never to have been proposed even, while yet a similar one respecting the forms of Poetry has employed many theorizers, and has been successfully solved by them. Why, then, is there Prose at all ? What right has it to exist by the side of Poetry ? Should men, generally, speak only in verse, and is it owing merely to convenience or inability, that they do not ? We feel that this cannot possibly be, for there are modes of presenting thought in which poetical forms cannot be employed at all. And this does not arise from their intrinsic difficulty, for finished Prose has its peculiar excellences, and, consequently, its difficulties also, which are not easier to master than those of versification. If, now, Prose is to

* See Gibbon's *Miscellaneous Works*, p. 455.

maintain itself as a peculiar form of presenting thought, the rightfulness of its claims must be demonstrable from rational grounds. Or shall we, after having deduced the necessity of the forms of Poetry, represent Prose as a thorough and complete opposite to them, and consider the matter as settled in this way, because there can be nothing which has not its opposite? But, not to mention that this principle is not justifiable in itself, it could not, even if it were correct, find its application here, because although Prose and Verse indeed differ from each other, they by no means constitute a proper antithesis, the members of which run parallel to each other, and have purely opposite and mutually correspondent marks.

The right of Prose to assert its place beside Poetry, and the necessity of the characteristic marks perceived in it, can be satisfactorily shown, only in case it is construed from ethical principles. In deriving the rules to which the moral activity of man, so far as it makes use of discourse for its purposes, is subjected, we had arrived at the law of Vivacity; while we further develop it, we shall see Prose with all that is peculiar and distinctive in it, originating from it.

For, in the first place, since according to the law of Vivacity, each thought should appear with a peculiar turn and movement, it must naturally impart a peculiar form and structure to the period also, in which it is presented. On this ethical ground, therefore, the carefulness with which the period is formed in Prose, is explained and justified; while, on the contrary, a similar carefulness in Poetry, would not only be unnecessary, but a fault also. For the change in the form of the period is expressive of a change in the mental state,—a change which is required in the orator, but not allowable in the poet, since

he purposes to exhibit only one and the same tone of mind. With the same right that figures in the thought are assumed in Rhetoric, we believe we may assume figures in the period, which are to be distinguished still further from figures in the language. Moreover, much that is cited by Rhetoricians under this latter name, is a peculiarity in the structure of the period, rather than in the position of the words,—*e. g.*, the climax, the antithesis, the isocolon, the prosapodosis, and the coinotes arising from the connection of the epibole and epiphora.

But not only does the law of Vivacity exert its influence upon the structure of the period; it also exerts it, secondly, upon the position of the words. For since the greatest care must be taken that the thoughts do not flow into each other, so as to form one uniform mass, it is evident that those particular words which express each particular thought most plainly should be made prominent, and be distinguished from the others. From this ethical view of Prose, not only is the peculiar emphasis laid upon the most important words,—such as the substantive, adjective, verb,—explained, but also the origin of the more exquisite figures of speech,—such as paranomasia, paradiastole, antanaclasis, epanode, diaphora, homœoptoton, etc. The use of these figures in Poetry, is condemned of right, because in Poetry the essential thing is not the distinguishing of one thing above another, but the connecting of one thing with another. And if Poetry has appropriated one or another of these figures,—as *e. g.*, the homœoptoton, from which rhyme seems to have arisen,—it has yet entirely altered it; for in Prose, a proposition is individualized by the homœoptoton; in Poetry, the metrical lines are linked and united together by rhyme.

Finally, in the third place, the law of Vivacity permits neither metre, nor rhyme, nor the numeration of syllables; for through these, the outward form of presentation acquires a repose and an evenness of proportion, it expresses a complacency, which, indeed, belongs necessarily to the finished unfolding of poetical ideas, but which must ever be foreign to the active process of the orator, which is full of Affection in itself, and seeks to awaken Affection in the hearer. Nevertheless, since that which is peculiar in the Rhetorical thought seeks to express itself, not only in the structure of the period, and the position of the words, but also in the relation of the long and short syllables; since, in order to the more distinct separation of the thoughts, there must be the slower pace of some, and the more rapid flight of others, and this difference must be made perceptible to the mind through the ear, the law of Vivacity requires a mingling of syllables, in respect to their quantity, suited to the existing thought, but going no further than to vary with each period, and never occupying the mind at the expense of the thought. For if this were the case, the orator would betray a complacency which is proper in the Poet, but which is forbidden to him by the law of Vivacity; and, moreover, he would fail to reach the end at which he aims, the production of Affection in the hearer, if the hearer should come to be as much delighted by the musical enjoyment of the melody, as impressed by the force of the thought.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCLUSION.

WE have thus far endeavored to unfold and perfect our theory of the ethical nature of Eloquence, in three different ways. By showing, first, that all of its essential laws are of moral origin; secondly, that a morally good character, alone, imparts the inclination and the ability to follow these laws; thirdly, that the orator is sure of success, only in proportion as he strictly obeys these moral laws, and puts away all references of a less pure nature.

And as, in running out these laws, we have arrived at the construction of Prose as a necessary form of presenting thought, we believe we may here lay down our pen, inasmuch as what has been said will be sufficient to enable him who has followed thus far, to form a judgment respecting the correctness of our hypothesis; and it will not be difficult for him who falls in with it, to apply the principles we have laid down, to the subject of Declamation, and other secondary subjects connected with Eloquence, of which we have not treated.

S U P P L E M E N T.

NOTE I. Page 176.

THE frequent allusions by Theremin to Demosthenes will receive additional illustration from the following sketch of "The Rhetorical Character of Demosthenes," which we translate from another work of his, published under the title of *Demosthenes und Massillon*. A condensed summary of this work, which the author intended should be the concrete statement of his systematic theory, as seen realized in the two masters of Grecian and French Eloquence, may be found in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. VI. pp. 1—26. — TR.

"From the foregoing representation, it follows that even if his character cannot be cleared of all stain, yet the praise of energy, decision, perseverance, and self-denial for his country, is due in the highest degree to Demosthenes; that he succeeded in impressing the stamp of these virtues upon his Eloquence, and that to them it owes its high and wonderful excellence. He himself seems to have regarded the moral state of the orator as his most important qualification. This is evident from a remark, made under very grave circumstances, and one that puts the necessary qualification upon that famous dictum of his respecting "delivery," which we have already cited. "It is not the words of the orator that are most worthy of admiration,"—he says in the *Oration for the Crown*,—"nor the tones of his voice, but it is the fact that he has the same aims with the people, and the same objects of hatred and love with his father-land."

We shall now endeavor to group the principal features of the Eloquence of Demosthenes in a brief sketch. In no one of these can the moral origin be mistaken; and as we proceed with the delineation, it will seem as if we were describing the inmost and essential nature of Eloquence, and not the peculiarity of an orator.

The first characteristic in the Eloquence of Demosthenes,—which might also be the first in the ideal of Eloquence,—is that his own

personality and all regard to the applause of the auditor, are wholly sacrificed to the matter in hand, to the aim and object of the discourse. No orator of ancient or modern times has practised this austere self-denial in an equal degree. But this is confessedly a moral quality, and in most men finds an insuperable hindrance in self-love and vanity.

Ordinarily the orator, while he moves forward to the goal, will not neglect to pluck many a flower on the way, and by port and gesture exhibit himself most advantageously to his hearers. If Cicero is inferior to Demosthenes, it is principally owing to a vanity that protrudes his personality with a prominence disproportioned to the subject matter. Not so Demosthenes. He would not shine, but reach his aim; he would not win, but carry away the hearer; he does not seek the hearer's applause, but his assent. All merely outward embellishments, with which even christian orators overload and deck their discourse, often in an offensive degree, are ever contemned in the most decided manner by this heathen orator. In this his greatness mainly lies. But it is precisely this greatness which is the cause that we do not fully appreciate him, and that he does not come up to our expectations. We demand of the orator, that he exhibit his subject to us by means of ornaments that do not belong to it; we demand of him paint, false curls, and a drapery rich in folds. Where we see nothing but muscles, sinews, and naked limbs, we complain of dryness. That the Athenians not merely endured Demosthenes but declared him to be the first of orators, shows that, even in the time of their decline, they were superior to the cultivated nations of the present day in the right estimation of things.

Perhaps no one has so correctly apprehended, and so well described, the characteristic of the eloquence of Demosthenes just mentioned, as Fenelon, who, in his "Dialogues of the Dead," makes Demosthenes speak to Cicero as follows: " You turned the attention of the hearers to your own person; I turned it solely to the subject upon which I spoke. You were admired by them; they forgot me while they thought only of the resolution to which I would determine them. You furnished them an intellectual entertainment; I smote, I hurled down, I dashed in pieces like a thunderbolt. When they had heard you they exclaimed: ' How finely he has spoken! ' When they had heard me they cried: ' Up! war against Philip! ' You they praised; when I had spoken they were so carried away that they did not think of praising me. You adorned your orations; in mine they discovered

no ornament ; they found in them only definite, forcible, distinct arguments, and then applications of them like lightning, which they could not resist."

If Demosthenes confines himself closely to his subject, he has nevertheless completely investigated it ; he has contemplated it upon all sides, and in all relations ; he has searched it through in all directions, and has penetrated into all its recesses. All the grounds and reasons that make for his purpose, and which are discoverable, he has discovered, and explored carefully ; of all that can be used and applied for his advantage, not the least thing has escaped him. The treasures which he has gained by this labor, which he has dug up and brought to the light, out of the subject itself, put him in a condition to despise all that is foreign to the thing in hand. We cannot but be astonished at the richness of the materials which stand at his command. When we have read half through one of his longer orations, — that against Leptines, that against Midias, the one for the Crown, — we think that now, certainly, the subject is completely exhausted. But we are mistaken ; the most forcible reasons, the most stunning thunder-claps have not yet come, and we are still to be astounded by them. He has such a superabundance of arguments that he sometimes wastes a very effective one in order to fill up a pause caused by the clerk, when he cannot immediately lay his hand upon a law-paper which must be read before proceeding further. Still greater and more glorious treasures than Demosthenes found in the subjects handled by him, are to be found in those which belong to the sphere of Sacred Eloquence ; but just as great singleness of effort, in searching, and toiling, is needed in order to bring them out of the depths where they lie.

But such richness of thought must be elaborated. And here, it is not enough to distribute the thoughts under certain heads, and to avoid all infringements of logical rules. On the contrary, every thought must have that place to which it is carried by what precedes, and where it carries what follows ; where it does not stop but propagates the previous movement ; where it is not only immediately understood by the hearer, but also strengthens his convictions, and heightens his emotions. The thoughts of the orator must be waves, of which one urges on another. But this is possible, only when, according to psychological laws, their series corresponds to the series of thoughts and feelings they are to evoke in the hearer. This disposition and arrangement of thought demands as great effort, and labor, as was necessary in order to its production. In this excellence also, which indeed

lies very deep, and can be known only by a fundamental study of his works, Demosthenes surpasses all other orators. His thoughts form a concluded series, no member of which could change its place without injury to the whole; and as they follow one another consecutively, so the thoughts and feelings which are to be excited by them in the hearer, follow one another, and develop themselves, in the most natural manner. The hearer is in the very beginning seized upon by a wholesome and salutary power, to which the best faculties of his being yield themselves without resistance; and since he is led along on a path where there is neither hindrance nor interruption, he follows on, step by step, to the end, not only because he must follow, but also because he follows willingly and gladly.

This firmly linked chain of thought, is, in Demosthenes, made red-hot with the most live fire of emotion. That the Ancients knew how to estimate this excellence in his eloquence, is clear from the above-cited passage of Dionysius, who confesses that he was transported into a Corybantic inspiration, by him. In modern times, we are inclined to deny him this excellence. We seem to take him for a cold and arid man, who, according to the favorite phrase, addresses himself only to the understanding, and not to the heart, and with whom the whole problem is, upon grounds of reason, to convince of the justice of his cause, and the utility of his propositions. Were this so, he had lacked the most essential characteristic of the orator, and we should not have had cause to wonder at his torrent-like power; for we are not carried away by mere conviction but by impassioned conviction. Now it is indeed true, that he always satisfies the requisitions of the understanding,—nay, that he usually puts his thoughts into the enthymematic form. But is it a fact that thought is incompatible with feeling? Rather, is not the connection of ideas a thread by which the fire of emotion runs down so much the easier? Is not feeling the nobler, and therefore the mightier also, in noble natures, the more it is borne up by thought? Is it not a modern judgment, that feeling necessarily presupposes confusion of thought? One may not indeed seek the softer and tenderer feelings in Demosthenes,—the struggle against Philip afforded him little opportunity for their unfolding. But if one seeks the strong, masculine feelings,—love for native country, enthusiasm for the glory of noble deeds, hatred against all that is wrong, indignation against selfishness and perfidy,—the words of Demosthenes, more than any other human words, are pervaded by the fire of those affections; and it still glows on in them, notwithstanding the lapse of so many centuries, enough to fire every noble heart.

To this perfection of Matter, in Demosthenes, perfection of Form is correspondent. The highest praise, in this respect, is ascribed to him by the critics of antiquity, especially by Dionysius. His style, says this critic, is not the rough and hard style of Thucydides, nor the soft and polished style of Isocrates, but he struck a happy mean between both. In this he is to be compared with Sophocles, who stands in a similar relation to Aeschylus on the one hand, and Euripides on the other. In fact, confinement to one of either of these two extremes would have been a onesidedness highly prejudicial to an orator who was to call up, and delineate the most diverse emotions. This freedom which Demosthenes aims at, and reaches, is nevertheless not licentiousness. On the contrary, his prose is, in its kind, as perfect and finished as metrical composition. For example, the greatest attention is bestowed by Demosthenes upon the sequence of long and short syllables; not in order to produce a regularly recurring metre, but in order to express the most diverse emotions of the mind by a suitable and ever varying rhythm. It may be remarked in general, that by the study of Demosthenes and the ancient critics, we are introduced to marvels of prose style at which we cannot but be astonished. The exhibition of them would be impossible without the aid of the Greek originals, and would exceed our design in this sketch. As, in Demosthenes, the prose rhythm never passes over into a poetical metre, so also his language, as to its elements, never loses itself in the sphere of poetry, but remains, as the language of rhetorical discourse ever should, that of common life and cultivated society; and the uncommon charm of this rhetorical prose lies precisely in the fact, that these simple elements of speech are treated with the same care which, usually, only the poet is wont to devote to diction. Demosthenes himself was well aware of this study which he bestowed upon his style, and he required it of the orator. It is not enough, said he, that the orator in order to prepare for delivery in public, *write* down his thoughts; he must as it were, have *sculptured them in brass*.* The comparison of prose composition with sculpture appears to have been a favorite one with the ancient critics generally, as Dionysius also remarks of Demosthenes, Plato, and Isocrates, “their productions were not so much works of writing, as of carving and embossing.”† The modern

* *Dicet scripta quam res patietur plurima, et, ut Demosthenes ait, si contingit, et sculpta.* — Quintilian, XII. 9, 16.

† *Αλλως τέ καὶ τῶν τότε ανθρώπων οὐ γραπτοῖς, ἀλλὰ γλυπτοῖς καὶ τορευτοῖς ἐσίκεται ἐκφερόντων λόγους.* Dionysius, *De compositione verborum* XXV.

world takes a totally different view of this subject. It is of opinion that he who is entirely filled with his idea cannot possibly expend so great care upon the Form; and, in the instance of the orator particularly, any art shown in style is a sign that he is less anxious for the profit of his hearers, than for their applause. But, on the contrary, one might ask whether such care expended upon the Form is not necessary for the very sake of the Matter,—necessary in order to present it to the view of the hearer in untroubled purity and clearness? We seem to assume, that in such sedulousness, Form and Matter must necessarily separate from each other, and the Form become a thing for and by itself, which we seek to adorn, without regard to the Matter. But that this is by no means necessary, the example of Demosthenes proves, against whom, most certainly, this objection cannot be brought. On the contrary, the fault, which the Moderns too frequently commit, of giving the Form an ornament independent of the Matter, is not to be imputed to art, but to the want of art; for in the estimation of true art, the most perfect Form is nothing but the clearest and boldest translucence of the Material itself."

Lord Brougham also notices this attention to diction by the great orators of antiquity, in his "*Dissertation upon the Eloquence of the Ancients.*" "We perceive," he remarks, "the exquisite care taken by the ancient orators to strike and to please their audience, in the attention paid by them to the rythm or numbers of their periods. In the ancient institutes of Rhetoric, that subject forms a separate and important head, which, or even the mention of which, would scarcely be borne among us. It must at the same time be observed, that although we are so suspicious of whatever would give an appearance of theatrical display to the business of debate, our greatest orators, nevertheless, have excelled by a careful attention to rythm, and some of the finest passages of modern eloquence owe their unparalleled success undeniably to the adoption of those Iambic measures which thrilled and delighted the Roman Forum, and the Dactylus and Paeonicus, which were the luxury of the Attic Ecclesia. Witness the former in Mr. Erskines celebrated passage respecting the Indian chief, and the latter in Mr. Grattan's peroration to his speech on Irish independence."

NOTE II. Page 185.

“It is a common thing,” says *Lord Brougham*, “with those who, because Cicero is more ornate, suffers the artifice of his composition to appear more plainly, and indulges more in amplification, imagine that he is less argumentative than the Greek orators, to represent the latter, and especially Demosthenes, as distinguished by great closeness of reasoning. If by this is only meant that he never wanders from the subject, that each remark tells upon the matter in hand, that all his illustrations are brought to bear upon the point, and that he is never found making any step, in any direction, which does not advance his main object, and lead towards the conclusion to which he is striving to bring his hearers, the observation is perfectly just; for this is a distinguishing feature in the character of his eloquence. It is not, indeed, his grand excellence, because everything depends upon the *manner* in which he pursues this course, the course itself being one quite as open to the humblest mediocrity as to the highest genius. But if it is meant to be said that those Attic orators, and especially their great chief, made speeches in which *long chains of elaborate reasoning* are to be found, nothing can be less like the truth. A variety of topics are handled in succession, all calculated to strike the audience. Passions which predominated in their minds are appealed to, feelings easily excited among them are aroused by skilful allusions, glaring inconsistencies are shown in the advice given by others, sometimes by exhibiting the repugnance of those councils among themselves, sometimes contrasting them with other counsels proceeding from the same quarters. The pernicious tendency of certain measures is displayed by referring, sometimes to the general principles of human action, and the course which human affairs usually take; more frequently, by a reference to the history of past, and generally of very recent events. Much invective is mixed with these topics, and both the enemy without, and the evil counsellor within the walls, are unsparingly dealt with. The orator was addressing hearers who were for the most part as intimately acquainted as himself with all the facts of the case, and these lay within a sufficiently narrow compass, being the actual state of public affairs, and the victories or the defeats which had, within the memory of all, attended their arms, or the transactions which had taken place among them in very recent times. No detailed statements

were therefore wanted for their information. He was really speaking to them respecting their own affairs, or rather respecting what they had just been doing or witnessing themselves. Hence a very short allusion alone was generally required to raise the idea which he desired to present before his audience. Sometimes a word was enough for his purpose ; the naming of a man or a town ; the calling to their recollection what had been done by the one, or had happened to the other. The effect produced by such a rapid interchange of ideas and impressions, must have struck every one who has been present at public meetings. He will have remarked that some such apt allusion has a power, produces an electrical effect, not to be reached by any chain of reasoning, however close, and that even the most highly wrought passages, and the most exquisite composition, fall far short of it in rousing or controlling the minds of a large assembly. Chains of reasoning, examples of fine argumentation, are calculated to produce their effect upon a far nicer, a more confined, and a more select audience. But such apposite allusions, such appropriate topics, such happy hits, (to use a homely but expressive phrase), have a sure, an irresistible, a magical effect upon a popular assembly. — *Dissertation on the Eloquence of the Ancients.*

QUESTIONS.

MENTION the primary characteristics of Eloquence. Which one is to be selected as furnishing its fundamental and constituent principle ? Practical effect of selecting either of its other affinities as its fundamental principle ? Distinctive difference between a product within the provinces of philosophy and poetry, and one within that of practical life ? Proof from the examples of Sophocles and Demosthenes, that the productive agency of the orator lies in the sphere of active life ? Inference from this with regard to the essential nature of Eloquence ?

What is meant by saying that Eloquence is a Virtue ? Relation of knowledge, culture, and special training, to Eloquence ? Illustrate by reference to the art of painting. Explain the relation of the orator to the hearer, and the consequent nature of the influence he is to exert upon him. State the highest and most general law of Eloquence. Mention the general Ideas to be assumed by the orator as necessarily existing in every hearer. Particular modifications which they undergo in the spheres of Church and State ?

Mention the three species of orations assumed by the Ancient Rhetoricians. Coincidence of this division with the theory of the Author ? Connection between the Ethical theory of Eloquence, and the success of the Orator ? Reasons why an appeal to the Passions is not so likely to succeed, as an address to the Moral Ideas ? Mention the subordinate Ideas or Categories. Explain the manner in which they enter into the structure of an oration. The particular species of oration in which each is prominent ? Effect of making either one of them *predominant* in an oration ?

Distinction between the Rhetorical and the Philosophical presentation of truth ? Does the oration admit of a strictly philosophical demonstration of truth ? How is truth to be established in Rhetorical discourse ? Define the term *popularity*, in relation to the orator. Connection of morality, or strength of character, in the orator, with the existence of this quality in the oration ? Relation of the above-mentioned Ideas and Categories to the Plan and Division of an oration ? Advantage of this method of constructing the doctrine of the Plan ? Define the simple oration ; the complex. Define the Exordium. Its distinguishing characteristics ? What tends to lengthen the Exordium ? Is practice to be uniform with regard to the preānnouncement of the parts of the development in an oration ? Did the Ancients observe this practice ? Why ? Principle upon which the division of the simple oration should proceed ? Illustrate by a sermon of Reinhardt. What peculiarity in the manner of announcing the division, in the French

preachers ? Effect liable to result from this ? How many parts has the complex oration ? Relation of the Will and Character to Eloquence ? Illustrate by the examples of Demosthenes, and the younger Cato. Definition of the Orator by the elder Cato, according to Quintilian ?

Define Elocution or Style, in distinction from Invention. Faults in the treatment of this part of Rhetoric, by the Ancients ? Peculiarity in the circumstances of the Ancient Orator, contributing to this ? Example of Demosthenes, in regard to the employment of artifices in Elocution ? Distinction between Affection and Passion ? To what must the orator confine himself, in case he does not awaken and address the Affections of his hearers ? Consequences of this ? Connection between Affection and Action in the hearer ? By what Idea are the affections of Zeal, Shame, Penitence, and Anger generated ? How may they degenerate into Passions ? Defect in Aristotle's treatment of this part of the subject ? Define Wit in relation to Affection and Enthusiasm. What consequently is its general relation to Eloquence ? The most valid reason for employing it, mentioned by Cicero ? Confirmation of this view of Wit, derived from a comparison of Demosthenes with Cicero ?

Why may not the Philosophical, or the Poetical, presentation of thought, be employed by the orator, in order to produce Affection in the hearer ? Mention the three Laws which impel and regulate the Rhetorical presentation of thought. Define the law of Adaptation. Essential nature of this law, and its connection with Affection in the hearer ? What does this law prescribe with respect to the hearer's power of comprehension ? With respect to language ? With respect to phrases and images ? Importance of knowledge and culture in this respect ? Mention the chief causes which prevent the orator from adapting his oration to the individuality of the hearer. How far may the orator venture, in dealing with the faults of his auditors ? Illustrate by Demosthenes, and the French preachers of the age of Louis XIV. Are brilliancy and high coloring characteristic of the highest style of Eloquence ? What examples in Ancient and Modern Oratory prove this ? Define the law of Constant Progress. Its essential nature ? Effect of a stop in the progress of an oration ? The surest means of securing constant progress ? Maxim in relation to the employment of Narration and Description ? Ground of the maxim ? What does the law of Constant Progress prescribe respecting the development of individual thoughts in an oration ? Management of arguments according to this law ? Relation of strength of Character, in the orator, to progress in the oration ? Define the law of Vivacity. Its essential nature ? The true source whence figures should be derived ? Distinctive difference between Poetical and Rhetorical tropes ? To what law is the employment of figures to be subjected ? Example of Demosthenes ? Distinctive difference between Prose and Poetry ? Between Number and Metre ? Explain the origin and construction of Prose on ethical principles.









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